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This dissertation shall examine the claim of John Scottus Eriugena, the ninth 
century Irish philosopher, that all things must ultimately return to unity with their creator. 
This is the ancient Greek theme of apokatastasis, which essentially means reconstitution 
in full to that which was primordial. A special case subsumed under the class of all things 
is that segment of mankind traditionally understood as being damned, or separated from 
God. Eriugena holds that no portion of mankind can be so separated for God, as the 
Word, received the entire human race, not a subset of it. 
Although sometimes thought to be at odds with Christianity, it is Eriugena‟s 
position that the restoration of separated souls should be embraced. The word 
apokatastasis appears in both the Old and New Testaments. The first reference is found 
in Malachi 4:2-6, and speaks of the divine bond between children and their fathers, a 
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theme which will have special significance in this dissertation. The New Testament 
reference is found in Acts 3:21, where Peter affirms that the restoration of all things was 
ordained before the world began. 
An additional question that this study seeks to answer is whether man is made 
happy in this restoration. Eriugena gives no clear resolution to this issue. His writing 
seems to contradict itself, and can reasonably be interpreted either way. Our answer is 
offered in the affirmative: man is made happy in his restoration. The final chapter of this 
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This dissertation will explore the position of the ninth century Irish philosopher, 
John Scottus Eriugena, and his work on the salvation of the damned. We will focus 
mainly on Book Five of his most noted work, the Periphyseon, however, his other 
writings on the subject will be examined as well. Eriugena holds that all men will gain 
salvation (Eriugena, Per, 1987, V, 923 C), but not complete salvation. In other words, all 
men will be restored to the original pristine condition that they enjoyed prior to their fall; 
however, they will remain unhappy, forced to suffer through the recollection of the evil 
that they worked while living their earthly lives (Eriugena, V, 944 D). 
Concerning the first issue, the salvation of all souls, it seems to us that Eriugena 
has offered some compelling arguments in support of his position. These arguments are 
advanced mainly within a Christian framework. Although our study should be of interest 
to non-Christians as well, it seems to us that Christianity, with its unique notion of grace, 
must confront the issue. 
Concerning the second question, the eternal torment or unhappiness of the saved, 
it is our position that Eriugena has failed to show that suffering can be experienced by a 
resurrected soul. The central argument that Eriugena uses to prove the former position 
tends to disprove the latter. The Word took all humanity upon Himself, not a subset of 
humanity (Eriugena, 923 C). Therefore, since man was essentially happy prior to the fall, 






Chapter I: Introduction 
John the Scot 
 
Eriugena was a Christian philosopher keenly influenced by his understanding of 
the Old and New Testaments. He also had an abiding respect for the authority of the 
Church Fathers as it had developed since the first century A.D. However, our aim is to 
present a study that will be of interest to both Christians and non-Christians. For the 
purposes of this study, we shall presuppose the immortality of the human soul and ask 
our reading audience to reflect upon this immortality. Could it be that some of the human 
race, and not others, are subject to eternal damnation at the end of their mortal lives? It is 
our position that Eriugena has answered this question in the negative, as well as 
providing a reasonable explanation as to why he is correct. In large measure, Eriugena 
took a position contrary to the established doctrine of the Western Church; a position 
perhaps best articulated by Augustine. In Book XXI of the City of God, Augustine states 
that “… the human race is cut in two, so that in one portion is displayed the power of 
merciful grace, in the other the power of just vengeance” (City of God, Bk. XXI, Ch. 12, 
75). The precise qualifications for entry into the former state remain unclear. Grace was 
of paramount importance, for all were worthy of just vengeance (City of God, Bk. XXI, 
Ch. 15, 77). Nor could the victory be “… gained truly and sincerely except by a delight in 
true righteousness and this comes by believing in Christ” (City of God, Bk. XXI, Ch. 16, 
101-102). In the end “… it is very hard to learn and ticklish to define what is the manner 
of life and what are the sins that stand in the way of reaching the Kingdom of God” (City 
of God, Bk. XXI, Ch. 27, 167). Perhaps it is better for us not to know; if we did, we 
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might tend to focus on the good works that secured our entrance into the blessed kingdom 
and neglect the true righteousness that attends a contrite heart (City of God, Bk. XXI, Ch. 
27, 167). 
Eriugena held a far less elitist position. He maintained that the human race cannot 
be cut in two because everyone in it is made in the image of the one unity that cannot be 
cut in two. To assert otherwise would be an admission that “… God the Word took upon 
Himself not the whole of human nature, but only a part of it, … which would be an 
absurd belief” (Periphyseon, Bk. V, 922 A). Evil men will not be punished, but the evil in 
them will be. “He [God] will rather extinguish in men their wickedness and impiety and 
baneful power… and… we may say that their eternal damnation will consist in the total 
abolition of their wickedness and impiety” (Periphyseon, Bk. V, 923 D). This ultimate 
restoration of every soul makes sense only in light of Eriugena‟s distinctive 
understanding of the relation between particulars and universals. We will discuss this 
point later, but for now it is sufficient to say that Eriugena advances an “…idealist system 
[which] is consistently the most radical in ancient or medieval philosophy…” (Moran, 
1989, 82). The human mind, as shown perfectly through the incarnation, contains all 
things as ideas, and this is their full reality.  
Eriugena maintained that all things, including man, must return to their original 
source. Created things descend “…through generation in space and time, and… when this 
sensible world comes to an end, they return once again to those causes from which they 
sprang…” (Periphyseon, Bk. V, 886 A). This is the ancient Greek theme of 
apokatastasis. Deirdre Carabine has noted that one of the most interesting aspects of 
Eriugena‟s philosophy is his integration of Eastern Greek thought with that of the Latin 
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West (Carabine, 2000, 20). Carabine‟s observation is especially valid with regard to our 
present topic, the salvation of the damned. We begin with a brief historical sketch. 
    One of the most decisive battles in world history occurred in 732 A.D. near 
Tours, a town in central France about one hundred twenty miles southwest of Paris. It 
was there that Charles Martel, leader of the Franks, defeated the Saracens, thus halting 
their military advance into central Europe. The Frankish victory provided the stability 
that enabled the rise of the Carolingian dynasty which was to become the central 
European political power for the next two centuries and would influence European 
culture and learning beyond that time frame. This was a bright period in the history of 
philosophy in which the Christian West tended to consolidate around its own tradition of 
Latin scholarship. The five monarchs of this dynasty were Charles Martel (688-741), 
Pepin III (714-7768), Charlemagne (742-814), Louis the Pious (778-840), and Charles 
the Bald (823-877) (Carabine, 2000, 8). 
It is this last monarch who provided the security and patronage that enabled John 
Scottus Eriugena to complete his greatest work, the Periphyseon, the focus of our study.  
This intellectual revival had its genesis with Charlemagne, whose interest in learning is 
well chronicled.  His famous capitulary of 789, the Admonitio Generalis, advised the 
cathedrals and monasteries to open schools with curriculums designed to advance 
theological scholarship.  Incidental to this effort was the teaching of grammar and 
arithmetic, which benefited all learning.  His close advisor was Alcuin of York, who laid 
the foundation of later medieval education in reliance on the seven liberal arts as outlined 
in the allegory, Marriage of Mercury and Philology by Martianus Capella.  Charles the 
Bald, grandson of Charlemagne, continued this legacy of scholarship.  Charles, like his 
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grandfather, gathered noted intellectuals to his court, among them Hincmar, Bishop of 
Reims, and John Scottus Eriugena from Ireland (Carabine, 8, 2000). 
Little is known of Eriugena‟s early life or education.  He refers to himself simply 
as “Eriugena,” a word which means born of Ireland.  It can be accepted that he was born 
circa 810, arrived at the Court of Charles the Bald in the 840‟s and is no longer heard 
from after 870.  Eriugena held no distinguished rank within the church, and perhaps no 
rank at all.  The most notable aspect of his education was his fluency in Greek, a very 
rare ability for his place and time.  How Eriugena could have acquired such fluency has 
been the topic of much speculation, and it now seems that this will always remain a 
mystery.  Undoubtedly, this ability in Greek increased his standing with his benefactor, 
Charles, who was very interested in Byzantine culture.  Around 860 A.D., Charles 
requested a translation from Greek into Latin of the works of the Pseudo-Dionysius, and 
this important task was entrusted to Eriugena.  It was thought at the time that Dionysius 
was the Apostle Paul‟s Athenian convert to Christianity mentioned in Acts 17: 34, 
thereby conveying great authority on the work.  However, two German scholars, Josef 
Stiglmayr and Hugo Koch, independently confirmed in 1895 that this was not the case.  
Nonetheless, the influence that the work of Dionysius was to have on later medieval 
scholars was great.  Additionally, Eriugena completed translations from two other Greek 
theologians: Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor.  All of these three were to 
have profound influence upon him as he worked through the various philosophical 
problems of the Periphyseon (Carabine, 16, 2000). 
Eriugena was said to have been interested in music and medicine.  He also 
authored several poems in celebration of major Christian festivals.  The New Testament 
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book of John seemed to have a special interest for him.  He wrote the Homily on the 
Prolougue of John and A Commentary on the Gospel of John (Carabine, 19, 2000).  
Perhaps his most uncelebrated work was The Treatise on Divine Predestination, 
commissioned by Hincmar around 851.  This writing can be said to be before its time.  
Like the Periphyseon, this treatise is original and bold: too bold for Hincmar.  We shall 
examine this work below but for now suffice it to say that On Predestination foreshadows 
the theme of apokatastasis advanced so capably in the Periphyseon.  All of these 
achievements seem much in keeping with Eriugena‟s skill with and love of the seven 
liberal arts (Carabine 15, 2000). 
The Periphyseon was begun around 864 and may be viewed as the culmination of 
Eriugena‟s mature thought.  The entire work is rendered in the form of a dialogue 
between a master (Nutritor) and his student (Alumnus).  One has the distinct feeling upon 
studying the text that this is Eriugena conversing with himself.  He asks the question, 
gives a response, then tests that response by advancing on it, refining it or sometimes 
asserting a contrary position.  The style is rather open and fluid in the manner of a 
Platonic dialogue rather than a systematic approach such as that employed by Aquinas in 
his Summa Theologia.  Eriugena‟s dialectical method is an effective way of advancing 
his ideas for two reasons. The first is technical, and is in accordance with all good 
philosophical literature. Dialectic is an art esteemed since the time of the ancient Greeks 
and “which is defined as the science of good disputation” (Periphyseon, Bk. V, 869 A). 
Second, and just as importantly, it is the way that God works through the creative 
process.  This art “did not arise from human contrivances, but was first implanted in 
nature by the originator of all the arts” (Periphyseon, Bk. IV, 749 A ). In other words, 
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Eriugena could claim that the Periphyseon is itself an image, albeit a secondary and latent 
one, of the created universe.  
The Periphyseon consists of five books, each of the first four dealing roughly with 
Eriugena‟s four divisions of nature: that which creates and is not created, that which is 
created and creates, that which is created and does not create, and that which neither 
creates nor is created. The fifth book is the most lengthy and discourses more fully on the 
fourth division. The fourth division is thus the most important since it is the end to which 
the others resolve; that which neither is created nor creates. Here we discern the theme of 
apokatastasis, that of all things returning to their source. All nature must return to God, 
for God alone endows it with value. Specifically, in our study we treat only one small 
subset of nature: man. All men must return to God, otherwise they cannot be men.  Of 
course, we must say at the outset the word “man,” as used hereafter, does not mean male, 
but humankind both collectively and distributively. It must be noted that for Eriugena, 
gender is accidental. We adopt this convention merely for simplicity and consistency 
with the text of the Periphyseon. 
The seven major influences, which we discuss below, are readily apparent in the 
Periphyseon.  Eriugena‟s command of the mathematical arts of the quadrivium 
(arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy), as well as his talent with the linguistic arts 
of the trivium (grammar, dialectic and rhetoric), are always apparent.  Throughout the 
Periphyseon he calls upon authority.  The most prolific references are to the scriptures of 
both the Old and New Testaments.  Additionally, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, 
Dionysius and Maximus are often cited.  These will each be dealt with below, but for 
now suffice it to say that Eriugena rarely disagrees with any of these sources.  He does, 
8 
 
however, often disagree with the interpretation that others have given to them.  This is 
especially true with regard to the scriptures and the writings of Augustine.   
Despite the excellence of the work, Eriugena has never received just recognition 
for it.  He seems to have had only slight influence on the later medieval philosophers. The 
noted scholars of the later Middle Ages, such as Anselm, Albert the Great, Thomas 
Aquinas, and Bonaventure, rarely mention Eriugena (Bett, 1964, 174). We can, however, 
reasonably claim that his influence has been appreciably greater than generally thought. 
This is mainly due to the work of Honorious of Autun, who wrote a summary of the 
Periphyseon called the Clavis Physicae circa 1125-1130 A.D. Through this summary, as 
well as through the translation works of Eriugena, currents of his thought can readily be 
discerned in the writings of Robert Grosseteste (1168-1253), Meister Eckhart of 
Hochheim (1260-1329), and Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) (Moran, 1989, 274-279). The 
Periphyseon was actually condemned in 1050, 1059, 1210, and 1225.  The first 
publication of the work was made at Oxford by Thomas Gale in 1681.  Only three years 
later it was placed on an index of prohibited books  (Carabine, 23, 2000).  As evidenced 
below, one reason for these censures is the topic of our study, “Salvation of the Damned.”  
Eriugena holds that all things must return and be united with their source, and this 
includes man.  Indeed, it includes man prior to all other things.  Over the centuries, the 
Roman Catholic Church has said that this position is not doctrinally correct. This may be 
found as early as 543 A. D. in the Canons of the Provincial Council of Constantinople 
which held that any man who claimed that the “punishment of devils and wicked men is 
temporary and will eventually cease”…or that the “ungodly will be completely restored” 
was anathema  (Clarkson, Edwards, Kelly, Welsh, 345, 1955).  And again in the 
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Athanasian Creed of the 5th century “…those who have done evil will go into everlasting 
fire”  (Clark, Edwards, Kelly, Welsh, 6, 1955). The Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 A. D. 
declared a “perpetual punishment with the devil” for the wicked, and that anyone who 
dies  “…unrepentant in the state of mortal sin, he will undoubtedly be tormented forever 
in the fires of an everlasting hell”  (Clark, Edwards, Kelly, Welsh, 348, 1955).  And 
perhaps, most of all, the venerated Augustine wrote an entire book on the eternal 
punishment for the damned, namely Book XXI, in the City of God, 413-426 A. D.   Just 
and certain recompense for the unsaved was to be material, fiery yet unconsuming, 
excruciatingly painful and eternal.  Moreover, “…many more are left under punishment 
than are delivered from it, in order that it may thus be shown what was due to all”  
(Augustine,  City of God, 1948, Bk. XXI, Ch. 12).  Eriugena would answer that none are 
left under punishment, all are delivered from it, in order that it may thus be shown what 
was due to all.  We may admire the eloquence of Augustine, but dispute the logic.  His 
statement is inherently concerned with justice and it holds that all men are pronounced 
guilty because of their earthly origin. “That the whole human race has been condemned 
in its first origin this life itself… bears witness by the host of cruel ills with which it is 
filled” (Augustine, City of God, 1997, Bk. XXII, Ch. 22, 194). All men are children of 
Adam, thus all are justly condemned, according to this text. But if this were so, then all 
must be left under punishment in order to show what was due to all. This topic will be 
more fully addressed in Chapter IV. It is sufficient to say for now that if all men have 
equal status, as being in God‟s image entitles them, then redemption is accidental under 
the Augustinian explanation.  Eriugena presupposes that God‟s justice is circumscribed 
by his nature.  Moreover, His nature and His will are one and the same.  Is it not God‟s 
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will that “none should perish?” Of course, there was a great deal of controversy in the 
Middle Ages over whether God‟s nature and will were one and the same. This question 
will be dealt with in Chapter V.  
 
The Problem to be Investigated: The Salvation of the Damned 
The New Testament is replete with statements that speak to the universality of 
redemption as well as statements to the contrary.  We must therefore use our reason as 
best we can to decipher God‟s intention. 
“For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive”  (I Corinthians 
15: 22, King James Version).  In this most unequivocal statement, St. Paul seems to be 
asserting that all men are raised in incorruptible glory.  The all-inclusive claim to life can 
immediately be discerned, and is often reinforced in other passages of the New 
Testament, such as Ephesians 1:10 and Luke 15:4-6. If the Word, in becoming incarnate, 
took away “the sins of the world” (John 1: 9, KJV), how can anyone remain eternally in 
darkness?  If His mission was to “seek and save that which was lost” (Luke 19: 10, KJV), 
how can that mission not be completed in absolute fullness? 
Eriugena sees the Word as being in the world and providing truth (light) to it long 
before, during, and long after He was perceived in it.  The Word eternally, albeit 
mysteriously, precedes the matter into which He descends.  The Word became manifest 
in the world in time to save all that live in the world through time.  Not all are raised to 
the same degree of beatitude, but all are restored to the original pristine nature from 
which they came (Carabine, 97, 2000). To claim otherwise is to assert that the very nature 
of Christ is other than what it is.  The temporal part of His mission bears witness to an 
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eternal saving reality.  Since God is unbound by time, He knows the future with the same 
certainty that He knows the present and past.  God‟s knowledge is His predestiny, one 
with Himself, thus His plans are neither contingent nor unfulfilled.  Therefore, His plan 
for every man is sure and cannot be undone. 
Moreover, Eriugena fully accepts the idea, as advanced by Augustine, that evil 
has no positive force; elementally it is a privation only. This is not to say that evil, as the 
opposite of good, is infinite as goodness is infinite. When we speak of something being 
finite or infinite we are usually speaking with respect to some magnitude of that thing, as 
opposed to its substance. Augustine‟s position is that evil has no substance. It exists only 
as a privation of good, which does have substance. Similar to darkness, which has no 
existence apart from light, evil has no existence apart from good. Thus, speaking strictly, 
God does not even know evil; He knows it only by contrariety (Eriugena, Treatise on 
Divine Predestination, 1998, Ch. 1, 8).  The notion of eternal punishment in recompense 
for finite, albeit grossly magnified sin, seems quite unjust.  Following with Augustine, as 
the latter had written in On Free Choice of the Will, the sole cause of any evil act is the 
evil which underlies it (Augustine, Free Choice, 1964, Bk. 3, Ch. XVII, 126). One could 
ask if the evil which underlies the act is merely the will‟s object, or the will itself. Our 
answer is that it is the will itself, but ultimately, these are one and the same.  The 
instruments of operation, whatever they be, are without blame.  Eriugena reasons that, as 
a good earthly judge seeks to punish only the evil will, a divine one would do the same.  
The just punishment for the evil-doer is to take away his ability to sin.  Unlike the earthly 
judge, this is small work for God; He can accomplish it most thoroughly in an instant. He 
simply takes away the evil will.  This is the justice and the circumscribed punishment.  
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Take the desire to sin away from the sinner and he is rendered helpless, for to sin is all he 
wants.  The central question remains, is the sinner rendered happy in the process?  It 
appears so.  However, this question will remain unanswered for now. 
Avital Wohlman has written an article entitled “John Scottus Eriugena, a 
Christian Philosopher,” in which she asserts that the entire Periphyseon may be 
characterized as a commentary on I Corinthians 15:28, which states, “God may be all in 
all.” Most people would agree with the statement, when taken broadly and viewed from 
the perspective of the subject. However, some would likely be troubled if the statement is 
interpreted to mean that each and every human being is ultimately reconciled to God. In 
other words, when the general principle of unification with God descends into particulars 
to include those who seem unworthy of salvation, “all hell breaks loose,” both literally 
and metaphorically. For this reason we focus on the special problem of salvation for the 
damned. 
As Wohlman has pointed out, Eriugena has appropriated from Augustine the 
notion that true philosophy, namely Neoplatonism, is true religion. Yet it seems very 
likely that if the great pagan Neoplatonists were to return to this life they would be 
resistant to conversion. If this is so, then a radical difference must exist between the 
truths of philosophy and those of religion (Wohlman, 2005, 637).While we cannot 
necessarily agree that a radical difference exists between the truths of philosophy and 
those of religion, we do affirm that one‟s traditions, culture, and education greatly 
influence the discernment of truth. It would seem that a better understanding of both 
disciplines would yield a better grasp of truth. After all, both disciplines ultimately seek 
it. We hold that this harmony is attainable because Christianity is not a philosophy, but 
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rather a fundamental set of beliefs. Of course, both the theologian and the philosopher 
seek the same thing, but they seek it through different avenues. Because this is a 
dissertation in philosophy, we do not seek to challenge the tenets of faith. We assert only 
that once those are accepted, philosophy, as the final arbiter of reason, can find particular 
answers to questions that always remain outside the axioms of faith. It is a valuable effort 
to undertake because the correct solution advances the interests of both disciplines. 
Augustine and Eriugena were similarly inspired by the mysteries of man‟s fall and 
God‟s incarnation through the Word that was intended for man‟s final salvation. Both 
used Neoplatonic concepts to explain their view of the created order. Augustine seemed 
especially sensitive to the pathos of sin and redemption as it was experienced in human 
life. Eriugena was attuned to the signature which the Creator had manifested in the 
corporeal universe as a clear indication of His redemptive intention. This intention was 
discernible through true philosophy as well as true religion. Eriugena‟s purpose was to 
uncover this signature in his philosophical as well as his polemic works (Wohlman, 2005, 
639).  
Wohlman holds that the problem of salvation for the damned is solved by 
Eriugena‟s postulation of a two-fold conception of grace  (Wohlman, 2005, 640). The 
first is terrestrial and ethical, the second is spiritual and ontological. Therefore, we can 
agree with the above statement, and we defer to our later discussion of datum and donum. 
The second part is the major contribution of Eriugena. It originated with the Eastern 
Fathers, was given definition by Eriugena, and has been passed to the West through his 
writing. This will be the major focus of our study as well. 
Can this mean that the fulfillment of the second aspect of grace takes away the 
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notion of free will? Wohlman seems to think so, and here her thinking parts company 
with this dissertation. She cites examples from the Republic, the Laches, and the 
Phaedrus, where Plato always stressed that men could freely choose to do ill (Wohlman, 
2005, 648). Yet we note that in these examples the characters had no sure knowledge of 
what good and ill were. We suggest here that perhaps always choosing the good in 
accordance with sure knowledge is not a violation of the principle of free will. Of course, 
we can never have the absolute knowledge that God has. However, it is possible for man 
to have sufficient surety of knowledge to enable him to always choose correctly, as well 
as freely.      
Influences 
Since the views of every philosopher are to some degree shaped by his 
predecessors, we will begin by outlining Eriugena‟s most influential sources. It seems 
especially important to show how these sources are significant in relation to the question 
at hand: salvation for the damned. They will be addressed in chronological order. The 
first is not a philosopher at all, but a mind-set: a disposition to view the seven liberal arts 
as a method through which the answer to any question could be found.  We list this first 
because Eriugena considered it to be eternal.  Although these seven arts had been studied 
since antiquity, they were given special attention by the Latin Neoplatonist, Martianus 
Capella, in his allegorical work, The Marriage of Philology and Mercury.  It was written 
circa 410-427 A. D., and was widely available to, and emphasized by, the monastic 
schools of the early Middle Ages.  The arts were studied in the order of grammar, 
rhetoric, dialectic, arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy.  The first three literary 
arts were called the trivium and the final four mathematical arts were called the 
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quadrivium.  First and foremost, Eriugena was a teacher of them and had written a 
commentary on Capella‟s work circa 845 (Carabine, 15, 2000).  He is quite eloquent in 
the adoption of them and makes it clear that they are the foundation of all knowledge 
(Eriugena, Bk. 1, 475A- 475B). All of the seven arts are keys used to unlock the wisdom 
hidden within scripture.  Scripture was revealed holy and absolute, but it was written 
metaphorically owing to our own limitations of understanding.  The liberal arts are 
eternal and reside in the soul, they are discovered as opposed to invented.  They are 
termed “liberal” because they tend to free the mind or liberate it from material 
constraints. 
Historically, the arts can be viewed as having their genesis in ancient Greece, for 
it was there that the initial systematic treatises of the arts were formulated. The arts 
quickly became integrated into the educational communities of the era, and gained an 
esteem recognized universally for many centuries. They were the framework of the 
curriculum in the ancient Greek schools and this continued through the Roman 
ascendancy, as it was customary for the children of the patrician class to be educated in 
Greece.  Even the practical Romans seemed to value what most parents want for their 
legacy, a knowledge essentially grounded in something higher than the material.  Thus, 
the arts continued to profoundly influence the Latin scholars and perhaps the most 
notable example here is Boethius (480-524 A.D). His works on music (De Instituitione 
Musica) and arithmetic (De Institutione Arithetica Libri Duo) were to have significant 
influence throughout the Middle Ages (Eco, 1959, 10, 30-31). The culminating 
codification of the liberal arts was accomplished by Martianus Capella in his allegory, 
The Marriage of Philology and Mercury.  Martianus was most probably a Carthaginian 
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who wrote in the middle part of the fifth century.  The work is hardly systematic and 
seldom rises above an elementary level.  Yet it was widely available to the Carolingian 
scholars and represented their most complete source of secular knowledge (Moran, 1989, 
40).  In the allegory, the god Mercury is betrothed to Philology, a mortal, yet very wise 
and learned woman.  After receiving a magic clock from her mother to protect her, and a 
potion from her sister to make her immortal, Philology traverses the heavens until she 
arrives at Jupiter‟s palace in the Milky Way.  The wedding guests are gods and 
philosophers, all assembled to bestow their blessing.  Philology is attended by the seven 
liberal arts as bridesmaids, each of whom confers a dowry and gives a speech concerning 
her respective art.  The marriage symbolizes the ultimate union of god and man, 
eloquence and knowledge, the return of the soul to its native home. 
There has always been a privileged connection between the study of philosophy 
and that of the liberal arts.  It was not until the rise of the Scholastics in the thirteenth 
century that this close bond began to be questioned.  In some quarters it remains strong 
even today. However, for Eriugena and his contemporaries this connection was 
axiomatic.  Philosophy was the study of wisdom, or as Augustine famously said in his 
Against the Academicians, the knowledge of things human and divine (Augustine, A.A., 
1957, Bk. 1, Ch. 16, 25).  For the Latin encyclopediasts, this meant that philosophy must 
comport with a broad understanding of all things, not just art and science but religion and 
theology as well.  This tradition passed naturally to the Carolingians, and to none more so 
than to Eriugena.  The seven liberal arts were considered as seven pillars of wisdom, so 
anyone contemplating the study of philosophy must first and concurrently study the 
liberal arts (Moran, 1989, 128). 
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Eriugena views the arts as being one with the Logos, Christ himself.  This point 
must be underscored for the remainder of our study: all truth is derivative of the 
incarnation.  In other words, when Euclid stated his first postulate circa 300 BC, two 
points determine a line, he was somehow mysteriously manifesting a truth the basis of 
which would not be revealed for another three centuries.  How could Euclid possibly 
know this?  He discovered it through the study of geometry which precedes the man, 
Jesus of Nazareth, in time yet succeeds the Logos by nature.  We reiterate that all truth 
that man can lay claim to is lesser than, posterior to, or derivative of that ultimate truth of 
the Logos.  In order for the conventional view of redemption to hold, the traditionalist 
must ground his thinking on the proposition that man can discern secondary truth while 
rejecting the primary from whence it comes.  Eriugena views this proposition as 
unreasonable. We will discuss this topic more fully in Chapter 3. However, it is sufficient 
to say for the time being that man can never know God in Himself. God is known through 
theophanies, or “…manifestations which are comprehensible to the intellectual nature…” 
(Eriugena, Bk. I, 446 C). In this life, theophanies can be received without the receiver 
knowing their reasons; hence, the mathematician can know mathematics without grasping 
the origin of numbers. However, in the life to come, man will know more in the sense 
that he will know both the theophanies and their source. When man is restored to the 
original state of his nature, he will have knowledge which equals that of angels, “…for he 
will have a Gnostic science of reasons in the things that are…” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 535 A). 
In other words, although man cannot know the Logos in itself, even in the life to come, 
he will surely know then what he may not know now: that the Logos is the original truth 
of everything else. In this life, man can, of course, become confounded by the order, in 
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that he can attain knowledge of the arts before attaining knowledge of the Originator.  
Indeed he can get disordered just as easily as if he had mastered music before rhetoric.  
However, he cannot deny the source of the arts altogether.  Ultimately he must accept it, 
for in so doing he is only laying claim to his own rationality.  The liberal arts are not 
merely something we know, i.e., what we know, but they are how and why we know. 
The Carolingians considered the arts to be eternal, complete and unchanging 
exemplars of knowledge.  They were seen as an aid to man through which knowledge of 
the highest truth, that of their source, was restored.  Through the fall, man turned away 
from God but not from the arts.  Man always discovers them; he cannot create them.  Let 
us return again to Euclid and his Elements.  We may say with the highest degree of 
known certainty that he discovered his first four postulates and formulated them 
correctly.  We cannot safely claim the same certainty with Euclid‟s fifth, the parallel line 
postulate. It was immediately challenged, and remains in doubt to this day, proving itself 
valid in some contexts and invalid in others. 
No other scholar of the time and perhaps none of any time consider the liberal arts 
to be of such vital importance to the study of philosophy and for human life in general as 
Eriugena (Moran, 1989, 130). The arts are so intrinsically bound to the mind that they are 
mind.  They equip the mind to remember itself; to recollect the pristine nature that it 
enjoyed prior to the fall.  In truth, they enable the soul to rest secure in the assurance of 
its own immortality.  They liberate the mind from its earthly constraints and raise it to an 
ideal realm of eternal and unchanging truth. The general framework of this Carolingian‟s 
thought with regard to the arts was grounded in Augustine, but Eriugena goes further.  
The arts transcend the mind, but the mind is co-eternal with the arts.  Both share in and 
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partake of God‟s eternal knowledge which is, of course, God, Himself.  For the sake of 
convention, we treat the arts in the order that they were traditionally studied in the 
medieval schools. 
“Grammar is the art which protects and controls articulate speech”  (Eriugena, Bk. 
I, 475A). It begins with the letter from which all words are derived and into which it is 
analyzed (Burch, 1951, 10). Grammar formed the basic discipline of the trivium, and a 
young student was advised to focus upon it until the age of fourteen.  Only after 
mastering grammar could the student proceed to the study of rhetoric and dialectic  
(Wagner, 1983, 59). There were two central approaches for the subject, one tutorial, the 
other philosophical, and it is the latter which is of interest here for it is the one Eriugena 
refers to.  Grammar for the philosopher of the Middle Ages had an inherently universal 
content and was not the unique province of one specific language.  Like the other six arts, 
grammar resided in the soul.  Whenever the bridesmaid of grammar accepted students, 
she would appeal to the “powers of reasoning” (Martianus, Bk. III, 66),  and she “firmly 
held the different classes of things and the words for them”  (Martianus, Bk. III, 66). Her 
duties were to ensure truthful reading, writing, then understanding and criticizing.   
“Rhetoric is the art which carries out a full and elaborate examination of a set 
topic…”  (Eriugena, Bk. 1, 475A). It begins with the questions from which an argument 
is built and then resolved into (Burch, 1951, 10).  Of course, for the early Middle Ages, 
rhetoric had become synonymous with the works of Cicero.  His De Inventione had 
become an accepted canonical work by the second century and this continued through the 
Carolingian period.  In some ways, the art of rhetoric was even heightened following the 
collapse of the empire because when Rome fell, the orator and his narrow specialty also 
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fell.  The rhetorician could no longer appeal to the beauty of spoken eloquence.  Thus, the 
period of late antiquity saw the rise of figures such as Augustine and Boethius, scholars 
highly skilled in the broader elements of arrangement, style, and originality (Wagner, 
1983, 97-99). In the common parlance of modern America, the word rhetoric is more 
often used as a pejorative word.  This is unfortunate because for several centuries it was 
considered the highest art.  The bridesmaid says “I am a virtue, a study, a science. … A 
science because I am the object of teaching … a virtue in that I possess the knowledge of 
how to speak well … a study in that I can be learned” (Martianus, Bk. V, 160). Her duty 
was to persuade through appropriate speech, and that speech must first and foremost be 
truthful.  “It was worth even the gods‟ efforts to hear such genius of argument, so rich a 
wealth of diction, so vast a store of memory and recollection”  (Martianus, Bk. V, 157). 
Continuing on, we come to dialectic, the crown jewel of the trivium.  It is the “art 
which diligently investigates the rational, common concepts of the mind”  (Eriugena, Bk. 
1, 475A).  It begins with the essence from which all forms proceed and into which they 
return (Burch, 1951, 10). There can be little doubt that Eriugena considers this the highest 
art.  He speaks about it more than the other six and indeed the Periphyseon itself can be 
viewed as a five book exercise in dialectic.  This is the one art that seems to most fully 
echo the work of God himself through His creative, sustaining and perfecting process.  It 
did not arise from human contrivance but rather was “… implanted in nature by the 
originator of all arts…”  (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 749A). Indeed, many philosophers, including 
Aristotle, have held that grammar and rhetoric are branches of dialectic (Eriugena, Bk. 
IV, 869D). This is the high art of good disputation first discovered by the Greeks         
“… from which every division and every multiplication of those things which the art 
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discusses takes its origin… “ then by intelligible rules of synthesis, it returns to the same 
origin always seeking that “… in which it yearns to rest forever…” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 
869A). For Eriugena, dialectic is the never ending manifestation of the Logos.  This art 
seems to have the highest place for all philosophers.  Indeed as the bridesmaid says “… 
there are six canons on which the other disciplines rely, and they are all under my power 
and authority”  (Martianus, Bk. IV, 110). Of course, she is not immediately impressive 
for she is revealed only though labored study and long contemplation.  At the wedding 
ceremony, Jupiter, himself, waits on her alone and is silent.  “And many of the gods, who 
had at first laughed at her, trembled before her” (Martianus, 154). 
We underscore the paramount importance of the liberal arts in the method of 
Eriugena, with dialectic being the highest art. Much of this is derived from Maximus, 
according to Catherine Kavanaugh in her article, “The Influence of Maximus on 
Eriugena‟s Treatment of Aristotle‟s Categories.” She highlights a tension in the thought 
of Maximus that was largely passed on in Eriugena, and this was a healthy respect for the 
cogency of Aristotle‟s logic, laid on top of a Platonic metaphysical framework. Maximus 
was a true Neoplatonist who held no sympathy with Aristotelian thought in general, but 
he did recognize the forceful, convincing nature of the logic of the Prior Analytics 
(Kavanaugh, 2005, 570). Later, we will also see that Eriugena has a formulation of time 
which is very similar, although slightly more nuanced, than that of Aristotle. 
The categories, as formulated by Aristotle, are an essential element in Eriugena‟s 
philosophical system. Our philosopher, at heart a Neoplatonist, can effectively employ 
them because, for him, dialectic is more than a mere function of language: it is the 
fundamental framework of all reality. As we have noted earlier, to engage in dialectic is 
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to communicate with the Word. Eriugena comments on the ten categories in Book I, parts 
463 A through 524 B of the Periphyseon. They pertain to created things that come after 
God. He holds that nothing can be found in created nature or in the various 
comprehensions of human minds which is not contained in one of these categories. There 
are innumerable subdivisions of the basic ten, and it is the function of that branch of 
philosophy termed dialectic to analyze and synthesize this complex framework. We may 
note immediately that the categories cannot apply to Eriugena‟s first and fourth divisions 
of nature. 
Aristotle‟s treatise on the Categories has been very important in the history of 
Western philosophy. In the traditional order, it comprises the first six parts of the 
Organon. Those in the Platonic and Neoplatonic camps have not always been in 
agreement with Aristotle‟s teaching. The various interpretations of the Categories have 
generally fallen into one of four types: the grammatical, the ontological, the logical, and 
the inclusive (Evangeliou, 1988, 29-32).  We focus here on the two most germane to our 
study, the ontological and the inclusive. Plotinus held to the former interpretation, and 
criticized the Categories in Book VI of his Enneads. He held that the Categories did not 
apply to the intelligible realm of being and had to be modified even to apply to the 
sensible realm (Evangeliou, 94). His most noted disciple, Porphry, advanced the inclusive 
interpretation, thereby achieving something of a reconciliation between Aristotileanism 
and Platonism. Eriugena accepts the Categories in their broadest possible interpretation, 
as does Porphry. He sees them as a practical framework under which the things of this 
world can be studied. However, they do not apply to God, nor do they apply to the human 
mind, it being a direct extension of God (Moran, 1989, 133). Eriugena even turns in the 
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direction of Plotinus by claiming that the ten categories might not be exhaustive and that 
others might be discovered. “…[N]o one of the less able should suppose that a thorough 
investigation of things could [not] get further than the above mentioned quantity of 
categories” (Eriugena, Periphyseon, Bk. II, 597 A). We must now qualify our original 
statement about the ten categories. They apply only to some of the things that come after 
God, namely corporeal things. They do not apply to any of the primordial causes, of 
which man is one (Moran, 134). To conclude, we may say that Eriugena is not so much 
interested in what the Categories order, but rather what they do not order. He thus 
extends the art of dialectic exponentially beyond the categories to apply to the activities 
of God, man, and the universe (Moran, 134). In other words, this exposition on the 
Categories has been a necessary, yet intermediate, step toward Eriugena‟s primary 
method of negative theology, which we treat below.   
Since, however, Eriugena holds that ideas, such as the idea of God, are not 
contained by the categories, we must then ask if the logic is still sound. It is, because 
dialectic has a higher priority than simple conformity to material things: dialectic is the 
very structure of all reality. In other words, it can be thought of as extending over and 
through all of Eriugena‟s four divisions of nature, and not just corporeal nature. 
Moreover, the logic can be employed in the negative to investigate the nature of God 
Himself, the highest reality. We will discuss this technique of negative theology more 
fully in Chapter III. 
For Eriugena, dialectic is the inherent principle which links the genus to the 
species. It moves from the universal to the particular and back again, and this process is 
always at work in nature (Kavanaugh, 2005, 577). Eriugena‟s explanation of the ten 
24 
 
categories is taken from the work of Boethius. However, his appropriation of this realistic 
application of the categories is the most important contribution of Maximus to the 
Periphyseon (Kavanaugh, 2005, 570). The language of Maximus, as written in his 
Contemplation 37 of the Ambigua and Iohannem, is very close to that of Eriugena in 
Book I as it pertains to this art of dialectic.  
“For it is moved from the most universal kind through the more universal 
kinds to the species, by which and in which everything is naturally 
divided, proceeding… by a process of expansion, circumscribing its being 
toward what is below, and again it is gathered together from the most 
specific species, retreating through the more universal, up to the most 
universal kind, by a process of contraction, defining its being toward what 
is above.” (Maximus Confessor, Ambigua, CCSG 18, P. 92, II, 1387-97; ii 
77 C), (as per Kavanaugh, 2005, 575).  
“Arithmetic is the reasoned and pure art of the numbers which come under the 
contemplations of the mind” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 475A). It begins with the monad that is 
multiplied to form every other number and yet retains its unity in the numbers that are 
derived from it (Burch, 1951, 10).  Eriugena gives considerable attention to the notion of 
the monad in Book III of the Periphyseon.  Today, of course, we tend to think of the 
number one as having no certain uniqueness, just another number in an infinite string.  
The ancient Greeks and Romans had no such mind set, and this thinking continued long 
past the Carolingian period.  One was not considered to be a number, but was the basis of 
numbers.  Two was the first number.  All numbers can be understood as existing in two 
different modes; they exist potentially in the monad, yet they exist actually in so far as 
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they are made (Eriugena, Bk. III, 657B).  Eriugena gives an ingenious argument to prove 
that arithmetic is an eternal art generated by God and discovered by man.  Numbers are 
perfect, immutable and supremely ordered.  If they were merely a human contrivance, 
they would suffer imperfection, change, and disharmony (Eriugena, Bk. III, 658A). But 
more than any other single influence of the liberal arts on the mind of Eriugena, we find 
the most manifestly apparent to be the correlation between that of number theory as 
advanced in the Marriage and the four divisions of nature as outlined in Book I of the 
Periphyseon.  These are “first that which creates and is not created, secondly that which 
is created and creates, thirdly into that which is created and does not create, while the 
fourth neither creates nor is created” (Eriugena, Bk. III, 441B). Scholars have given much 
speculation on the source of this but we find it given explicitly by the bridesmaid of 
arithmetic.  Within the first ten numbers there are those which are ungenerated (prime) 
and generate (2, 3, 5); numbers which are generated and generate (4); numbers which are 
generated and do not generate (6, 8, 9, 10); numbers which neither generate nor are 
generated (7).  “What reasons should I recount for your veneration, oh Heptad?” 
(Marianus, Bk. VII, 281). The number seven represents the topic of our study. 
“Geometry is the art which considers, by the mind‟s acute observation, the 
intervals and surfaces of plane and solid figures” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 475A). It begins with 
the point from which all figures are developed and into which they are resolved (Burch, 
1951, 10). The word literally means to measure the earth.  Indeed, the French equivalent 
for the English word “surveyor” is “geometre.”  We mention this fact because it is in this 
art that the notion of all the liberal arts residing in the soul is most easily comprehended. 
Geometry is by the “mind‟s observation,” not the eyes. We normally think of geometry as 
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a discipline which studies figures in ideal space.  This is not so for Eriugena, rather space 
is the outward manifestation of geometry, an astounding claim.  “I am forced to confess 
that place exists in the mind alone.  For if every definition is in art and every art is in 
mind, every place, since place is definition, will necessarily be nowhere else but in the 
mind”  (Eriugena, Bk. I, 475B). This leads to a very interesting question.  God surely 
knows geometry but does He know space?  Perhaps not.  In the Marriage, the bridesmaid 
Geometry knows every part of the earth but the gods do not. She tells the gods that her 
scholars have knowledge that they do not possess.  “I see my Archimedes and the most 
learned Euclid… I could call upon them to expound my doctrines to you…”  (Martianus, 
Bk. VI, 220). 
“Music is the art which by the light of reason studies the harmony of all things 
that are in motion that is knowable by natural proportions”  (Eriugena, 1987, 475A).  It 
begins with the tone from which all symphonies are composed and in which they find rest 
(Burch, 1951, 10).  Music is mentioned only twice in the Periphyseon: once in Book I 
(Eriugena, Periphyseon, 475 B), and once in Book V (Eriugena, Periphyseon, 869 C). Yet 
many of Eriugena‟s statements concerning number are clearly musical, as this art was 
understood in the ninth century. This line of thought follows directly from August ine‟s 
De Musica, an essay which held that music was an art properly founded in the ratio of 
audible harmony and fixed according to the principle of number (Augustine, Mus., 1979, 
Bk. I, 14-15). We know by studying the Marriage that it enjoyed equal status with the 
other arts and perhaps even higher.  Harmony sings her instruction to the gods “… having 
long since taken her departure from earth”  (Martianus, Bk. IX, 349). We are speaking 
here not of individual skill in musicianship, but rather of a knowledge of music that 
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transcends the theoretical and could be termed metaphysical.  In his De Institutione 
Musica, Boethius reinforced the thinking of Plato by claiming that “… musical concord 
united the soul of the universe” (Wagner, 1983, 171).  Music alone, of all the 
mathematical arts, was occupied with the pursuit of not only truth, but morality as well.  
Music is the most mystical of the arts.  “She indeed, above all others, will be able to 
soothe the cares of the gods, gladdening the heavens with her song and rhythms” 
(Martianus, Bk. IX, 349). 
“Astronomy is the art which investigates the dimensions of the heavenly bodies 
and their motions and their returnings at fixed times” (Eriugena, Bk. VII, 475A). It begins 
with the instant of time from which all change is measured and into which all is returned.  
(Burch, 1951, 10).  Unlike music, Eriugena discourses on astronomy at some length.  
This occurs mainly in Book III of the Periphyseon where he speculates on the creation of 
the universe. Perhaps astronomy, more than any other art, best illustrates Eriugena‟s 
consistent theme of the return of all things to their source. This discipline grants us the 
opportunity to actually see heavenly bodies begin and complete their recurring courses.  
For Eriugena, astronomy is an art which reflects an ordered extra-terrestrial creation. He 
gives several examples of astronomical observations and relevant calculations concerning 
the earth, moon, planets, and stars (Eriugena, Bk. III, 715 C-726 D). Eriugena promotes 
the study of this art because “… although nothing definite is found in the divine 
scriptures concerning such measurements… I would not say that the constitution of the 
world lies outside the understanding of the rational nature when it was for [that nature‟s] 
sake that it was created” (Eriugena, Bk. III, 723 B).  In the Marriage, the bridesmaid, 
Astronomy, is very modest and respectful of the gods.  She knows that the gods in vanity 
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believe that the movements of the stars and planets are controlled by themselves.  Her 
study is so long and diligent as to seem eternal.  “Forty thousand years I kept myself in 
seclusion there, in reverent observation” (Martianus, Bk. VIII, 316).  Astronomy tells the 
assembled gods that her discourse is to be understood in a theoretical sense and is not 
concerned with transitory conditions in the heavens.  Her calculations are of sublime 
intervals.  “Never would the understanding of your journey and your return reach mortal 
intelligence” (Martianus, Bk. VIII, 318). We now leave this most elemental source of the 
liberal arts and turn to the thinkers which significantly influenced Eriugena. 
The first of these is Plato. Eriugena refers to him as the “greatest of those who 
philosophized about the world” and it seems apparent that he had great confidence in 
Platonic theory in outline (Eriugena, Bk. I, 476C). However, the specific influence of 
Plato is hard to trace.  It seems most likely that the influence was indirect and filtered 
through the writings of the following thinkers that we consider hereafter.  Eriugena 
makes only fifteen references to Plato in the Periphyseon (Moran, 1989, 105). We may be 
certain only that Eriugena had access to the Timaeus, and even that was not in the 
original Greek, but rather through the Latin translation of Chalcidius (Bett, 1964, 166). 
Nor can it be shown that Eriugena had available any of the writing of Philo or the pagan 
Neoplatonist scholars such as Proclus or Plotinus.  Our philosopher never refers to any of 
them.  Therefore, we must conclude in paradox that Eriugena, perhaps one of the greatest 
Platonic thinkers of all time, had little direct knowledge of Plato himself.  Moreover, 
Eriugena, who in later centuries would become the main channel through which 
Neoplatonism would flow to the mysticism of the high Middle Ages and the Renaissance 
had even less knowledge of the pagan Neoplatonist disciples (Bett, 1964, 169). Of 
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course, Eriugena did have works of various Christian Neoplatonists at his disposal. 
Thus, we focus on what we know for sure and continue with a careful reading of 
the Timaeus, paying particular attention to what Plato has to say about God‟s will and His 
apparent plan for the world.  We must give the utmost consideration to any passage 
which even hints that life cannot be lost; that death is not so much a recompense, but 
more properly, a restoration.  We need not concern ourselves with any process of 
purification; or perhaps better said, whether the soul rises in staged advancement.  The 
only question is whether or not the soul attains its ultimate restoration.  How this 
restoration occurs is of no consequence to our study, only that it happens. 
Plato gives early warning that not all men are going to accept the truth of their 
own creation.  “But the Father and maker of this universe is past finding out; and even if 
we found him, to tell of him to all men would be impossible” (Timaeus, pt. 28, 12).  
Some men will not be converted.  Can this possibly mean that the one who made them 
ceases in his love for them?  Of course not, for “He desired that all things be as like Him 
as they could be” (Timaeus, pt. 30, 13). The creator is infinitely good, thus, lacks any 
jealousy of any kind.  He wants only to make, sustain and perfect the universe, to bring it 
into total concord with himself.  This process can only be an eternal one wherein the 
three modes of his action are eternal not sequential.  Timaeus tells Socrates that when the 
Father and supreme artisan saw what he had made, living and moving, an image of the 
eternal “He rejoiced and in his joy, determined to make the copy still more like the 
original” (Timaeus, pt. 37, 19). God initially fashions a community of lesser gods and 
children of these lesser gods, and then binds each in the security of this most genuine 
covenant. “Wherefore, since ye are but creatures, ye are not altogether immortal and 
30 
 
indissoluble, but ye shall certainly not be dissolved, nor be liable to the fate of death, 
having in my will a greater and mightier bond than those with which you were bound at 
the time of your birth” (Timaeus, pt. 41, 23). Then God instructs His lesser gods to 
continue to “betake yourselves to the formation of animals, imitating the power which 
was shown by me in creating you. The part of them… which is called divine… I will 
myself sow the seed… beget living creatures… and receive them again in death” 
(Timaeus, pt. 41, 24). We must assume by this that Plato held the soul to be immortal, 
otherwise there would be nothing for the gods to receive other than constituent particles, 
which they already have. The lesser gods are obedient and receiving from Him the 
“immortal principle of the soul; and around this they proceed to fashion a mortal body” 
(Timaeus, pt. 69, 52). It is important to note the genealogical nature of this explanation of 
the universe. The most perfect God makes lesser gods who are referred to as “his 
children” (Timaeus, pt. 43, 25), and they in turn make the “men of old” (Timaeus, pt. 40, 
23), who are most surely Plato‟s ancestors. The significance of this relationship is 
detailed below.  
We next consider the influence of Origen Adamantius (185-254) on the 
philosophy of Eriugena.  Origen was a Platonic Christian scholar and distinguished 
Father of the early church, who studied and taught in Alexandria.  Eriugena refers to him 
in Book IV of the Periphyseon, as being “that supreme commentator of scripture” 
(Eriugena, Bk. IV, 818B). Origen was a prolific writer, composing about 6000 works, 
many of which have been lost.  Fortunately, his systematic Treatise on First Principles, 
written between 212 and 215, has survived in the translation of Rufinus.  This is 
important for we know that Eriugena had access to Origen‟s Principles because he made 
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reference to the work in the Periphyseon (Eriugena, Bk. V, 929A). We choose to expound 
on the connection in some detail, for this is an area which is rarely mentioned in 
contemporary scholarship concerning Eriugena. 
Eriugena borrows three central themes from Origen.  The first is stressed 
continually in the Principles, that God‟s act of creation is an eternal, not a temporal one. 
The word „eternal‟ raises the question as to whether it is „always going on‟ or as per the 
nature of things created. We mean both: God is always creating things, and those things 
always abide.  The second is that God‟s creation involves only the creation of rational 
beings, not corporeal ones.  The third, and Origen is one of the first, if not the first 
Christian theologian to state it, is that all of the rational beings that God creates, can and 
will be restored in Him. God does not curse what He has made.  This last theme flows 
naturally from the first two and it is the essence of our study herein. 
“We can imagine no moment when [God] was not engaged in acts of well-doings 
… It follows plainly from this, that at no time whatever was God not creator, nor 
benefactor, nor providence”  (Origen, First Prin., 1936, Bk. I, Ch. 4, 42). The first theme 
of creation being an eternal as opposed to a temporal action on the part of God arose from 
Origen‟s optimistic and fairly successful intention of reconciling Christianity to 
Platonism.  Plato, as well as Aristotle, as all the rest of the ancient philosophers had 
thought the world to be eternal. However, this did not necessarily mean that everything in 
it was eternal. It should be stated that Plato is not explicit and unambiguous on this point. 
For this reason, we do find some ancient interpreters rejecting this usual reading as an 
unjustified assimilation of Plato to Aristotle. Christianity in its rather literal interpretation 
of the Old Testament claimed that the world was created in time.  This most interesting 
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question was to become a topic of great disputation in the high Middle Ages and in large 
measure remains so today.  The question turns on the meaning of the word “eternal.”  It is 
interesting to note that the ancient Greek formulation of the problem addressed only the 
world in its infinite duration.  In other words, extended backwards and forwards in time.  
However, when Christ said “I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending” 
(Revelation 1:8, KJV), His claim involved much more.  Boethius would later give 
definition to eternity as “the complete possession of an endless life enjoyed as one 
simultaneous whole” (Boethius, Con Phil., 1957, Bk. V, pt. 6, 62).  Understood in this 
latter way, the world could well extend infinitely in time and yet still not have the 
simultaneous and whole possession of itself.  Said better, the world could be infinite in 
time yet still dependent on something else, namely God, for its duration. This is Origen‟s 
claim.  God creates the world yet He creates infinitely with Himself, not in temporal time.  
It is most interesting to note that Plato himself sows the seeds of this line of reasoning in 
the Timeaus. 
Where the traditional Christian viewpoint makes its greatest contribution is not so 
much its technical correctness, but rather in the importance with which it views the 
material world. This viewpoint is in accordance with Origen, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, 
and the non-Christian Neoplatonists, all of whom regarded the corporeal world as good. 
While this claim of the goodness of the corporeal world cannot be unqualified, we find it 
to be generally true in such works as the First Principles of Origin, the Timaeus of Plato, 
the Ethics of Aristotle, the Meditations of Aurelius, and the Enneads of Plotinus. The 
body is good, the world is good, albeit not as good as the soul.  Thus the world is good 
and we must cling to it so long as we are able. The Christian viewpoint, as well as the 
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Platonic, is that the world is our only ticket to eternity and must not be given up 
prematurely.  This material world is our one means of regaining that which we have lost, 
so it seems reasonable that it is infinite in duration, as are our souls. This seems to imply 
that Eriugena is resorting to the employment of dialectical logic, and we will address this 
below in the treatment of negative theology. For now, let us simply state that this present 
world of time and space is our punishment; sometimes unpleasant, but always good. As 
we shall discuss below, Augustine explained our human condition in the City of God: 
“And yet the whole of mortal life is itself a punishment…” (Augustine, City of God 
1972, Bk. XXI, Ch. 14 81). It is worth noting that from the very heart of the question 
Plato was correct in holding that the wise man does not avoid punishment, he seeks it. 
“And in what way is it profitable to get away with doing injustice and not pay the 
penalty? … For the man who doesn‟t get away with it and is punished, his whole soul [is] 
brought to its best nature” (Plato, Republic,  1968, Bk. IX, 591B, 274).  Thus, it is 
ultimately good and we must do our best with it.  Not only did Origen teach this 
philosophy, he lived it charitably through a long life of bitter hardship. 
This leads directly to his second contribution to the thought of Eriugena; the idea 
that God creates only intelligible beings, not matter (Moran, 108, 1990).  Strictly 
speaking, man makes his own material world. In other words, God creates only souls.  
The soul is like God in that it seeks the good, but unlike God because it has only limited 
knowledge of the good.  Hence it falls to a condition of equilibrium, a world of its own 
making where it can begin its own ascent.  It falls into a world of time and space, similar 
to a mountaineer rappelling down a cliff.  Where he stops is that position from which he 
can regain his footing and begin climbing again.  We are not in time and space, but rather 
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time and space are elemental definitions in the mind which all rational beings constitute. 
This world with all of its accompanying examples of terror and beauty is a product of our 
own making, a natural consequence of our own free will. 
Origen holds that this strange descent and then re-ascent happens so that the 
creator of all may be manifestly made greater.  It has nothing to do with us and 
everything to do with Him.  We have free will. Indeed, our legal and social systems are 
premised on this foundation. We may rightly ask why we have it.  Of course we benefit 
from it, but is our benefit His ultimate end?  Surely it is not.  Consider the parable of the 
prodigal son.  The obedient son is greater for exercising his free will to return, but the 
paramount consideration is that of the father whose joy is made full.  And as any father 
knows, he can be made complete in no alternate way other than by having both of the 
sons in communion with him.  What if he could force both sons to remain?  In such case, 
their presence abides, but their communion is broken.  The very kinship that inherently 
binds the relationship is lost.  The father is not happy, he is not great and most of all he is 
not even a father.  The sons must have the freedom to choose so that when they choose 
wisely, as they surely will, the father is more exalted.  Put another way, it has been said 
that Paganini was the greatest violinist of all time.  His audiences acknowledged his 
genius with great adorations.  Let us suppose that Paganini could push some magic button 
and force his audience to wildly applaud.  His greatness cannot possibly be made 
manifest under such conditions.  His fans must have the freedom to do as they wish in 
order for his talent to shine forth.  This is Origen‟s teaching on free will, one that 
Eriugena adopts, and advances upon (Origen, Bk. III, Ch. 6, 254). It is true that men must 
have the freedom to choose against God. However, this choice is a temporal one, made 
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within the confines of incomplete knowledge, and easily rescinded. 
Thirdly is the idea that all rational creatures will ultimately be restored to the 
original condition to which God created them, and this necessarily means redeeming 
harmony with Him.  Origen is the first Christian to overtly assert this as fact.  He does so 
in a most ingenious way by comparison, similar to a mathematician who proves that one 
series is infinite by showing that it is larger than another series which is already known to 
be infinite.  Origen conjures up a personality for Satan, surely the worst rational being 
which has ever existed.  Origen has only to show that Satan will be restored and everyone 
on our list neatly follows.  “The demons themselves and the rulers of the darkness in any 
world of worlds, if they desire to turn to better things, become men and so revert to their 
original condition in order that being disciplined by the punishments and torments which 
they endure for a long or short period while in the bodies of men they may in time reach 
the exalted rank of angels” (Origen, Bk. I, Ch. 4, 56). And later he states, “For the 
destruction of the last enemy [Satan] must be understood in this way, not that its 
substance which was made by God shall perish but that the hostile purpose and will 
which proceeded not from God but from itself will come to an end.  It will be destroyed, 
therefore, not in the sense of ceasing to exist, but of being no longer an enemy and no 
longer death” (Origen, Bk. III, Ch. 4, 250). Rufinus, the Latin translator, has concealed 
the original reference to the devil and left the question of his salvation open but the 
intention of Origen was quite clear (Origen, Bk. III, Ch. 4, 251).  No other idea of 
Origen‟s was more reviled than this.  Theophilus, in his Doctrina Patrum, states that “[h]e 
has dared to pay great honor to the devil, saying that when he is freed from all sin he will 
be restored to his ancient rank…”  (Origen, Bk. III, Ch. 4, 251). 
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There is one significant difference between Origen and Eriugena, and this should 
be addressed. For Origen, man may fall and be raised, then fall again and be raised again, 
in infinite succession. Since “[t]he soul is immortal and eternal, it is possible that in the 
many and endless periods throughout diverse and immeasurable ages it may either 
descend… or be restored…” (Origen, First Prin., Bk. III, Ch. 1, 209). For Eriugena, this 
is not the case because he believes that the primordial causes, of which man is one 
(Eriugena, Periphyseon, Bk. III, 536 B), descend only once. “In His Word, God created 
all at once the causes of the intelligible and the sensible essences (Eriugena, Bk. II, 554 
C). These primordial causes are understood to be divine definitions or predestinations 
(Eriugena, 615 D). They are goodness itself, being itself, life itself, truth itself, etc. Thus, 
there can only be one manifestation of them. For Eriugena, man falls and is restored only 
once. It is apparent from the above discussion that Eriugena had a much more nuanced 
conception of time than Origen. This is due mostly to the influence of Augustine, which 
will be addressed below. 
Another important source for Eriugena was Gregory of Nyssa (circa 335-394).  
He became bishop of this city in present day Turkey, in 372, and is known to have been 
present at the Council of Antioch and the Second Ecumencial Council.  Eriugena takes 
two main themes from Gregory, his theory of matter and his teaching on the image of 
God as manifested in man (Bett, 1964, 164).  Gregory of Nyssa‟s important work, On the 
Creation of Man, is frequently quoted by Eriugena, who refers to it as “the Image”  (Bett, 
1964, 162). 
Turning to the first, Eriugena followed Gregory in maintaining that all matter as 
we know it is nothing other than the concourse of accidents (Eriugena, Bk. I, 502 B).  He 
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maintains that the objects we sense have their origins in immaterial primal causes, which 
we cannot sense.  Moreover, material objects are immaterial in our constitution and 
analysis of them.  For instance, the familiar elements of geometry, i.e., points, lines, and 
figures, are not sensed but intuited.  Such is likewise the case with the other sciences 
which study objects, though admittedly not as readily perceived.  Thus, matter is really 
nothing more than the conjoining of immaterial categories.  Matter is purely accidental in 
that it could surely be other than what it is.  It is made up of some combination of the four 
ancient elements: earth, water, air, and fire, mixed into some mutable proportion (Bett, 
1964, 47).  Eriugena likens matter to a shadow formed out of the concourse of light and a 
body.  When the shadow vanishes it returns to its causes, neither of which has suffered 
change.  The various qualities that constitute an object, such as form, color, density, etc., 
cannot be understood apart from it.  They precede the object not in time but in natural 
priority of order, as causes precede effects.  To clinch this argument Eriugena returns to 
the science of dialectic and underscores the definition as given by Gregory, that matter is 
that which is produced by the concourse of accidents.   
“For whether it has accidents or does not have them, whether there are in 
it things which cannot exist without it or whether things which, either by 
thought alone or by act and operation, can be separated from it withdraw 
from it, it always subsists without change by its own natural resources.  
But body, when the accidents are withdrawn, can by no means subsist by 
itself since it is not supported by any substance on its own.  For if you 




Such an innovative and thoughtful theory of matter has tremendous implications for one‟s 
views on creation, as we shall soon see. 
As to the second major theme for Eriugena that originates in Gregory, that of the 
image of God as manifested in man, we maintain that this theoretical argument is the 
mainstay for salvation of the damned.  Eriugena references St. Gregory‟s Treatise on the 
Image twenty times in Book IV of the Periphyseon.  The Genesis passage “Let us make 
man in our own image, after our likeness” (Genesis 1:26, KJV), was interpreted of the 
Word of God, or the second person of the Trinity.  Essentially, God conjured up in the 
divine mind a man possessed of a similar mind to His own.  God‟s contemplation was the 
actualization of all mortal men, though each one would, of course, be materially 
manifested through time and space.  But the time and space are man‟s, rather than God‟s.  
“… [B]efore the establishment of man there was a council, and he was prefigured by the 
Creator through the Word of Scripture as to what he should be … All these things were 
first considered by the Word … before he came forth … in the world of becoming …”  
(Eriugena, Bk. IV, 758 B). Man was and is bound for unification with God whether he 
sinned or not.  By sinning, he merely brings upon himself mortal death, or perhaps better 
said mortal life, as well as a host of other misfortunes.  Man cannot surrender his essence 
because it is not his to surrender.  It belongs to God, who has the authority to take it, but 
doing so runs contrary to His nature because man‟s soul is an image of God and bears 
likeness to it. 
We may affirm the above argument by observing nature itself.  All of nature 
desires to live.  Nothing, save man, voluntarily kills itself, and even he but rarely.  We 
need only examine the example of suicide to show that the desire for life is universal, and  
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Augustine may be our guide here.  The man who takes his own life does not do so freely, 
but only when racked by some unbearable hardship.  He desires rest and mistakenly 
reasons that death will provide it.  But here is the supreme irony, he truly wants to live 
more, not less; he seeks a higher condition of being, not a lower one.  “Be careful that 
you do not make a mistake in the very place you think that you see the truth.  If you were 
happy you would rather be alive…” (Augustine, On Free Choice, 1964, Bk. III, Ch.7, 
102). We may conclude that all nature, everywhere, in all times desires to live. 
Perhaps we may best illustrate this notion of man being an image of God through 
the following example. Augustine looks like Simone de Beauvoir, but they do not look 
alike in that they both have two eyes, two arms, etc.  Rather they look alike because he is 
an image of the Word and she is an image of the Word.  Both are created according to a 
certain essence, both are images of it and bear likeness to it.  Of course, we do not mean 
to suggest that their likeness is physical but rather they are alike in that unique essence 
that makes them both human.  They have the freedom to choose whether or not they want 
to be good but not the freedom to choose whether or not to be human.  A man can choose 
to reject Christ in his mortal lifetime, but not in his eternal essence.  He can believe what 
he wants in this world, but he cannot deny who he is in the next.  He is ultimately God‟s 
man, not his own. 
Interestingly, Gregory holds that not only is all human nature derived from one 
source, the Word, it is also derived at once.  “He who brought all things into being 
formed man … after the Divine Image [He] did not establish intervals in which future 
things would gradually be added, … but intellected … the whole of human nature at once 
in its fullness…” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 812 A). This leads to the perplexing paradox that 
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even though birth and death are understood to be in time, life is not.  Thus the soul is not 
constrained in time, just as the archetype, the Word, from which it originated, is not 
constrained in time. 
The writings of Augustine had a remarkable influence upon the course of 
medieval philosophy in the West, and this influence is highly evident in the work of 
Eriugena.  The North African bishop is referenced constantly in the Periphyseon, and we 
may justly say there was some community of thought which influences all of our 
philosophers‟ writing.  Oftentimes it seems as if Eriugena takes an Augustinian principle 
and pushes it far beyond where Augustine would have it go.  We focus here on the one 
doctrine which seems to us to have had the most significant influence for our present 
study and this is Augustine‟s teaching on the problem of evil (Bett, 1964, 158). 
We all recognize the existence of evil in the world but accounting for it presents a 
serious intellectual problem for any thinking person.  There seems to be only four 
explanations for it: 
(1) God, himself, is evil.  This was the scheme posited by the ancient Babylonians.  It 
surely explains evil in the world but poses a greater problem.  Whence comes 
good? 
(2) God is not all good. 
(3) God is all good, but not all powerful; thus He lacks the ability to end evil in the 
world. 
(4) God is all good and all powerful and he allows evil in the world so that a greater 
good can eventually come. 
Augustine‟s answer to this most perplexing question came over a lifetime of 
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honestly seeking truth, first in the liberal arts, second in philosophy, and lastly in 
religious studies.  The first explanation given above was a serious one for him at one 
point in his early life.  He first became a disciple of Mani, a third century Babylonian, 
who taught that reality was essentially a dynamic dualism between two opposing sources 
of evil and good.  Each was a positive force which tended to counter balance the other.  
After following Manicheanism for several years, Augustine finally concluded that it was 
merely empty eloquence.  Ironically, the notion that evil is a positive source seems likely 
enough on the surface.  Perhaps this is why Manicheanism flourished for some time and 
moreover why Christianity still suffers from the latent effects of it.  Augustine ultimately 
concluded that it would not withstand rigorous intellectual investigation.  From this he 
turned to the skeptics of the New Academy who advanced no positive doctrine 
concerning God. This philosophy satisfied Augustine for a time, but in their wisdom the 
Academicians claimed that they had no wisdom. Through long and diligent intellectual 
speculation and aided by Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, Augustine was able to formulate an 
accounting for the problem of evil, based upon his earlier studies from “certain books of 
the Platonists” (Augustine, Con., 1960, Bk. VII, Ch. 9, 168). This was his important 
contribution: that evil has no positive dimension; it is merely the absence of good. 
Augustine spent the remainder of his life enthusiastically and successfully championing 
this idea.  
Augustine is explicitly clear that every being is good in so far as it has being. He 
does so by an argument involving three possibilities or modes of goodness in things. All 
things are totally good, partially good or not good. The first and the last categories are 
resolved immediately. If something is totally good it cannot be corrupted; if something is 
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totally bad then there is nothing in it to corrupt. It is the second category, the one that 
comprises everything within our realm of perception, that we must seek to fully explain. 
These beings have some good and some bad and can, therefore, suffer corruption. But 
what is corruption other than the diminution of good? Thus, the very fact that they can 
suffer corruption means that they are good, at least in some measure. Moreover, 
concerning the possibility of beings in the third category, i.e. beings that are in no way 
good, we may rightly say that there are no such things. “What is more monstrous than to 
claim that things become better by losing all their good? Therefore, if they are deprived 
of all good, they will be absolutely nothing. Hence, as long as they exist they are good” 
(Augustine, Con., 1960, Bk. VII, Ch. 12, 172). 
This is not to say that evil does not exist in this world or that it has no reality. It is 
merely to say that its reality is qualified. Evil has no substance and could not be known 
apart from good. However, if we speak of evil as being a lack of perfection or goodness, 
then evil surely exists. Perhaps we could say that when we call something evil, we are 
merely using a convention of language so our ideas are more easily conveyed. For 
instance when we say “Judas was evil,” we do not imply that he was inherently evil. We 
only mean that he lacks the goodness that he could have had. He chose a temporal good, 
thirty pieces of silver, over an eternal one. Judas lost sight of the eternal, but is he 
damned for all time?  Of course, Augustine would affirm that he is. The human race is to 
be cut in two and Judas, having proven himself worthy of just vengeance, would inherit 
the same. However, insofar as he still exists, albeit in eternal torture, he is still good. 
Augustine‟s position is consistent granted that a good thing can be eternally tortured, i.e. 
infinitely deprived of that end for which it was created, namely restoration with its 
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creator. Eriugena‟s position is more nuanced. Judas is fully restored in his spiritual body, 
but eternally tortured in the memory of his evil work. Eriugena‟s position is consistent 
granted that a restored soul, i.e. one that has reached the end for which it was intended, 
can still be tormented. We will substantively address this question at great length in 
subsequent chapters. 
Such was the core of the Augustinian doctrine of evil which Eriugena accepted. 
Every good derives from God. Evil, which appears to actively counter good, is merely a 
turning away from God. A most fitting analogy is our experience of the sun‟s physical 
light. At noon we enjoy the light, at midnight we suffer darkness. But that darkness has 
no source. It is merely the absence of light. Eriugena quoted Augustine‟s City of God, 
Chapter 13, “But evil begins within them secretly at first to draw them into open 
disobedience afterwards. For there would have been no evil work had there not been an 
evil will before it.…” (Eriugena, Periphyseon, 1987, Bk. IV, 808 C). Eriugena interpreted 
this passage to mean that man was never without sin, because man was never without the 
mutability of will. The will, being free, has a certain irrational nature that must always 
accompany it. Man can always choose the good but does not always do so, for sometimes 
the irrational tendency wins out. Sometimes man loses sight of the eternal and becomes 
fixated on the temporal. Both Augustine and Eriugena would hold that free will is a good 
gift from God that man has misused. God intended it so that man could turn to Him, 
thereby completely perfecting his nature. However, man has too often used the gift for 
something other than its intended purpose. One could ask: why did God create man with 
the vulnerability to turn away from Him? Why not just create man as perfect? The answer 
lies in the ambiguity of the word “perfect” as used in the question. God is perfect in that 
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his free will is always coincident with his rational choice. To robotically force man to be 
“perfect” would be to deprive him of being like God. Perfection in the first instance 
means never committing wrongful acts. In the second it means being like God, who never 
commits wrongful acts. Free will safeguards man‟s perfection to the highest degree 
because it allows man to be like God to the highest degree. 
All of the above statements place the core of evil in the brokenness of the 
relationship of man to God, as opposed to the wrongness of the evil act itself. The evil act 
is merely the continuance and likewise the manifestation of the irrational choice by man 
to turn away from the good. The evil act is wrong, to be sure, but it is not the essence of 
wrongness. This point must be stressed emphatically for our study. The essence of the 
sinful act is the sinful turn away from God; the essence of the turning away is the 
fractured relationship. If the relationship between God and man is ordered as it should be, 
no sin of any kind follows. 
On this theory of evil, shared by both Augustine and Eriugena, there is one 
specific topic on which the two would disagree and this is the very important concept of 
original sin. As noted earlier once general Augustinian theory descends into the 
particulars Eriugena tends to reinterpret it, despite calling upon his predecessor as 
authority. This is most apparent concerning this notion of original sin. The difference 
arises due to the varying degree that both philosophers held as to what extent scripture 
could be interpreted as allegory. St. Ambrose had taught Augustine that the employment 
of the allegorical method was appropriate when trying to reconcile seemingly 
contradictory passages, and the latter made impressive use of it throughout his long 
career. However, it appears clear that Augustine held to a very literal interpretation of the 
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Genesis account of Adam, as the first man in time. This meant that all other men were 
biological descendents of Adam. Thus, Adam‟s original sin in the Garden of Eden was 
genetically transferred to all other men. Despite the eloquent rhetoric, Augustine was 
never able to show how this transference was just. “If Adam and Eve sinned, what did 
we, poor wretches, do? Why should we be born with the blindness of ignorance and the 
tortures of difficulty? … Our reply to these men is brief: Let them be silent and cease to 
murmur against God” (Augustine, Free Choice, 1964, Bk. III, Ch. 19, 129). Eriugena has 
no such difficulty because for him, Adam is not a man in time, rather he is all men. 
Eriugena employs a very liberal and allegorical interpretation of the Genesis story. It was 
not an individual who turned away from God, but humanity. It was not one who suffered 
under a broken relationship with his creator, but all of mankind. Moreover, it is not one 
that enjoys the restoration and homecoming but all. In a very mysterious yet rational 
explanation Eriugena holds that all men are created at once, yet each turns away and then 
falls into a material world of space and time. One should not conclude from this notion of 
all men being created at once that Eriugena concurs with a theory of pre-existence. 
Rather, he claims, through an assertion detailed below in Chapter III, that all men are 
both eternal and made. Man‟s manifestation in the material world of space and time is his 
fall, and follows his turning away from God. The sin is still original but it is each man‟s 
original not his great great-grandfather‟s (Bett, 1964, 133). 
The works of the Pseudo-Dionysius were translated by Eriugena at the request of 
Charles the Bald circa 860, and these writings had a profound influence. Prominent in 
these translations is the employment of negative theology, a device used so effectively by 
Eriugena. Much has already been written on this and indeed we will discuss it below, but 
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for now, we proceed rather boldly and focus on one specific passage in the Divine Names 
of Dionysius that bears greater importance for our subject. “The procession of all of our 
intellectual activity can at least go this far, that all fatherhood and all sonship are gifts 
bestowed by that supreme source of Fatherhood and Sonship on us and on the celestial 
powers” (Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Names, 1987, Ch. 2, pt. 8, 64). This is a most 
astonishing claim and one that has the highest importance for our study.  Clearly, this 
relationship of father to son can be broadened by the principle of equivalence to include 
father to daughter, mother to son, and mother to daughter, because for Eriugena gender is 
accidental. The human family is a compound of two dimensions: vertical, which is parent 
to child, and horizontal, which is husband to wife, or brother to sister. The claim of 
Dionysius that the father-son relationship is a spiritual one can now be reformulated to 
say that the parent-child relationship is a spiritual one. Thus, we have established that the 
vertical dimension of the family is a spiritual one. There are many who would claim that 
all the various facets of family relationships are spiritual, and we are among them. 
However, it is sufficient for our study to limit the claim to what is clearly apparent from 
the works of Dionysius. Incidentally, other philosophers prior to Eriugena have come 
sufficiently close to making this same claim so that for speculative purposes we may 
accept it.  Plato so claimed in the Timaeus, as was explained above. Likewise, Aristotle 
in the Ethics holds “…parents love their children as themselves” (Aristotle, Ethics, 1992, 
1161 A) because the children are themselves by extension.  Lastly, Augustine in the 
Confessions, states “[a] child… forces himself upon our love” (Augustine, Con., 1960, 
Bk. IV, Ch. 2, 94). No other love can be forced upon us. The essence of this relationship, 
i.e. the spiritual as opposed to the material nature of it, must be accepted by all who 
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reasonably reflect upon it, for this is a nature which approaches universal recognition. It 
is a relationship clearly and appropriately reflected in our most ancient literature, art, and 
law, and it continues to be reflected at present with no indication that it will ever be 
extinguished.  “Fatherhood and sonship of this kind are brought to perfection in a 
spiritual fashion … in the domain of mind, and this is the work of the divine spirit which 
is located beyond all conceptual immateriality … it is the work too of the Father and Son 
who supremely transcend all divine Fatherhood and Sonship” (Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine 
Names, 1987, Ch. 2, pt. 8, 64). We must examine this claim, for it has the utmost 
consequences for our study. 
The entire core of this argument is that the relationship of parent to child must 
ultimately be made whole. The child cannot be forever lost, else the loving parent is 
incomplete. We have observed the saddest event in all of all human experience: the death 
of a child. There can be no human redemption from this most hateful intrusion into the 
natural order of the world. Thus, we may conclude that parenthood has priority over even 
the most important earthly offices. A relationship is established which may or may not be 
material, but is always spiritual.  If the relationship is a spiritual one, akin to God‟s 
relationship to man, as Dionysius maintains, all the more must God save what is His. This 
is the meaning of countless New Testament parables. In the Letters, he writes that God 
“… wishes everything to be always akin in him and to have fellowship with him…” 
(Pseudo-Dionysius, Letters, 1987, let. 8, 271). It is true that God wishes, but does not 
demand, that man return to Him. To demand it would be to destroy the essential nature of 
the relationship. To wish it is to allow for its completion. His concern never ceases, even 
when they are far away and living with pigs. He receives them so that all may rejoice. To 
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those who say that the Prodigal Son had to return while he was alive and physically able 
to do so we summon the loving Father‟s own words: “… he was dead, now he is alive…” 
(Luke 15:32, KJV). 
What is this overwhelming force of attraction that exists primordially in the 
Father and wills Him to eternally call forth His Son? And what is this same force that 
ultimately brings the son home, restoring him to his father‟s house? Dionysius teaches 
that it is simply love. In the Divine Names, he defines love as a yearning which brings 
about unity. Love pre-exists in that which is good. It is a divine attraction that brings 
lasting happiness so that the lover belongs not to himself but to the beloved (Pseudo-
Dionysius, Divine Names, 1987, Ch. 4, pt. 12, 81). This world exhibits some very fine 
examples of love, but who will deny that the highest manifestation of human love exists 
in the vertical dimension of the family? Aristotle was right in claiming that the highest 
love was a mother for her child, but he need not have been a great philosopher to come to 
this realization. It is known by every mother, insofar as she is a mother, and also by every 
father.  
Eriugena appropriates the Dionysian understanding of love completely. “Love is a 
bond and chain by which the totality of all things is bound together in ineffable friendship 
and indissoluble unity. It can be defined in this way too: Love is the end and quiet resting 
place of the natural motion of all things that are in motion, beyond which no motion of 
the creature extends” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 519 A). And from the Divine Hymns: “This divine 
yearning brings ecstasy so that the lover belongs not to the self but to the beloved…. And 
it is shown by the subordinates in their divine return toward what is higher… his benign 
yearning for all is carried outside of himself in the loving care he has for everything” 
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(Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Names, Ch. 4, pt. 13, 82). “Rightly therefore is God called 
Love since He is the Cause of all love and is diffused through all things and gathers all 
things together into one and involved them in Himself in an ineffable Return, and brings 
to an end in Himself the motions of love of the whole creature” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 520 A). 
In other words, the love manifested in the relationship of parent to child is a 
theophany of God‟s love for his creation. Moreover, it is the highest and best one we 
have. All parents discipline their children in one way or another, but no parent, qua 
parent, curses his child, condemns his child, or destroys his child. This idea is most 
pointedly demonstrated in the case of Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber, 
and perhaps the most despicable American who has ever lived. His father beautifully 
pleaded for his life saying, “I know this was wrong, but I love him, he is my son.” In 
modern art it is shown in lamentations of the mother of Judas Iscariot, who sought mercy 
on only one count, “He is my son.” Ironically, the salvation of Judas is even addressed by 
Eriugena in his Treatise on Divine Predestination (Eriugena, Treat. Div. Pred., 1998, Ch. 
13, pt. 1, 83-84). Can anyone claim that McVeigh‟s father or Iscariot‟s mother are some 
special case of the human family that surpasses the ideal? Of course not, for we say 
herein that these two particular cases are instances that reach close to the ideal, perhaps as 
near as human families can reach. We abhor the crimes, yet we praise the wholeness of 
the relationships.  
Lastly, we trace the influence of Maximus the Confessor on our philosopher. 
Eriugena took from Maximus the fundamental idea that in Christ, the Logos, all wordly 
divisions are united with and through Him in redeemed humanity (Bett, 1964, 164). In 
effect, the Logos was the link between Plato‟s world of being and that of becoming. This 
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entailed an intimate connection between the form and all the images of that form. The 
images are dependent upon the form; however, the form is paradoxically dependent on 
the images. All men are images of Christ, but He is the prior form of each of them. This 
idea was stated very profoundly by the contemporary theologian, Karl Barth. “… 
[B]ecause this one is also man, every man in his place and time is changed, i.e. he is 
something other than what he would have been if this One had not been man too” (Barth, 
1961,168). Every man is His and He is every man‟s. Eriugena can make this claim 
because of his unique understanding of the relationship between universals and 
particulars. We noted this very early in Chapter I. The human mind, as shown perfectly 
through the incarnation, contains all things as ideas, and this constitutes their full reality. 
Nothing is more real for Christ than man, and nothing is more real for man than Christ. 
Every man derives his ontological status from Him, but He has relational status in every 
man. He does not need them for His being; but because He has created them, He needs 
them for having created them. Like the father who begets a son, He cannot be complete 
without unity with the son. However, not only is man restored but all creation is restored 
through man because it is in man that the irrational part of creation has its being. 
Eriugena refers to Maximus very early in the Periphyseon, only thirty paragraphs 
into the work. The Nutritor asks the Alumnus a question concerning theophanies, a Greek 
term meaning divine manifestations which take their names from the eternal causes of 
which they are the images. Now only God exists immutably in Himself but He 
reproduces these theophanies and gives them the name God. No creature can see God 
directly, for He dwells in inaccessible light, but angels, certain mystics and resurrected 
men see and know God through His theophanies. These manifestations are made in us 
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and in our world by Him. The Word of God, the Logos, the one unified form which all 
things desire and seek, bestows these theophanies upon each created nature, as grace 
admits. Eriugena here interprets the gospel (John 14:2 KJV), “In my Father‟s house are 
many mansions,” to mean that while the one form remains immutable and unified the 
multitudes that view it will contemplate it in infinite ways. The Alumnus presses on 
about the details of these theophanies, what, whence, how, etc. The Nutritor explains that 
this is perhaps the most perplexing question in all of human inquiry and that the best way 
to gain insight is to visit the work of Maximus. He teaches that the theophanies are a 
result of the diffusion of the Divine Word, the only begotten Son, the wisdom of the 
Father. They descend downward upon human nature with creation and rise upward to the 
Word through divine love. This diffusion and unification of wisdom from divine to 
human and back explains why the liberal arts, Eriugena‟s first mentioned influence, 
figure so prominently in his metaphysics. They are the very workings of the soul. This 
process is timeless, not constrained by the incarnation, and effects a certain deification of 
the creature. This also explains why the theophanies, although they are manifested in 
every man, are the more abundant in good men. Maximus teaches that they descend 
through divine compassion and rise through human charity, so men who are the most 
virtuous have the highest capacity to send them back. Consequently, a man like Buddha 
enjoys a phenomenal myriad of vivid theophanies without ever knowing Christ as his 
savior. Wisdom for Maximus has a certain communal nature; it abounds all the more 
when shared. And the more the soul comprehends, the more it becomes. “Therefore, to 
the extent that the mind comprehends virtue, to that extent it becomes virtue itself” 
(Eriugena, Bk. I, 448B – 450A). 
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Maximus illustrates his argument using the example of light in air. “For just as air 
illuminated by the sun appears to be nothing else but light, not because it loses its own 
nature, but because the light prevails in it so that it is believed itself to be light, so human 
nature when it is united with God is said to be God through and through, not because it 
ceases to be (its own) nature but because it receives a share in Divinity so that only God 
appears to be in it” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 450 A). 
As we would expect, Eriugena often refers to Maximus in Books IV and V of the 
Periphyseon. Here he explains the apparent divisions in creation and the final unification 
of them. He writes that in the end of eschatological time, all divisions are resolved in the 
Word. Maximus is an appropriate authority for he taught that all created nature is by the 
Father in the divine Logos and through redeemed man. It is interesting to note that the 
return of man has ontological status in that this return is simply what all men do. Like 
iron being attracted by a magnet, there is no choice involved. Eriugena does not seek a 
way to God such as conversion, self-denial, mystical union, etc. It is not needed for man 
is holy already. The Logos existing in itself and through itself, has accomplished this 
before the first man in time ever existed. The soul is so constituted that it is always and 
ever seeking its appointed end, God the uncreated and uncreating. The soul in its last and 
final theophany has returned to God just as it began. In a paradoxically real sense, the 
soul is God and always has been; hence there is no need to look for something extraneous 
to itself. Though many philosophers of negative theology look for an alternate way, 
Eriugena did not. Maximus had taught that creation was already sanctified. The verse 
from Ephesians 1:10 (KJV), “[t]hat in the dispensation of the fullness of time, he might 
gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on the 
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earth,” had literal understanding. Eriugena advanced an eschatologic direction to history 
rather than a temporal one. It flowed from the Genesis account of creation to the end of 
time as in Revelation and back irrespective of what we currently think of as one-
dimensional time. This orientation derived ultimately from Maximus. In typically 
Hegelian fashion, it was not that the end was justified by the beginning but rather that the 
beginning was justified by the end. The Logos stands primordially before any and all men 
even, and especially the men of Genesis. Whoever they were, the very fact that they were 




We should briefly examine Eriugena‟s views on the idea of authority. Eriugena 
continually refers to such sources as the Old and New Testaments, Plato, Aristotle, 
Augustine, and the eastern scholars. It would have been essential for Eriugena to have a 
well-defined conception of authority since many of his sources are in apparent 
disagreement. We examine this topic as closely as we can considering the overall subject 
of our study, salvation of the damned. First, it should be noted that Scripture itself is 
contradictory on the question of salvation. “For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall 
all be made alive” ( I Corinthians, 15:22 KJV). This statement seems to be about as 
definitive as one could get. As does this one, “So shall it be at the end of the world, the 
angels shall come forth and sever the wicked from among the just, and shall cast them 
into the furnace of fire” (Matthew 15:49-50 KJV). There even seems to be contradiction 
when one considers Scripture by the same author within the same book. The parable of 
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the one hundredth sheep (Luke 15:4-6 KJV) tells us that Christ will actively go forth and 
reconcile the wayward even though they show no inclination to return. The parable of the 
gate (Luke 13: 24-28 KJV) seems to say that Christ will passively turn away even those 
who are honestly trying to return. We have already seen how the revered Augustine 
taught on this question. Many are left to judgment, all the better to show God‟s mercy 
since all are justly damned, none are worthy. This notion is in direct opposition to some 
of the eastern fathers, namely Origen and Gregory of Nyssa, who, steeped as they are in 
Platonic teaching, maintain that all things including and especially man, must return to 
the essential unity of their source. 
Perhaps we can gain some insight by first examining various comments by 
Eriugena on the nature of wisdom. We noted earlier that in his Treatise on Divine 
Predestination he said that “ true philosophy is true religion and conversely true religion 
is true philosophy” (Eriugena, Treat Div. Pred., 1998, Ch. 1, pt. 1, 7). Elementally, the 
philosopher seeks to understand and promulgate the rules of religion through which God, 
the cause and end of all created things, is served and worshipped. There can be no 
ultimate conflict between reason and authority under Eriugena‟s scheme because the 
latter derives entirely from the former (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 748 A). The entire question 
reduces to which takes priority for us in the search for both because in the disciplined 
adherence to that priority we will hopefully attain both. Eriugena is clear that reason must 
have priority. “For there is no worse death than ignorance of the truth, no deeper pitfall 
than taking the false for the true” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 650 A). Yet he warns us to 
continually pray for God‟s help in seeking the truth for God Himself is the true light. 
Wisdom has a four-part organization according to Eriugena and we detail it in ascending 
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order of importance. The first and lowest is practical and this is akin to the study of 
ethics. It is the study by which vices are replaced by virtues in the moral self in greater 
and greater degree until all vices are gone and only virtue remains. The second is natural 
wisdom in which one investigates the causes and their effects in the material world. This 
is the wisdom of the scientist. The third is the wisdom of religion which seeks to discover 
the most proper and reverent ways to approach God, the cause and end of all creation. 
The fourth, and highest, is rational wisdom. It guides and controls the other three. Now, 
in our study of rational wisdom we do well to consider the historical account rendered by 
the philosophers of the past (Eriugena, Bk. III, 705 B). They were seeking the same thing 
and they had much skill, presumably more than our own. It should be emphasized that 
rational wisdom controls religious wisdom. Therefore, in considering any problem, even 
one of faith such as salvation for the damned, rational wisdom should have priority. Of 
course, we must proceed very carefully for the question, although fundamentally one of 
reason, has already been ruled in rather dogmatic fashion by the aforementioned 
authorities of the western church. We must thoughtfully consult scripture, as we have, for 
we may well gain some insight. However, we should not expect to find our solution there, 
as we have not. 
Christ is the Logos, “the only begotten Word of God, who makes all things and is 
made in all” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 743 C). As was noted earlier, the liberal arts abide in Him 
and He in them, thus to engage in the arts is to converse most directly with Christ. The 
arts inform the visible as well as the invisible parts of creation so when we study them we 
abstractly bypass all distractions. The arts have a certain high priority that cannot be 
abridged so Eriugena appeals to them time and time again. If we employ them correctly 
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we are always free from error and can have supreme confidence that we are on safe 
ground. This is akin to the example of Socrates, who maintained that if we have 
disagreement as to some number of objects we simply need to count. Of course things are 
not so simple with the linguistic arts as they are with the mathematical but in theory they 
are equally as correct. “…[I]t is possible for the rational soul to discuss within herself the 
liberal arts without recourse to utterance of articulate speech or fluent disquisition” 
(Eriugena, Bk. V, 870 B). In a very real sense the proper employment of the arts is the 
key to the proper interpretation of the lesser authorities. We could rightly say that in the 
study of arts we reach our highest grasp of divine exemplars, and when we reach this we 
have reached our highest knowledge of God both as cause and end. The arts abide in the 
mind of God and man pure and undiluted, free from all material distraction. 
The next authority for Eriugena is the Old and New Testaments. It will be 
immediately recognized that Scripture is diluted in two ways. The first and most obvious 
is that it is revealed to us through the medium of language. Everyone has a disposition to 
attach certain emotive or even pejorative value to words. This is simply human dynamics 
so we must constantly guard against introducing our own prejudices into Scripture. 
Second and much more significant is the very nature of Scripture. It is intended to convey 
truth, not fact. Truth and facts differ. Facts are small bits of information which we use to 
discern truth, but they may not capture truth. Statistics and detailed accounts are facts, not 
truth. Anyone who cannot grasp the difference needs only to ask himself if he would 
rather be esteemed as a truthful man or accepted as a factual one. Reporters seek to 
capture facts; however, we must accept that those who wrote Scripture were seeking 
truth. To cite a specific passage, we note Matthew 18:22, where Peter asks Jesus how 
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many times one must forgive a transgressor. The answer is factual (“four hundred 
ninety,” Jesus replies). Yet any reasonable interpretation of the underlying truth behind 
the fact actually negates the number of offenses. The meaning is that one must always 
forgive. Scripture is written for us, not for God and not for itself and it is written in such a 
way that we with our limited intellects can glean the most truth from it.  
“For the authority of Holy Scripture must in all things be followed because 
the truth dwells there as though in a retreat of its own, but it is not to be 
believed as a book which always uses verbs and nouns in their proper 
sense when it teaches about the divine Nature, but it employs certain 
allegories and transfers in various ways the meanings of the verbs or 
nouns out of condescension toward our weakness and to encourage by 
uncomplicated doctrine our senses which are still untrained and childish” 
(Eriugena, Bk. 1, 509 A).  
Take perhaps the most troubling passage in the entire Old and New Testament, that of 
Genesis, Chapter 22. Are we to literally believe that God had to test Abraham as if He did 
not know what Abraham would do? Can God order Abraham to kill his own son thereby 
violating God‟s own eternal ordinance? Moreover, is Abraham following God‟s will in 
being ready to kill, to say nothing of lying three times on the way to the sacrificial altar? 
Eriugena holds that there are infinite interpretations of such passages (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 
749 C). Dierdre Carabine has observed that for Eriugena there are four levels on which 
the intelligible world of Scriptures corresponds to the sensible world. These are the 
historical, literal, ethical, and theological (Carabine, 2000, 18). Although the theological 
is the most important, no passage can be properly interpreted on a level completely 
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independent of the other three. We would suggest that Eriugena would likely explain this 
passage in the considered order of the theological, ethical, historical, and literal. First, the 
passage is not so much about Abraham and Isaac as it is about the incarnation of Christ; 
in other words, it is prophetic. Second, no father could ethically kill his son, unless he 
was bound by some divine command the certainty of which would be beyond the ability 
of most, if not all, mortals to know. Third, this account should be considered as the 
historical genesis of a race of people. This leads back to the first level, in that it was this 
particular race of people into which the Logos chose to manifest Himself. Last, the literal 
level is so pale in relation to the former three that it is almost negligible. This does not 
mean that the events did not happen. It simply means that they could not have happened 
in the factual, inerrant manner that many choose to believe they happened. 
Finally we have the authority of man, the Holy Fathers, the philosophers, and the 
natural scientists. The authority of these persons is always judged in the light of how well 
their teaching corresponds to first the arts, second the Scripture. Eriugena will often write 
such statements as “… [of this] no one instructed in the liberal arts is ignorant” 
(Eriugena, Bk. I, 504 B). It is clear that he considers each of his cited sources with full 
contemplation of how well each accords with reason. In his Treatise on Divine 
Predestination, he goes so far as to accuse Gottschalk, an antagonist of the work, of being 
ignorant of the arts (Eriugena, Treat. Div. Pred., 1998, Ch.18, pt. 1, 117). In this vein, 
Eriugena holds the eastern fathers, Origen, Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus, and Gregory 
higher than Augustine. Most often when citing Augustine, Eriugena will go further and 
subtly, or perhaps not so subtly, change the meaning of what Augustine was trying to 
expound. This is never done with the eastern fathers. It seems clear that Eriugena has the 
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highest regard for them. Yet he acknowledges that any authority, no matter how highly 
respected, can err. “And that is why reason must be employed first in our business, and 
authority afterwards” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 513 C). We usually yield to them, not because 
they are right, but because they are wiser than we and probably right. However, reason 
must always have priority over authority because reason always precedes authority. The 
Holy Fathers, and philosophers themselves, became recognized as authorities over the 
centuries because they sought reason. They did have some success in finding it, and we 
would do well to defer to them. However, in the end we must follow our own soul‟s 
calling and Eriugena is perhaps more democratic on this point than most medieval 
philosophers. “Let every man hold what opinion he will until that light shall come which 
makes of the light of the false philosophers a darkness and converts the darkness of those 
















Chapter II: Presuppositions for This Work 
There are four presuppositions for our study. We list them here and discuss each 
in turn for the remainder of this chapter: 
I. God exists. 
II. The human soul is immortal. 
III. God has a triune nature that wills, creates, perfects. 
IV. Jesus of Nazareth was Christ Incarnate. 
Existence of God 
Eriugena makes no attempt to prove that God exists in the Periphyseon, and 
neither do we. He begins with the traditional notion of God as that nature which creates 
and is not created. God alone truly is. He has no beginning, middle or end, yet He is the 
beginning, middle and end for all that which He creates; “Beginning because from Him 
all things that [exist] participate in essence; the Middle because in Him and through Him 
they subsist and move; the End because it is toward Him that they move in seeking rest 
from their movement and the stability of their perfection” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 452 A). 
Eriugena goes on to say that he firmly believes this, but does not fully understand it.  
Immortality of the Human Soul 
The human soul is immortal. Eriugena accepted the notion that the soul is eternal, 
and we presuppose this for our study. If the damned are to attain salvation, surely the 
essential part of them must be brought into a state of eternal security. This essential part 
of them is the soul.  Eriugena writes that the soul is like God in that it is simple and 
without parts. Unlike material being it is whole unto itself and cannot be divided. The 
soul animates the body, for it provides life, nourishment, composition and growth. It 
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regulates the five senses and brings into subordination an overall sense of judgment. We 
refer to the soul by the use of many names: life, mind, reason, sense, memory, spirit, etc. 
All these names are appropriate when used within the proper context. Even in these cases 
the soul is indivisible and everywhere whole in itself. Also, the soul leads one to higher 
judgements; namely to speculation concerning the universe and its creator. It is the 
faculty that allows the human to apprehend truth, goodness, and beauty (Eriugena, Bk. 
IV, 754 B-D). This sounds much like Augustine; but for Eriugena there is a greater unity 
between the soul and body. The soul is not one substance and the body another. Rather, 
the soul itself can be said to receive its essence both from God and from material being. 
“Therefore the whole soul is on the one hand produced from the earth in the genus of the 
animals, and on the other hand is made in the image of God. For this and nothing else is 
what must follow from the foregoing arguments… Just so. And no true and orthodox 
philosopher should doubt it, lest he appear impiously to rend in twain this most simple 
and indivisible nature” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 755 A). This is a most curious and interesting 
turn from the usual way of Christian thinking, for it seems to imply that since part of the 
soul comes from the same genus as that of the animals, and since the whole human soul is 
returned to God, then the souls of animals will likewise be returned to God. This is 
exactly what Eriugena will later assert, that all creatures are restored through the 
redemption of man. This is not to imply that Eriugena held to a form of dualism where 
the mind is comprised of one material and the body another. Rather, both are spiritual. In 
this mortal life, the mind simply perceives that material as real. A “coat of skin” is added 
to the soul in mortality, which is removed via the resurrection (Petroff, 2005, 603). 
Unlike the existence of God, which Eriugena seems to take wholly on faith, he 
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does demonstrate the immortality of the soul, and his proof for this relies on the liberal 
arts. He asserts that the seven arts are gifts of the Holy Spirit manifested through the 
Logos, Christ Himself, and are one with Him. They illuminate, perfect , immortalize, and 
transcend the soul all while residing within the soul. The arts are eternal, yet can be 
understood as being contained in the soul. Since the arts cannot reside in anything 
temporal, we may conclude that the soul is immortal. No philosopher can be said to 
depend more on the arts for philosophy, happiness, even life than Eriugena (Moran, 1989, 
130).  
“For it has been rightly sought out and found by the philosophers that the arts 
are eternal and are immutably attached to the soul forever, in such a way that 
they seem to be not some kind of accidents of it, but natural powers [and 
actions] which do not and could not withdraw from it, and which do not come 
from anywhere but are innate in it as part of its nature, so that it is doubtful 
whether it is the arts which confer eternity upon it because they are eternal 
and eternally associated with it so that it may be eternal, or whether it is by 
reason of the subject which is the soul, that eternity is supplied to the arts (for 
the essence and the power and the operation of the soul are eternal), or 
whether they coinhere in each other, all being eternal, in such a way that they 
cannot be separated from one another” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 486 D). 
Trinitarian Nature of God 
The Trinity is not simply a mystery of revelation for Eriugena, but the 
fundamental truth through which the universe abides. Still, the Trinity and the unity of 
God are not such as can be understood by rational creatures. Following Dionysius, 
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Eriugena affirms that “…there is no way of signifying by verb or noun or by any other 
part of articulated speech how the supreme and causal essence of all things can be 
signified” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 456 A). The name „Trinity‟ is an expression devised and 
promulgated by “…holy theoligians so that we may believe in our hearts and confess 
with our lips that the Divine Goodness is constituted in three substances of one essence” 
(Eriugena, Bk. I, 456 B). This notion of beleiving stands opposed to that of 
understanding. We may inquire into this mystery only so far, for it can only be 
discovered through spiritual understanding. The terms „Father‟, „Son‟, and „Spirit‟ signify 
neither a nature nor an operation, but a relation. Eriugena does not allow himself to 
entertain the question of whether the Trinity is one essence in three substances, as the 
Greeks say; or one substance in three persons, as the Latins say. Such a distinction is 
semantical and cannot be translated in literal fashion (Eriugena, Bk. II, 567 B). The name 
is a symbol, employed by us so that we may inquire how the Trinity in our nature 
expresses the image and likeness of the created Trinity. 
Eriugena has referenced Dionysius, so it is especially fitting to consult with the 
latter‟s teaching at this point. In the Divine Names he writes, “They also describe it as a 
Trinity, for with a transendent fecundity it is manifested as three persons. This is why all 
fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named after it” (Dionysius, Divine Names,  
1987,Ch. 1, pt. 4, 51). And if all fatherhood is named after it, then surely all sonship, 
motherhood, and daughtership is also named after it. The human family, at least in the 
vertical dimension of parent to child, is once again affirmed as eternal.  
Eriugena understands the creation to be a process of God rather than a specific act 
of God. This important distinction allows Eriugena to claim an unseverable connection 
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between the creator and the created orders. Since all things are created in the image of 
God, they have a triune nature that is a reflection of God‟s triune nature. They subsist in 
an inseparable unity that can be understood in terms of the three aspects of essence, 
power and operation. The essence is the unknowable reality of a thing, its power is the 
sum total of the necessary attributes that make it what it is; and its operation is its specific 
motion. In the case of the oak tree, it exists; it has the potential to grow, bear acorns, 
reproduce, etc. The creation is the unfolding process of these three aspects. Their essence 
is created by God the Father, their power by God the Son, their operation by God the 
Holy Spirit. The four divisions of nature are brought about by the actions of the three 
persons of the one Trinity. The Father wills, the Son makes, the Holy Ghost perfects.  
These three reflect the method of division in the Periphyseon in a dialectical manner. The 
Father is the unbegotten, the Son is the begotten, and the Spirit is the proceeding. These 
three correspond to essence, power, and operation, which are inherent to every created 
thing in an inseparable way (Eriugena, Bk. I A, 1987). 
The Father wills. He can be understood as the “cause of causes. For He is the 
cause of that which is born and of the cause which proceeds” (Eriugena, Bk. III, 600 B). 
God the Father in His incomprehensible infinity wills, knows, sees and makes all created 
things. For any created being these actions are each distinct, but for the Father they are 
one and the same. For the artist composing his project these four actions can each be 
separated one from another. He must first will his project, then he must know it in his 
mind‟s eye, next he must make it as best he is able and finally he sees it in its completed 
state. For God the Father, all of these are the same. At the instant that He wills it, He 
knows it, He makes it, and He sees it. The creature can only know an object subsequent 
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to its actual material existence. For the Father it is just the opposite; the object acquires 
its material existence because He knows it. His knowledge of His creatures is their very 
essence. Moreover, the creation is not constrained to an instant in time but is rather an 
unfolding through time. The universe is eternal, made, good and incorruptible. It is 
eternal because the divine will makes it eternal. It is made for exactly the same reason. It 
is made outside of and beyond all time, even though it may well have a material existence 
in time. This is not to be understood that created things are co-eternal with the Father in 
all respects, such as the Son is co-eternal in all respects. Rather, it means that created 
things have their essence in the eternal will of the Father and subsist therein. The universe 
is good because the Father that makes it is good and wills nothing evil. It is incorruptible 
because there is nothing to corrupt it (Burch, 1951, 13). While it does often appear to us 
that things in the universe are subject to corruption, this is actually completion in 
disguise. Ultimately, everything created finds its final rest in unification with God. 
The Son makes. He is understood as the divine archetype of all that is, and from 
which all things radiate (Moran, 79, 1990). God the Son, in His incomprehensible 
creativity, conceives eternal ideas that are the prototypes of all created things. These 
ideas are appropriately called primordial causes, for they are the source of the material 
universe. Such things as beauty, truth, wisdom, unity and a multitude of other good things 
should be included here. The primordial causes render a created thing to be what it is and 
continually sustain it through all time and beyond. The Son is the “… form of all 
intelligible life. For otherwise it remains imperfect and without form” (Eriugena, Bk. II, 
548 C). Once again we note the importance of the seven liberal arts as the Logos 
manifested with the art of dialectic especially giving rational expression to the analysis 
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and synthesis of the cosmos. 
The Holy Spirit perfects. It is understood as that which distributes the divine 
causes in accordance with its own divine order. “Finally, the distribution of all the causes 
which the Father created in His word generically and essentially we find allotted by the 
divine word to the Holy Spirit” (Eriugena, Bk. II, 563 B). God the Holy Spirit in this 
eternal activity brings all creatures to a state of immutable rest. He operates in time and 
space, through accidents and essentials to fulfill His creation and return it unto Himself. 
And this return is led back to Him by redeemed humanity. Essentially, God the Father 
wills rational beings that God the Son creates and that God the Spirit perfects. Thus all 
nature is resolved into Eriugena‟s fourth division, that which neither creates nor is 
created. By Trinity, we mean that unexplainable idea that is a unity of three substances in 
one essence, as Eriugena accepted it, and as a being reflected in the created order in terms 
of essence, power, and operation. “There is no way of signifying by verb or noun or any 
other part of articulated speech how the supreme and causal essence of all things can be 
signified. For it is not unity or trinity of such a kind as can be conceived by any human 
intellect however pure…” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 456 A). 
Special Consideration of the Word Incarnate 
Our final presupposition is the Word, the Logos, Christ and the very special 
considerations which attend it. The reason for this is the unique nature of the Word as 
understood by Eriugena. Philosophy is the love of wisdom, and Christ is essentially 
wisdom; not simply spiritual but all wisdom. The Logos is the intersection point where 
the knower and the known become one. Thus, to employ dialectic of any sort, theoretical 
or practical, is to engage the mind of Christ Himself. The mathematician solving his 
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problems or the artist painting a landscape are both striving for a unity with Christ, 
though neither may recognize it as such. The Word, who was prior to all space and time, 
decreed that His wisdom must abide throughout all creatures that would become material 
in space and time. Essentially, the mathematician and the artist are merely capturing the 
rationality that the logos has posited already. Thus, they are engaging Him directly. “… 
Christ, who understands all things, indeed is the understanding of all things, really unified 
all that He assured…” (Eriugena, Bk. II, 545 B). And then even more to the point for our 
study: “… who doubts that what first took place in the Head and Exemplar of the whole 
of human nature will eventually happen in the whole…” (Eriugena, Bk. II, 545 B). And 
further, “For He was made perfect man. For He left nothing of man except sin, that He 
would receive into the unity of His substance…” (Eriugena, Bk. II, 541 C). 
The incarnation of the Word was not a temporal event in history, but history itself. 
Our use of the term „history‟, as we use it in this context, requires some explanation. We 
use it to include the entire sweep and drama of the human experience as it unfolds from 
creation to final restoration. For us, it includes future eschatological events as well as past 
occurences. This meaning stands opposed to the common use of the word „history‟ as a 
branch of knowledge which concerns past events. For Eriugena, conventional history is a 
contingent area of study, and as J.C Marler has pointed out in his article “The Eriugenian 
Tension Between History and Eschatology,” it has conventional time as its originating 
principle. The fall, which succeeds the evil will, although itself not an event in time, does 
initiate time. Thus, conventional history is a study of accidents and is inseperable from 
the problem of evil (Marler, 2002, 34). We will discuss the important conceptions datum 
and donum below, but for now it is sufficient to say that a datum is a descending gift and 
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donum an ascending and greater gift. Conventional history is the study of the particular 
accidents which result from the corruption of datum. Returning to the original, broad 
meaning of history, it is fair to say that the Logos entirely circumscribes it, for in 
descending He took upon Himself the whole of human nature (Eriugena, Bk. V, 923 C). 
He restores the datum to its original pristine condition. Moreover, it is not just human 
history in all its multiplicity that finds its completion in the Logos but also natural 
history, for the Word assumed this responsibility when He descended into human nature 
(Marler, 2002, 33). 
“Therefore in the Only-Begotten Word of God, Incarnate and made man, the 
whole world is restored even now according to its species, but at the end the world will 
return universally and in its genus. For what He wrought specially in Himself He will 
perfect generally in all; and not only in all men but in every sensible creature. For when 
the Word of God took upon Himself our human nature He also took upon Himself every 
created substance which is contained in that nature” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 912 B). In other 
words, the manifestation of the divine essence in man is not defined by history; rather, 
history is defined by it.  Indeed, all knowledge is defined by it, and all truth is derived 
from it. Thus, we return to our earlier postulate that even the most fundamental truths of 








Chapter III: Overview of the Periphyseon 
Modes of Being and Not-being 
The Periphyseon begins with no fanfare, just a straightforward statement made by 
one learned philosopher skilled in his discipline to a student trying to become equally as 
skilled: “As I frequently ponder and, so far as my talents allow, ever more carefully 
investigate that the first and fundamental division of all things which either can be 
grasped by the mind or lie beyond its grasp is into those that are and those that are not, 
there comes to mind as a general term for them all what… in Latin [is called] Natura” 
(Eriugena, Bk. I, 441A). Therefore, the mind is the keystone of our all-encompassing 
universe, the totality of all things. Those things that the mind can grasp can be defined, 
those things that it cannot grasp are unbounded, thus undefined. For what the mind 
cannot understand cannot in any manner be bound, and so must remain undefined. All of 
these things, whether understood by the mind or not, can be said to be, or not be, in 
accordance with five separate modes of interpretation (Eriugena, Bk. I, 443 A). 
The first mode is “… that by means of which reason convinces us that all things 
which fall within the perception of bodily sense or intelligence are truly and reasonably 
said to be, but those which because of the excellence of their nature elude not only all 
sense but also all intellect and reason rightly seem not to be …” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 443 B). 
The first subset of the first mode is denoted easily enough, material objects are said to be, 
for they lie within the perception of our senses. However, for the second Eriugena relies 
on the example cited by the Pseudo-Dionysius and Gregory of Nyssa: God is said not to 
be, for He is the essence of all other things and can be thought of as being beyond them. 
His nature exceeds all sense perception, all intellect, all reason, and even all truth. Just as 
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His knowledge is prior to all created intellect, nothing created can rise to it. One could 
ask how we can even know that God exists. Eriugena stresses that we know through 
accidents, that is, things that could have been different than they are, for these are 
somehow mysteriously added to God‟s essence. We can know the accidents, therefore we 
can know that God is, but we can never know what God is. This first mode of being is not 
simply a restatement of the Dionysian idea that God‟s being is non-being in a 
transcendent manner. Rather, God can be said not to be, for any nature unknowable by 
the human mind can likewise be said not to be. This mode has important implications for 
the entire Periphyseon and the following four modes are variations of it (Carabine, 2000, 
38). 
The second mode of interpretation involves the order and gradations in the created 
universe. This order begins with the highest intellectual creature and extends downward 
to the most irrational part of the soul. Then it ascends upward from the lowest part of the 
soul to the highest intellectual creature. The negation of a lower order yields the 
affirmation of a higher one; conversely, the affirmation of a lower order yields the 
negation of a higher one. Thus, any one species in the hierarchy can be said to be and not 
to be. Eriugena uses the example of an angel and a man; to be an angel means not being a 
man, and being a man means not being an angel. This process confirms that there is a 
highest created being for the upward negation leaves just one being than which nothing is 
higher, i.e. God; and a lowest for the downward negation leaves just one being than 
which nothing is lower, i.e. material nature (Eriugena, Bk. I, 444 A). Now, it is very 
important to note that this hierarchy is one of being, not simply knowing, for if these 
levels are merely mental then one can never affirm or negate. By this, we mean that a 
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thing with a higher intellectual nature actually has a higher level of being. In other words, 
something that exists and thinks occupies a place in a hierarchy which is above 
something which merely exists. God is the only thing that truly exists; all created things 
exist only insofar as they participate in Him (Carrabine, 2000, 39). Each level has a 
certain status that it cannot transcend, for the next highest level defines it. A particular 
level can be said to be in so far as it is known by itself and those above, but not to be 
insofar as it will not allow itself to be known by the levels below it. Eriugena is strictly 
relying on the art of dialectic in outlining this second mode. This is a further 
reinforcement of the principle that God cannot be known directly by us. However, it 
tends to counter His assertion that God cannot comprehend Himself since every order 
does know itself. Of course, Aquinas would argue that God does comprehend Himself 
(Aquinas, Summ. Theo., Ques. 14, Art. 2, 194), and we are inclined to agree. This 
problem will be treated below. 
The third mode of interpretation is made manifest in the dynamic nature of the 
created world and involves visible things and things unseen yet potential in their causes. 
“For whatsoever of these causes through generation is known as to matter and form, as to 
times and places, is by a certain human convention said to be, while whatsoever is still 
held in those folds of nature and is not manifest as to form and matter, place and time, … 
is said not to be” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 444 D). This third mode will be of special interest to 
us in our study, for Eriugena says that God, in making that first and one man in His 
image, made all other men at that time even though they were not brought into physical 
existence at the same time. Thus, the incarnation of Christ, though it occurred in time and 
space, must somehow transcend time and space. It is a defining moment in history, even 
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though it is not the beginning of history in a temporal sense. Examples of the third mode 
are numerous in nature. The latent oak tree is said to not be when viewing the acorn, yet 
it is said to be potentially in its cause. For Eriugena, God brought all things into existence 
at the same time and from nothing, yet some, even most, of those things are not yet 
manifest; they are hidden in the secret recesses of nature to be unveiled according to 
some sequence known only to Him. 
The fourth mode of interpretation holds that only those things which are 
contemplated by the intellect alone are truly said to be while those things which are in a 
state of becoming are said to not be (Eriugena, Bk. I, 445 C). Eriugena says that this 
mode is “according to the philosophers,” and by this he surely means Plato. We recognize 
the realm of ideas, forms, which alone truly exists. Those material things in this material 
world are only images and cannot be understood to truly be. The circle truly is; the wheel 
is a mere copy of it and cannot be understood to be, for in the course of time it passes 
away. 
The fifth mode of interpretation involves human nature only, and for this reason it 
will also hold special relevance for our study. When man sinned, he renounced his special 
status as a divine image and lost part of his being. He lost the harmonious, ordering part, 
which tends to keep all other parts in proper perspective. In other words, when man lost 
his ordered relationship with God, he, at the same time and in the same manner, lost it 
with himself. In this way, he is understood not to be. However, when restored through the 
grace of Christ he is brought back and fully recovers that part of his substance which was 
lost and is said to be (Eriugena, Bk. I, 445 C). God can be understood to call the things 
that are as well as the things that are not, in other words, those who have been resurrected 
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and those who have not yet been. This even includes those men not yet born; they are 
called from the secret folds of nature. This last mode speaks most markedly to what the 
essential nature of sin is, i.e. a broken relationship. Why else would God need to call? 
The evil act is sinful, but it is secondary to the evil will, which in turn is secondary to the 
broken relationship. For sure this is what was meant when Christ claimed to be the 
fulfillment of ancient law. No one can keep the law; moreover, no one can fully 
overcome his evil will. What one can do is restore his relationship, and if he succeeds 
here the rest will follow. He can answer that call now or later but answer he will, for in so 
doing he recovers his own being. “God daily calls forth from the secret folds of nature in 
which they are considered not to be” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 445 D). We must remember that 
time is a mental construction, thus those in the secret folds of nature are the unborn as 
well as the dead. 
Four Divisions of Nature 
First Division- God as Creator 
Eriugena employs the term nature to mean all that is, or is not, and all the mind 
can grasp or cannot grasp. In other words, he means that celestial bodies, angels, demons, 
ideas, virtues, etc. are all included. So his first task is to give some structure to this vast 
totality of things and he accomplishes this through the famous four-fold division of nature. 
“It is my opinion that the division of nature by means of four differences results in four 
species (being divided). First into that which creates and is not created, secondly into that 
which is created and also creates, thirdly into that which is created and does not create, 
while the fourth neither creates nor is created” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 442 A). The first and 
fourth are essentially the same, but we contemplate them differently: God as cause as 
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opposed to God as end. In other words, God is always one and the same. However, when 
the mind considers Him, it does so only insofar as it is able, i.e. in the various ways in 
which He draws the mind. Granted our own existence, any reflection would lead us to ask 
from what source and for what purpose is that existence. The first is God as a cause, the 
second is God as an end. We now address the first division. 
The first division, God as that which creates and is not created, is a very 
traditional notion and perhaps the one most comfortable to us. He is the source of all that 
we perceive, and nothing, at least nothing outside of Him, is the source of Him. He makes 
the world from scratch, or better said, from nothing. Yet this notion of God is perhaps the 
most problematic one for the philosopher, for it involves a leap from a realm of nothing 
to a realm of something, invisible to visible, spiritual to physical. Eriugena makes this 
leap by postulating an understanding of God in terms of creation. In fact, the first three of 
his divisions of nature presuppose this. Except for the fourth division of nature, God 
simply cannot be understood apart from His creative act. The first division of nature has a 
two-fold composition, the second part of which we can understand, the first part of which 
we cannot. We can grasp God as creator, but not as uncreated. We can know that He is, 
but not what He is. 
Eriugena employs interesting and appropriate methods for studying both 
components of his first division of nature. The first we have already touched upon, and 
this is the theophany. Properly, of course, theophany describes only the third division of 
nature. However, we, who are creatures of this third division, being temporally and 
locally constrained by it, use what we see to study nature in the first division. Maximus 
the Confessor teaches that the theophany is an accident attached to the essence of God, a 
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downward manifestation of God‟s creative will in which God‟s ideas become material 
(Eriugena, Bk. I, 449 A-C). Our senses perceive the material object, yet our intellect tells 
us that it is a theophany of God. The objects of the world are numerous beyond 
imagination, ordered, beautiful, and seemingly infinite, thereby attesting to their creation 
by a seemingly infinite God.  This line of reasoning brings on a perplexing question from 
the Alumnus: could God not be thought of as actually creating Himself through his 
theophanies? Some of the Holy Fathers assert just that. In other words, if God could have 
essence only in terms of His creation, in manifesting His creation does He not also create 
Himself? The Nutritor answers in such a way as to clarify the definition. It is not God‟s 
essence that is created but merely our understanding of His essence. God is said to be 
made only in that He actualizes His will in us. “… [T]he motion of the Divine Nature is 
to be understood as nothing else but the purpose of the Divine Will to establish the things 
that are to be made. Therefore it is said that in all things the Divine Nature is being made, 
which is nothing else than the Divine Will. For in that Nature being is not different from 
willing, but willing and being are one and the same in the establishment of all things that 
are to be made” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 453 C-D). 
To study the uncreated component to the definition of the First Division of 
Nature, Eriugena must first proceed upward from the material aspect of the world to that 
which underlies it and for this he relies on Aristotle. The “shrewdest among the Greeks” 
had posited ten universal genera, or categories, used to discover the way of all natural 
things. These were: substance, quantity, relation, quality, place, time, situation, condition, 
action and passion. Although we have taken a step upward, and gotten beyond the 
material aspects of this world, we still have a long way to go for as we examine these ten 
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categories we find that God cannot be circumscribed by any of them. Surely He is beyond 
or perhaps in all places, and the same can be said for all the other nine categories. So 
Eriugena resorts to the important method of negative theology. Traces of this method can 
be discerned in the writings of most of the sources high-lighted in Chapter I, but none 
more so than the Pseudo-Dionysius. As noted in Chapter I, it is Dionysius that Eriugena 
always cites when he employs negative theology. 
Positive statements about God affirm the truth of His nature but not the entire 
truth, for they proclaim only the creating part of His nature, not the uncreating. For 
example, let us quote the famous passage of I John 4:7, “God is love.” Now surely this is 
true; however, it is not exclusively true and does not capture the whole truth. In other 
words, we could say that an animal is a horse, but we cannot stop there if we are trying to 
understand the essence of what an animal is. Returning to I John 4:7, God is love, but 
indeed He is much more than love: He is all love and the original cause of all love. We 
can draw similar conclusions concerning all positive statements concerning God. He is, 
yet we can just as confidently say that He is not, for He is beyond what He is and 
transcends it. This inherent tension demands the employment of negative theology for 
Eriugena. In this twist of conventional logic, negative statements which are essentially de 
dicto come closer to capturing God‟s nature than positive de re statements. Again and 
again Eriugena strives to stay with his method and is largely successful in doing so. 
Negative theology is more removed from the senses, therefore it is the more appropriate 
method to study God. “For whatever negation you make about Him will be a true 
negation, but not every affirmation you make will be a true affirmation. [He who can] … 
abandon all the senses and the operations of the intellect, together with the sensibles … 
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having achieved a state of not-knowing, is restored to the unity -as far as possible” 
(Eriugena, Bk. I, 510 C). Viewed in the common parlance of descriptive language, 
positive statements about God are not considered false, but they are less complete than 
negative ones. Affirmative propositions cannot withstand the scrutiny of penetrating 
reflection. They are indeed practical in the study of scripture and for the child-like 
acceptance of faith, but not as appropriate for philosophical speculation. Eriugena holds 
that positive statements are valuable for we never think anything unworthy of God when 
employing them. They are for those people “who thus far have been nourished in the 
nursery of the church” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 511 C). Yet the names that scripture uses to 
denote God, such as Sun, Light, Rain, River, Lion, Dove, etc. all refer to His creating 
nature, not His uncreated nature. Hearing such things predicated of God can deceive the 
soul more readily than unlike things. The soul is rational, but limited, and may tend to 
become confused and actually think that natural things are properly predicated of God. 
However, when things contrary to nature are predicated of God, the soul discerns them 
correctly. It either judges them as false and rejects them entirely or acknowledges them 
with the understanding that they are said figuratively (Eriugena, Bk. I, 512 B). 
Notwithstanding the constant reliance on negative theology, Eriugena seems to 
understand that this technique is fundamentally grounded in the affirmation so far as 
human understanding is concerned. In other words, we humans must know something in 
a primordial way in order to negate that which we know. In our earlier example, God is 
love, yet He is not love for He surpasses love; He is super love. We must discourse for 
one moment on the word „super,‟ for we do not use it herein in the conventional way of 
meaning. Common parlance takes the word super to mean better than the rest. When we 
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say that Tiger Woods is a super golfer, Naomi Campbell is a supermodel or Spiderman is 
a superhero we do not literally mean they are in a class by themselves. We simply mean 
that they do what they do better than most, perhaps all other golfers, models, or heroes. 
There may well be other supers. However, God is uniquely „super‟ love for there is no 
other in His class. He has a certain uniqueness that rises above all the particular 
manifestations of love. He is the cause of all the particulars, not one of them. God loves 
more than any others, but He is not a „super‟ lover for this reason. He is a „super‟ lover 
because all the other lovers derive their essence from him. Take the example of space. 
God must be a being who transcends the three dimensions of length, width, and depth, yet 
each of these particulars receive their essence from Him. We thus postulate that God is a 
being who resides infinitely in infinite dimensions. This is not to suggest that God might 
be thought of as merely a being of infinite extension, a claim which nearly every 
medieval philosopher would deny. We see their denial as being correct, for a rational man 
cannot conceptualize beyond three spatial dimensions, and surely God cannot be 
circumscribed by infinite space. Rather, our postulate asserts that God exists beyond 
infinite dimensions, thus defining them all. The same can be said of each one of His 
infinite attributes. One must keep in mind that the entire dialectical process begins with 
the affirmation of what we know and then advances via the liberal arts. There can be no 
grounding in something that we do not know. We know it, bind it, define it, and negate it. 
Then we realize that what appeared to be a contradiction is in no way a mutual opposition 
when we apply it to divine nature (Eriugena, Bk. I, 461 B). However, the entire exercise 
must have its origin in something that is known.  
We conclude this discussion of the first division of nature with the summation 
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that it has a two-fold composition insofar as we may understand it. God as creator, we 
grasp through the theophany of His effects. God as uncreated, we grasp through 
employment of the liberal arts, the very well-spring of the human soul. Already we see 
here a possible reconciliation for a problem that would soon vex medieval philosophy. 
The Christian theologians held that God created freely and many of the Islamic 
philosophers held that God had to create. Both may be right depending on which 
understanding of God prevails in the mindset. The Christian seems right when viewing 
God as theophany, the Islamic philosopher when viewing God as understood through the 
arts. 
The Second Division- The Primordial Causes 
The second division of nature is that which is created and also creates. These are 
the divine exemplars, and here we find Eriugena giving a decidedly Christian 
interpretation to Plato. These divine exemplars, or primordial causes, are created by God 
and they in turn create the particulars which we sense, but not in temporal order. 
Eriugena introduces them through an interpretation of the Genesis text. When Moses 
wrote that in the beginning the world was “void and waste,” this was not to be understood 
in a temporal way but rather that the sensible world could not be understood apart from 
its formation by the primordial causes. It was “… void of every sensible thing in its 
effects until it issued forth into the genera and species of sensible nature” (Eriugena, Bk. 
II, 549 A). It was “…[w]aste because the understanding of the prophet who was initiated 
into the Divine mysteries had as yet beheld no quality, no quantity, nothing filled out by 
corporeal matter…” (Eriugena, Bk. II, 549 B). Thus the language “void and waste” was 
complete and perfect. Moreover, it meant that Moses in writing the Genesis text was 
80 
 
actually displaying knowledge of the highest sort, that of unknowing. The prophet surely 
had observed things “filled out by corporeal matter” yet in his initiation in “Divine 
Mysteries” he had actually beheld no such thing. Moreover, the words “void and waste” 
were, even in common language, used to praise the beauty and order of the universe. In 
an explicit call to the liberal arts of music and astronomy, Eriugena wrote the upper 
regions of air and space were termed void and waste to denote that which was pure and 
bright. “For it is the most serene save for the harmonious symphonies of the planets and 
surpasses every mortal and earthly sense by the high pitch of its tone and semitones” 
(Eriugena, Bk. II, 549 C). The divine exemplars are pure and ideal forms, patterns 
through which the sensibles receive their composition. They exist ever and always yet 
dependent upon God for their own being. 
Of course, Plato had come up with this scheme thirteen hundred years before. He 
taught that there existed an ideal world of forms, a world of being, separate and distinct 
from this material world of becoming. All the things that we see here are but images of 
the ideal world. Things here are imperfect and constantly changing, things there are 
perfect and always the same. Thus, the only way for us to have true knowledge was to 
study that real world of being where the forms are eternal. Plato never said where this 
real world was located though surely it could not be a place in local terms. Philo of 
Alexandria (circa 20 BCE- 40 AD) advanced upon this theory of Plato by placing this 
real world in the mind of God. “What Plato called the forms (in the higher world) were 
really the thoughts of God” (Solomon, Higgins, 1996, 112-113). Eriugena follows this 
thinking, and even goes so far as to call these primordial exemplars predefinitions or 
predestinations. God has them in His mind before they are actualized in corporeal matter 
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(Eriugena, Bk. II, 529 B). Not in a temporal sense but in logical priority the body of a 
man exists in God‟s mind before it exists in flesh and bone and the same can be said for 
any other creature. With this doctrine of primordial causes, Eriugena has lessened the gap 
between God and His creation. 
We could perhaps raise the question as to precisely how the primordial causes are 
to be studied, and also ask if we can know of their truth. It should be recalled from our 
discourse on the first division of nature that we studied it using a two-fold process, first 
by studying God as creator via His effects, and secondly God as uncreated through 
intellection. We do not employ that process with the second division of nature for we 
study it via the intellect alone and only after we come to an understanding of God as 
uncreated. But it does seem to us that Eriugena‟s method is valid, for he conceives of 
God and creation as linked through a continuum of creative acts. They are distinct in 
essence, but clearly not mutually exclusive in regard to our knowledge. It even seems to 
us that Eriugena is able to theorize on primordial causes from a more advantageous 
position than Plato, for he had to appeal to reason alone. Eriugena appeals not only to 
pure reason but also to faith, for he continually says that faith comes first and prepares 
the way (Moran, 1989, 90). “For faith is nothing else, in my opinion, but a certain 
principle from which knowledge of the Creator begins to emerge in the rational nature” 
(Eriugena, Bk. II, 551 C). And writing later in life, in his Prologue, he states “… faith 
necessarily enters first into the tomb of Holy Scripture, followed by the intellect, for 
which faith has prepared the entry” (Eriugena, Hom. St. John,  2000, Ch. 3, 73).  
It seems to us that only a philosopher with both a theistic and a Platonic 
disposition of mind would accept this formulation of the second division of nature as that 
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which is created and creates. For instance, Plato, who came close in holding that his real 
world of being was a realm of divine exemplars, had no conception of a creating first 
cause. Thus, his real world might be construed as creating, but not being created. And 
both the Old Testament and the Quron, works which contain no notion of a Platonic 
world of being, hold that God created the world directly without intermediaries. 
However, Eriugena, who states that faith prepares the way, reconciles Platonism to 
Christianity in a novel manner: by placing the Trinity at a level just above the divine 
exemplars. Although Eriugena does not consider the Trinity as a divine exemplar, it 
causes all of them. He writes, “Before we consider … the primordial causes… [w]e 
should … say a few words about the first and supreme cause of all, I mean, about the 
Holy Trinity” (Eriugena, Bk. II, 556 A). “For the most high Trinity, creative of all things 
and by nothing created, made from nothing all that it made” (Eriugena, Bk. II, 580 C). 
The Trinity is higher than the primordial causes, for it informs all nature. For students of 
the Republic it may be thought of as corresponding to Plato‟s “the good.” All the lesser 
causes, as well the entire created realm, participate in the Trinity (Eriugena, Bk. II, 560 
A). The procession radiates downward through gift and returns upward through grace. 
Both gift and grace are essentially the same thing considered from two different 
perspectives. As noted above, the Father makes, the Son wills, and the Spirit perfects in 
an infinite manifestation into discernibles and resolution into unity (Eriugena, 1987, 553 
C). The division and return is eternally synchronized by the art of dialectic. Lesser 
primordial causes derive from the Trinity and these causes are themselves infinite. 
Eriugena names several of the lesser primordial causes which are most proximate to the 
Trinity. These are goodness through itself, being through itself, life through itself, reason, 
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intellect, wisdom, power, blessedness, justice, truth, eternity, magnitude, peace, love, 
omnipotence, unity, perfection (Eriugena, Bk. II, 622 B to 623 C). We could add courage, 
temperance, beauty, eloquence, and multitudes more.  
This section of the Periphyseon that treats of the second division of nature is an 
appropriate place to discourse on the topic of participation and here Eriugena borrows 
from Dionysius the Areopagite (Eriugena, Bk. III, 644B). Participation may be thought of 
as a kind of nontransitive relation resulting from God‟s downward manifestation into 
creation. All things in nature either participate or are participated in and some, such as the 
divine exemplars, do both. Strictly speaking, one level in the hierarchy receives its being 
from the levels above it and therefore participates in them. For example God, the cause of 
the divine exemplars, brings them into being, thus they participate in Him, not He in 
them. Likewise the divine exemplars bring man into being and man participates in them, 
not they in man. The key element in this participation is that it must be continuous and 
not terminating subsequent to some creative act. Thus, man is infinitely dependent upon 
God, not simply for his coming into being but rather for his being through all time and 
even beyond. This concept is the more discernible if one contemplates the primordial 
causes. They have no beginning in time and always participate in God. We need to 
reconsider, especially after we erroneously extend Newton‟s laws of mechanics into 
metaphysics, that a falling stone continues to fall until something stops it. This may be so 
in physics, but not in the metaphysics of Eriugena. The stone continues to fall because 
God sustains it in its falling, indeed in its very being. By contemplating the divine 
exemplars, we get a much better sense of this notion of participation because we clearly 
discern that the laws of mechanics simply do not apply to ideas; for us to have an idea we 
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must sustain it. All the more for God to have the idea of some divine exemplar He must 
sustain it. 
Eriugena‟s most effective example of the second division of nature is the monad, 
the unity from which all the mathematical sciences begin. It is created by God and it in 
turn creates all other numbers, i.e. the integers through multiples of the monad, the 
rational numbers. Eriugena refers to it throughout the Periphyseon. This raises the 
question of irrational numbers for they cannot be expressed as a proportion of integers. 
Does this mean that they cannot be thought of as having their divine exemplar in the 
monad? The answer seems to be no, for although there is no direct proportionality in the 
irrational numbers, they still have relation in the integers which have proportionality in 
the monad. For instance the number pi, 3.1416…, though irrational, still bears the relation 
of the circumference of a circle, divided by its diameter. The irrational numbers can still 
be understood as having their essence in the monad, even though they seem to represent 
some strange confluence between geometry and arithmetic that the average mind cannot 
fully synchronize. 
The monad is a good demonstration of the divine exemplars for a civilization that 
considers the number two as the first number. We posit the notion of truth as a better one 
for the philosopher. Of course, in the ninth century truth had a more or less standard 
meaning, grounded externally in the reality of things. This is not so today for we have 
various theories: correspondence for the lawyer, coherence for the scientist, pragmatic for 
the engineer, constructivist for the sociologist, etc. Each may have their place and each 
may even reach to the level demanded by the respective professions. Yet the divine 
exemplar, truth, is the cause of all others and precedes them. When the Word said, “I am 
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truth,” that was the definition of it given in time but preceding time. All truth is therefore 
derivative of the subject “I” in the above statement. Eriugena considers the divine 
examplar of supreme truth to be in the ninth position of importance after goodness, 
essence, life, reason, intellect, wisdom, power, and blessedness. Its highest “… 
participation is truth-through-itself, after which and through which… all truths are true” 
(Eriugena, Bk. III, 623 B). Like the other primordial causes, we do not comprehend it in 
itself, but rather through its effects. Thus, it would seem that the more we are able to 
simplify the effects, i.e. by abstracting particular phenomena from them, the better we are 
able to rise to the truth. One such example would be arithmetic, the pure art of numbers, 
which would be closer to supreme truth than, for instance, accounting, which has the 
particular of currency attached to pure numbers. Truths relating to Divine Nature are 
discovered through negative theology, or “Affirmation and Negation” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 
461 B). Statements such as “It is truth” appear to contradict statements such as “It is not 
truth.” However, these are not mutually opposed when applied to Divine Nature. The 
former statement does not properly affirm that the Divine Substance is truth, merely that 
it can be called truth. The latter statement more clearly demonstrates that the Divine 
Nature is beyond truth and is the cause of it (Eriugena, Bk. I, 461 B-C). Eriugena is clear 
that truth, to whatever extent it can be known, is such only because the Logos descended 
into the world. “…[O]ur sole quest should be joy in the truth, which is Christ…” 
(Eriugena, Bk. V, 989 A). “I should say that by these words of truth, or one might call 
them words of the Word, for truth is the Word, are meant none other than these causes 
and substances for these are immutable „reasons‟ of things, created in the wisdom of God, 
and in accordance with all things visible and invisible…” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 887 C). 
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Moreover, when Christ was present in this world He used audible words of speech, 
which, due to their source, can be counted as truth in itself. To mistake the false for the 
true is our greatest error, “[f]or there is no worse death than ignorance of the truth…” 
(Eriugena, Bk. III, 650 A). 
The Third Division- Corporeal Things 
The third division of nature is that which is created and does not create. This 
includes man and his physical world, angels, and demons. It is our world, the one that 
Aristotle says that we know best, and indeed many of us side with him. This third 
division of nature can be thought of as the concluding effects of God‟s creative act 
manifested downward through the primordial causes. Eriugena holds that it is the lowest 
state of nature “for the devolution of the universe ceases with them, having no place 
further whither to descend, for it is now established in the realm of corporeal objects” 
(Eriugena, Bk. IV, 743 C). 
This third division of nature is discussed in Book III of the Periphyseon, and 
Eriugena deals with the subject mainly through the creation account in Genesis. This is a 
natural course for our philosopher to follow because for him the third person of the 
Trinity is the “infinite founder” (Eriugena, Bk. III, 690 C) of the text. The actual author, 
presumably Moses, is relaying through figurative language what the Holy Spirit intended. 
The words “in the beginning” cannot be meant to signify a beginning in time because the 
continuum that the scientist calls time does not exist without the corporeal world. Thus, 
“in the beginning” refers to the condition of things that were, or perhaps better said, 
things that were not, prior to the first division of nature manifesting itself downward into 
the second. The words “empty and void” describe matter without form and the word 
87 
 
“darkness” signifies that the grandeur of the creation was hidden in God‟s mind. Eriugena 
discourses at length about the meaning of the phrase “let there be light.” Some of the 
early church fathers had held that this meant the creation of physical light as we know it 
and others maintained that this signified the creation of angelic and intellectual essence. 
Still others thought this referred to the creation of fire. Noting that scripture often refers 
to effects by the name of their cause and causes by the name of their effects, Eriugena 
concludes that these interpretations are reasonable. However, Augustine goes beyond 
them and says that the phrase “let there be light” refers instead to the planetary workings, 
as yet undiscovered, by which God manifested His physical laws. In other words, the 
division of light from darkness meant the enformation of formless matter into multiple 
forms we recognize (Eriugena, Bk. III, 691A-691 D). As we should expect, Eriugena 
goes further still and gives a more subtle interpretation. “Let there be light” refers to the 
creation act in which the primordial causes become manifested into the corporeal world. 
“In those words of Holy Scripture „let there be light,‟ [we] say that by the creation of 
light is signified the procession of the primordial causes into their effects” (Eriugena, Bk. 
III, 692 B). As noted above these causes are divine predefinitions hidden in their own 
mysterious darkness. God, as the first division of nature, impels them downward into the 
invisible, then into visible theophanies. So light is not so much a created thing as it is the 
way a created thing is known. Once again we see a certain priority of knowledge over 
being, however, this time it applies even to corporeal things. Hence, there is a high 
importance on the liberal arts, not simply for general knowledge of the material world, 
but active interpretation between the knower and the object known. Through this last and 
lowest manifestation of the creative act into discernible things, God surpasses all 
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understanding and “… suffers Himself to be in a kind of way understood” (Eriugena, Bk. 
III, 692 C). 
There is also in Book III a discussion on the meaning of the phrase “out of 
nothing” as this pertains to creation. The Alumnus asks what is signified by the word 
“nothing” (Eriugena, Bk. III, 634 B). Does it mean the privation of all essence, substance 
or accident or the excellence of divine super-essentiality? Earlier we noted that when 
discussing God via negative theology the word “nothing” was used in the latter sense. 
When we say God is as nothing we simply mean He is beyond all things, the super 
essential cause of them. However, when we talk about the “stuff” out of which God made 
the universe we use the term in the former sense. We rightly can say that the world is 
made from nothing because before it came into being there was complete privation of 
everything. The Christian authorities that Eriugena has cited, namely Origen, Gregory of 
Nyssa, Augustine, Dionysius, and Maximus, all seem to be in agreement here, that there 
is no pre-existing material that God uses to fashion into a world (Eriugena, Bk. III, 635 
A). Thus the word “create” has a very narrow meaning for Eriugena. The artist, the 
author, and the statesman do not, strictly speaking, create; they rearrange in novel ways. 
We often judge the artist by the more he can do with the less that he has. It was said that 
Paganini was never so great as when he, having broken three strings on his instrument, 
continued to astound the audience by playing masterfully on only one. God, as the first 
division of nature, does infinitely more. He shows up to a concert with no violin, to say 
nothing of the music or audience. He alone creates something out of nothing. Here 
Eriugena is at odds with some of the pagan Greek philosophers such as Plato in the 
Timaeus, for they had taught that God simply arranged the world from a certain 
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unformed matter that existed co-eternally with Him. While Eriugena does not deny the 
notion of unformed matter, he certainly rejects the idea that it is co-eternal with God. 
“For He who made the world from unformed matter also made unformed matter out of 
nothing at all” (Eriugena, Bk. III, 636 D). Once again Eriugena likens the creative act to 
the liberal arts “just as all numbers burst forth from the monad and all radii from the 
centre” (Eriugena, Bk. III, 637 A). However, this discussion of unformed matter seems to 
lead Eriugena into a difficult dilemma, for it suggests that God has created in an 
unworthy manner. In other words, He who is eternal and immutable has created 
unformed matter which is temporal and mutable. Thus, the world is an accident. The 
ingenious and bold solution is to show that it is both eternal and made (Eriugena, Bk. III, 
638 C).  
At first glance, these two aspects of a thing being eternal and made appear to 
contend with one another. Yet Eriugena insists that the universe is both eternal and made 
at the same time and, moreover, that a careful investigation by reason will reconcile the 
two. Eriugena discourses for approximately twenty-four thousand words, over a third of 
Book III, to argue this point. Augustine had claimed in Book XI, 7, and Book XII, 29 of 
the Confessions, that God could not be separated from His acts. While we tend to view 
the creation as an event that occurred at some point in time, this is simply the usual mode 
of our mindset. Understood from God‟s perspective, the creation is eternal. “Therefore 
you say once and forever all that you say by the Word, who is co-eternal with you. 
Whatever you say shall be made...” (Augustine, Con., 1960, Bk. XI, Ch. 7, 283). Erigena 
drives this argument to its paradoxical end; all things are both eternal and made. In 
essence, to view the creation of this world in the common mode of a past event that just 
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happened is to focus solely on the made part of the equation and to lose sight of who 
made it. Eriugena maintains fervently that there is no separation between Creator and 
creature. To view the creation is not an add-on to God‟s nature but it is His nature 
through and through, eternal in Him. 
“Nutritor: Is God receptive of accidents? 
Alumnus: His nature is simple and more than simple, and free and more than free                       
from all accident. 
Nutritor: Then nothing in God is an accident? 
Alumnus: Nothing at all. 
Nutritor: Then it was not an accident in Him to establish the universe and  
Creatures” (Eriugena, Bk. III, 639 A). 
In other words there is one creation and God knows its property, through its 
predefinitions, as spoken in the Word. Man is capable of viewing this creation from two 
perspectives; eternally in its causes, or temporally in its effects (Moran, 1989, 232-234). 
In bringing the discourse on all things being eternal and made to a conclusion, 
Eriugena returns to a familiar example from the liberal arts. “Arithmetic is the science of 
numbers, not of those which we count but of those by which we count” (Eriugena, Bk. 
III, 651 A). It finds its eternal cause in the unity of the monad. This unity is not simply 
the beginning but the middle and end of all numbers. The various numbers can be viewed 
as being made since all have some multiple to the monad, i.e. in their effects, yet they are 
eternal in their cause.  
The Fourth Division- God as End 
The fourth division of nature, that which neither creates nor is created, is the most 
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original and bold contribution of Eriugena. He grants that the exposition of this division 
is the most challenging of all. Up until now we have sailed in calm waters, steering a safe 
course without fear of disaster. “Now, however, we enter upon a voyage where the course 
has to be picked from the mass of tortuous digressions, where we have to climb the steeps 
of obscure doctrines, encounter the region of the Syrtes, that is to say, the dangers of the 
currents of unfamiliar teaching, ever in immediate danger of shipwreck in the obscurity 
of the subtlest intellects, which like concealed rocks may suddenly split our vessel” 
(Eriugena, Bk. IV, 744 A). The first three divisions of nature all dealt with the outward 
manifestation of God‟s goodness, however, this fourth division concerns the inward. It is 
God calling His creation back to Him, eternally home to rest with Him and in Him. We 
set the stage for this study of homecoming by addressing ourselves to a proposition made 
by Plato in the Symposium. The wise priestess, Diotima of Mantinea, tells Socrates that 
man being mortal seeks to be immortal. For this reason he creates in the form of other 
men: works of art, literature, and laws. These things live after him and he continues to 
live through them. To live forever is man‟s ultimate desire; he creates in order to live 
(Plato, Sym., 1970, 207 A- 209 A). However, in refutation of apparent wisdom of 
Diotima we ask the mother, the artist, the author, the statesman: do you create to live, or 
do you live to create? We are quite sure that the mother, the artist, the author, the 
statesman, per se, will always choose the latter. The answer is not a simple one, for being 
a man means being an image of God, which means being a creator insofar as we are able. 
Of course we cannot literally make something from nothing, and few of us can even 
approach Paganini. However, to the extent that we are an image we have a share in the 
act of creating. Moreover, we have a share in the act of living. Our final answer is that the 
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two are so intertwined that they cannot be separated either for God or man. The living is 
the creating, the creating is the living. This is so for God as source and end, likewise it is 
so for man as God‟s image. 
God‟s creative acts manifested outward in the first three divisions of nature are 
resolved inward in the fourth to live and rest eternally. God will be all in all, as He has 
always been, is, and will always be. The entire process of creating, resolving, and resting 
is an eternal one always abiding in the living. From our limited time bound perspective, 
we view it, write in it, and even philosophize about it the only way we can, in temporal 
fashion. It is therefore fitting that Eriugena continues to cite the creation in Genesis even 
in the fourth and fifth books so as to highlight the idea that an end for creation can only 
be understood in terms of the beginning.  
Early on in Book I, Eriugena had posed the question of why there even needed to 
be a return. Could not creation proceed in linear mode, always reaching for its own 
infinity? No, because creation has no value apart from its creator. Through the creative 
act, God vests the world in worth, most notably His worth (Carabine, 2000, 94). Only 
through the return can creation become complete. Similarly, we could ask Diotima: if 
man were to live forever and never create anything, what would be the point? “For it 
[Divine Power] is above every likeness and surpasses every example and while by itself 
and in itself it is immutably and eternally at rest, yet it is said to move all things since 
through it and in it subsist and have been brought from not-being into being, for by its 
being, all things proceed out of nothing, and it draws all things to itself” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 
521 C). This bond is appropriately called love. God loves His creation with such eternal 
compassion, indeed the bond is His very being, that unity ultimately prevails. Eriugena 
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gives numerous examples from nature that mirror this return process. The magnet draws 
iron back to itself. The planets, stars, sun and moon all return eventually to their original 
positions. Sensible light fills the entire visible realm yet remains ever immutable in its 
source. And once again we have the example of the seven liberal arts, which are complete 
and immutable in themselves. This can be understood to move rational minds in 
accordance with eternal principles (Eriugena, Bk. I, 520 B- 521 B). 
Having discussed the essential reason why all things must return to God we turn 
our attention to the proximate. Man is not now with God; he is not now with God because 
he has fallen through the sin of Adam. Of course, this only explains why man must return 
to God, not the remainder of creation. The astounding solution here is that the remainder 
of creation abides in man and through man. All else, planets, animals, rocks, plants, stars, 
everything is created in man. Thus, when man fell he took all of creation down with him, 
save angels, and when man returns again he takes all creation back with him. “He has 
created in man all the creatures visible and invisible, for the whole spread of creation is 
understood to inhere in man…. There is nothing naturally present in the celestial essences 
which does not subsist essentially in man. For there is innate in him intellect and 
reason…” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 764 A). Therefore, even angels are created in man, even 
more amazing demons, most amazingly Satan himself. We do know why God chose one 
particular species to create all others through, and this is so that His supreme rank in the 
order of all nature is most appropriately reflected in that of created nature. “Just as the 
Primal Archetype transcends all by the excellence of His Essence, so His image should 
transcend all created things in dignity and grace” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 764 B). 
Midway through the lengthy argument on why all things must return to their 
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origin, Eriugena makes a claim that many of his sources would not agree with. Eriugena 
holds that the knowledge of a thing is higher than the thing itself (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 765). 
We must challenge this idea for it seems controversial, and yet it is the keystone of 
Eriugena‟s continued speculation. Supposing we have complete knowledge of a thing, is 
that really better than the thing? Most of us would be tempted to answer no. However, let 
us posit some functional object, such as a space shuttle, or even some work of art, such as 
Rodin‟s “The Thinker.” Cannot the knowledge contained in the thousands of intellects 
who assembled the space shuttle or the artistry of Rodin be thought of as being prior to, 
therefore better than, the object? We are inclined to agree, at least to the extent that 
knowledge of the object cannot be less than the object in any case and greater in the vast 
majority of cases. Here our philosopher quotes and fully agrees with Augustine, “… the 
phantasm of a body in the mind is better than the species of the body, inasmuch as it is in 
a better nature, namely in a vital substance, for such the mind is” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 766 
B). It seems appropriate to reflect on Augustine‟s Concerning the Teacher here, for the 
same idea is advanced in that work, and Eriugena is likely relying on it. “…[E]verything 
that exists because of another is inferior to that because of which it exists” (Augustine, 
Teacher, 1938, Ch. 9, 36). In our case, the space shuttle and “The Thinker” exist due to 
the knowledge of their respective makers; therefore the knowledge is greater than the 
object. Again, we have the example of the liberal arts which pre-exist in the mind and 
again we encounter the concept that knowledge is prior to being. So, returning to the 
example of “The Thinker,” for simplicity we can say that a certain trinity is established 
for the mind (Rodin), its skill (Rodin‟s talent), and the art (The Thinker) are all of the 
same substance. The latter two are not to be thought as potencies of the mind but rather as 
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substantial and constituent parts of the mind, a co-natural trinity that is co-essential and 
co-equal in itself (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 767 A- 768 A). Both the catholic faith and truth 
assent to this teaching. We are now in a position to define man as follows: “Man is a 
certain intellectual concept formed eternally in the mind of God” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 768 
B). From God‟s perspective this is all that is needed, a definition, complete and simple. 
Of course this definition will not do for us because it includes too much. We may refine it 
by adding that man is a mortal, rational animal in the customary way. Still the most 
important element, the essential nature, is that idea in the mind of God. It precedes all 
men, and is all men, and ever will precede and be all men. It is the Word, Logos, Christ 
Himself. Thus, no man can rightly claim that he is something else. He may claim to be a 
Muslim or a Jew, but he cannot claim that he is his own man, or that he is an image of 
any other apart from that first man. Every man is different than he otherwise would have 
been had not the Word been first.  
Eriugena‟s conception of the return to unity, the fulfillment of the fourth division 
of nature, is founded upon the incarnation of the Word. Prior to all time, the Word 
descended in time so as to redeem the effects of those causes that are eternally present in 
the Word. The return of all things occurs in man, however, it is always accomplished 
within a Christological framework (Carabine, 2001, 97). As in the earlier divisions, there 
is always some tension between the concepts of gift and grace. However, in the return, 
grace is the clear dominant. Whereas gift is a datum, a calling forth from nothingness into 
created nature, grace is a donum, a calling beyond which brings man into unity with God 
Himself (Eriugena, Bk. V, 905 A). “… [T]he general resurrection of the dead, of the 
wicked as well as of the good, could not be effected without the grace of the Redeemer to 
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achieve it: so that if God, the Word, had not been made flesh and had not made His 
dwelling with men and had not taken upon Himself the whole of our human nature, in 
which He suffered and arose from the dead, there would be no resurrection of the dead at 
all” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 899 B). The incarnation of the Word is the point of beginning in 
which the created realm finds its rest.  
We now turn to that instant which initiates the dynamic movement from gift to 
grace: the fall. The account of the creation of Adam is not to be understood as the 
creation of one individual man but rather of all men in general. “For the name Adam is 
not here given to the creature as later on in the story, but the name given to the man who 
was created is of universal application” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 797 A). The creation story of 
Genesis is not the story of one man in history, it is the story of all men past, present, and 
future. Man was created in God‟s image. The essence that lies behind the image is not the 
essence of one image only, but of all. In other words, we are all the images of God, not of 
Adam, one individual in time. “Therefore, all human nature which has endured from the 
beginning until now is an image of Him who truly exists” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 797 C). This 
especially includes Eve; she is not second, she is co-eternal just as all the rest of us. God 
creates in love, in wisdom, gift and grace, not in time. Nor does He create in gender, for 
in that one eternal creation of man there was neither male nor female. This separation of 
man into two genders occurs after the fall, or better said, as a result of the fall, not before. 
Man was originally created in paradise, which is to say, he was created in a state of 
complete communion with God. This condition is what the Garden of Eden symbolizes 
(Eriugena, Bk. IV, 829 C). However, at the instant of his creation, he turns away from the 
blessedness that is his by divine gift, embraces the senses, and literally falls into a 
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sensory world of his own making. The division into genders is an accident, not an 
essence in that it could have been otherwise. Adam is already compromised when he is 
way-laid by Eve and she is already compromised when she is tricked by the serpent, for 
the serpent is a “man-slayer” already (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 811 B). Much of the thought 
advanced in this part of the Periphyseon bears a striking similarity to Gregory of Nyssa‟s 
writings in On the Making of Man. In Chapter XXVI of that work, we note the same 
creation of man as being rational and unified in the image of God. There is no prior 
distinction as to gender. The passage of Genesis 1:27 (…”male and female He created 
them…”) is specifically cited by Eriugena as an argument to support the claim that 
gender is accidental. The peculiar attributes of male and female are added after man‟s 
initial creation. God creates for no reason, other than that He is good, thus He makes man 
in His image as a perfect form. “…[F]or if the Deity is the fullness of good, and this is 
His image, then the image finds its resemblance to the Archetype in being filled with all 
good” (Gregory of Nyssa, Man, 2010, pt. 3, 3). We also note that in Chapter XVI, there is 
the same idea: that Adam is not a particular man but rather a signification of all men. 
 We may say that at the instant of man‟s creation, the very moment man descends 
from that which creates but is not created, his relationship with God is broken, and 
contemporaneously, he openly manifests sin. “For it is in man, not to God, that the sin 
was a future event, and that the consequences of sin anticipate the sin itself, seeing that 
even the sin itself anticipates itself in the same man” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 808 B). And 
again our philosopher quotes Augustine, “For there would have been no evil work had 
there not been an evil will before it…” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 808 C). In Adam, the descent 
of the image severs the unity of the divine relationship, but only temporarily. The gift of 
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life is itself the event that breaks the bond while at the same time paving the way for the 
grace of return to that which neither creates nor is created. “…[T]he first man, Adam, is 
always a figure of the man to come, Christ; but an inverse figure. [That is, Christ is prior] 
… In the first man all nature was expelled from the blessedness of paradise; in the second 
man is recalled and re-established into the same blessedness” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 836 C). 
 
 


















Chapter IV: That the Damned are Redeemed 
Resurrection of All 
Eriugena is very clear and unequivocal in forwarding his claim that all men will 
be resurrected. Not only man, but the tangible creation that man senses around him; 
having been created in man, it will make the return with him. In the end, God will be all 
in all, yet somehow through the mystic transformation into that one unity each retains its 
identity. Before proceeding further, we note only that on the ethical level, this 
arrangement does seem just and appropriate. We hold that Aristotle discovered the form 
of friendship best when he defined a friend as someone who wished his friend well, and 
for his friend‟s sake (Aristotle, Ethics, 1992, 1156 B). We take no issue with this 
definition, or on one of his subsequent claims that we originally have friends for our own 
sake. God can be viewed as the truest friend in both respects: He creates us for His sake, 
and He wishes us well for our own sake. Following on this definition, it seems to us that 
any gift given by one friend to another is given so that the receiving friend can use it well 
and for his own sake. Moreover, we must remember that one has friends for his own 
sake. Thus, with due respect to both of Aristotle‟s maxims, we can infer that no friend 
will knowingly give a gift that will destroy his friend. Neither can God, who is the truest 
and wisest of all friends, give such a gift. Therefore, the only explanation seems to be that 
this mortal life is a gift intended to be used by us for our benefit. At the same time, it is a 
gift which cannot destroy us or our relationship with God. Moreover, a gift, to be a gift, 
cannot be reclaimed by the giver. Of course, even the best of friends can be 
compromised; however, they are not compromised by the giving of gifts. It is not the gift 
that needs to be reconciled, but the relationship, which, as will be shown, is accomplished 
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through grace. The higher the grace, the higher the potential to heal; the highest grace 
overcomes the deepest division, thus infinite grace transcends all division. This is the 
condition of fallen man. In our case the gift given and the recipient to whom it was given 
have collapsed into the same thing: life. All the more is the gift not recalled, for to do so 
is to actually destroy the gift, the friend, the friendship, and for all these reasons to lessen 
the giver. The solution is to overcome the fall, restore the relationship, and bring all the 
parties back into the same condition that they originally enjoyed. God does not move; He 
calls. Man does not call; he moves. “For all men in general whether perfect or imperfect, 
chaste or defiled, redeemed through knowledge of truth in Christ or lingering in the 
darkness of ignorance … have one and the same natural yearning after being and well-
being and being forever” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 867 C). The idea of humanity from God‟s 
perspective lacks nothing. Contrarily, man‟s idea of himself lacks completeness. All men, 
no matter what their condition, desire this being, well-being, and being forever; none can 
do otherwise. 
In order to show this, Eriugena returns to the account of creation in Genesis and 
gives his interpretation of its actual meaning. We have already seen that the story is not 
an historical account of origin, but rather an allegorical statement of being. This myth 
differs from all others in that the Genesis account is divinely inspired, while the others 
are not. Thus, we may conclude that the truth which underlies Genesis is certain, even 
though our ability to interpret it is not. Moreover, Eriugena goes even further and holds 
that the Genesis account is a covenant of prophesy. What happened to the mythical 
figures of Adam and Eve will, in truth, happen to us. It is more a story of hope than one 
of demise. He states that “…the prophetic virtue of these words… give the clearest 
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promise of the return of human nature…” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 859 D). In reality we are not 
dealing with an event in the past, but rather our condition as incomplete human beings. 
To begin, we note that there are two trees in the Garden of Eden that we must be 
concerned with. The first is the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Adam is 
commanded not to eat of this tree, for by doing so he shall die. In eating the fruit of this 
tree, Adam breaks his community with God, for he chooses the irrationality of non-sense 
and non-being. Furthermore, in vainly choosing non-being, which he mistakes for 
knowledge, he even seeks it via the senses, for the tree was “good for food, pleasant to 
the eye, and desired to make one wise” (Genesis 3:6, KJV). Of course, Adam then openly 
secured his death; he ate of the fruit and died, thereby fulfilling the prophecy. Moreover, 
he brought unto himself much more than death; he earned such miseries as thorns, 
thistles, sorrow, hard labor, and bad food. At the end of all this unpleasantness he returns 
to the dust from which he fashioned his own body. However, the misfortune ends there 
for God immediately begins his care anew, or better said, continues his care anew, for He 
has never really forsaken it. He makes for Adam and Eve coats of skins and He clothes 
them. 
The key to understanding this myth is found in the final few verses of Chapter III. 
Here Eriugena up-ends the conventional interpretation. “Now therefore, may he not 
perchance put forth his hand, and take also the Tree of Life, and eat of it, and live forever. 
And he cast Adam out, and set cherubim before the paradise of pleasure, and a flaming 
sword to turn every way to guard the path to the Tree of Life” (Genesis 3: 22-24, KJV). 
The hope of return is contained in the words “Now therefore” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 862 B). 
For God, in speaking these words, is accepting the choice that man has made and is 
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working to overcome it. God takes Adam as sad, not happy; wretched, not blessed; 
temporal, not eternal; separated, not whole; and most of all mortal, not immortal, as man 
was intended to be. Yet God can still reconcile man to Himself and bring him home. Of 
course, man must leave the garden, for therein stands the Tree of Life. If Adam eats from 
this tree, as he surely will if left to his own devices, he will continue to live, but in the 
unhappy mode he has already chosen. As Socrates has said the goal should be “not to 
live, but to live well.” God cannot allow man to live endlessly in his wretched state, for if 
He does, man will never come to realize that he is living with pigs, just as the prodigal 
son will one day say, “why do I perish,” when all he has to do is return home. In other 
words, Eriugena holds that taking the fruit from the Tree of Life away from man is for 
man‟s salvation, not his punishment. Man must experience physical death in order to 
return home. Moreover, the allegory does not end there, but continues to be confirmed in 
the eternal security of the Tree of Life. A cherubim, the longstanding symbol of 
intellectual knowledge, is posted at the garden‟s gate. This is not a belligerent warrior; 
rather it is an invitation to divine wisdom. He holds a “flaming sword” that turns “every 
way.” The sword symbolizes Christ, the Word, the one truth that all men must recognize 
in order to gain eternal life. And all men will, for the sword turns “every way.” All 
rational men of this world recognize the sword, even though many are constrained in 
their customs from understanding the One who inflames it. The allegory in Chapter 3 of 
Genesis confirms rather than limits man‟s salvation, for all men die mortal deaths. If a 
man were to succeed in avoiding it, this would mean he had somehow gotten around the 
flaming sword which turns every way. Essentially, he would be denying the truth which 
constitutes his very nature. 
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Incidental to our specific topic of salvation for the damned is Eriugena‟s notion 
that all created nature enjoys the return to God as that which is uncreated and does not 
create. Very interesting in its own merit, we treat it briefly given that our thesis concerns 
universal salvation, and the notion that all of created nature returns to God is part of 
universal salvation. Eriugena is unique among medieval Christian philosophers for he 
maintains that plants and animals enjoy the return the same as man does. Eriugena builds 
on the notion, first advanced by Plato in the Timaeus, that the created cosmos is itself an 
animal possessed of body and soul. The creatures that inhabit the world are not so much 
constituent parts of it but rather are images of it. They also have body and soul. Their 
bodies are corruptible, but their souls are immortal, akin to the souls of gods, all being 
fashioned from the same stuff that constitutes the soul of the cosmos (Harrington, 2005, 
612-614). Plato is the only one of Eriugena‟s sources who holds to the idea that the souls 
of all living things are immortal. There is, however, one significant difference, in that for 
Plato the souls of animals can become rational by returning to earth and dwelling in 
human bodies, and Eriugena never speaks of this. The created and non-creating nature of 
the third division does not return to itself; it returns to the fourth division, that which is 
uncreated and does not create. For Eriugena, plants and animals are indeed immortal, but 
they remain eternally irrational. The claim that all creation must return to the fourth 
division helps us, for if all creation returns, then surely the damned return. Erigena states 
that if “… everything which is naturally moved received the source of its motion from 
some life, it necessarily follows that every creature is either life-through-itself or 
participates in life and is somehow alive” (Eriugena, Bk. III, 728 B). He further states 
that “if all bodies which are naturally constituted are governed by some aspects of life, 
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and every species seeks its own genus while every genus takes its origin from universal 
substance, it must be that every species of life which contains the numerousness of the 
various bodies returns to universal life by participation in which it is a species” 
(Eriugena, Bk. III, 728 D- 729 A). There must then be a universal life or life-in-itself 
(Harrington, 2005, 619). This argument may be extended to inanimate objects. Seeds 
sown in the earth do not sprout unless they first separate as to matter and form, or, in 
effect, die. The extension proceeds even further to non-living creatures for their vital 
motion, though not clearly apparent, is “hiddenly governed through life” (Eriugena, Bk. 
III, 728 B). Eriugena first calls upon the teaching of Plato to support his claim that no 
body can be without life. “[T]here is no… body that is deprived of life; and that life, 
whether general or special, we confidently dare to call the soul…” (Eriugena, Bk. III, 728 
B). Because all bodies move, and the source of this movement is either life-through-itself 
or through participation in life, they are somehow alive. Secondly, Eriugena cites the 
work On True Religion by Augustine to affirm that this life-through-itself is Christ, the 
Word. “For every form derives from Him. And who is this but the one God, the one 
Truth, the one Salvation of all, and the first and highest essence from which comes 
everything that is insofar as it is” (Eriugena, Bk. III, 728 C). Our point here is that if all 
animals, plants and rocks are made complete through the return to the Word, then surely 
all men are likewise made complete, for they participate more directly in the life-through-
itself principle than the aforementioned objects.  
Returning now to the particular subject of man, all can agree that man has a body 
and a soul, and Eriugena argues that if this is so now it will always be so, indeed it has 
always been so (Eriugena, Bk. III, 729 D). When the human body is generated, the soul 
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assumes control of it, retaining control until death. At that time, the soul surrenders 
control of the body, and soul and body become separated with the body returning to the 
elements. However, since man is a composition of the two, the relationship must 
continue. Thus, what appears to the senses to be a separation is in reality the continuance 
of that relationship on a higher level. The soul remains the controller of the body after it 
has receded into the elements just as it did before. The control of the body is even greater 
in this state, for the soul is more able to control what is similar to it than what is 
dissimilar. The soul is not corporeal but spiritual, as is the body after it has dissolved into 
the elements. It is not that the body ceases to be, but rather that it passes “into the 
lightest,” most ethereal particles and becomes “as spiritual” (Eriugena, Bk. III, 730 B). 
The relation of body and soul is not so much one of “composition” as we used the word 
above, but of “compound,” in the sense that the term is used in chemistry.  
By extension of the above dissolution, the same argument applies to irrational 
beasts and even inanimate objects. The soul of an animal controls that animal‟s body as 
well, and when the animal dies that soul continues to control the body. This raises the 
question of what happens when former parts of one body become parts of another. 
Eriugena does not say, but presumably the resurrection is of such an all-encompassing 
magnitude that it sorts out and restores all parts. The same can be said of stationary 
objects, which can be said to move, in that they are subject to diminution (Eriugena, Bk. 
III, 737 B- 738 A). This is not to say that animals are raised as human, for they remain 
animal. Presumably, an entire animal and environmental system of ethics could be built 
around this notion with those animals and objects closest to man‟s rationality having the 
highest value, and those farthest away the least. We leave this discussion with a statement 
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from Paul‟s letter to the Ephesians given as a recapitulation: “That in the dispensation of 
the fullness of times he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in 
heaven and on earth” (Ephesians 1:10, KJV). 
For man, his lowest depth in the fall, both described and foretold in Genesis, is his 
own death. This is the point from which his return begins. However, this depth should not 
be considered so much as a death of the flesh, but rather as a death from death. For the 
human body has been bestowed upon man not for punishment but for betterment. The 
body is corruptible, thus a separation of the body from the soul signifies a release from 
corruption, a rest from labor, a resurrection from darkness. In summation, one‟s death 
brings about the final end to all misfortune and evil, and the resolution of true nature 
(Eriugena, Bk. V, 875 C- 876 A). There is a five-fold process through which this 
redemption takes place. The first step is taken when the body suffers dissolution and 
returns to the four elements of the sensible world from which it came. These four 
elements are earth, air, water, and fire. The second step occurs in the resurrection of 
Christ, when each man shall claim his own spiritual body from the commonality of the 
four elements. The third occurs when this spiritual body is changed into soul. The fourth 
step involves the return of the soul, and also the whole of human nature to the primordial 
causes. These primordial causes reside eternally and immutably in God. The fifth step is 
fulfilled when the primordial causes are absorbed into God, the uncreated, uncreating, 
Fourth Division. At this point, God alone will be all things in all things (Eriugena, Bk. V, 
876 A-B). Eriugena uses the analogy of air being absorbed into light. The air is 
unnoticeable in the light, yet it remains. Therefore, we can expect human fellowship to 
continue after the final unification in total communion with itself. Each man will be more 
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unique, yet somehow more integrated into every other. Again, this restoration does not 
happen in time, but rather eternally in the present instant. 
One telling example of this unification is the integration in the return of male and 
female. Eriugena is unique among his western sources to maintain that after the 
resurrection there will be no distinction as to gender. Adam and Eve are not to be 
regarded as male and female, nor is the Garden of Eden to be regarded as a local place of 
paradise. Instead, Adam is understood to be the essential nature of man, and Eve is that 
part of man vulnerable to temptation through the senses. The Garden of Eden is a non-
local, non-temporal bliss in complete harmony with God. Therefore, the separation of 
man into male and female had to have happened after the fall rather than before it. 
Moreover, there never was a time in which man was in paradise, for he fell the instant he 
was created. “[T]his distinction [male and female] has absolutely no connection with the 
divine image and likeness, and would never have existed had man not sinned, nor will it 
exist after the restoration of our nature…” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 799 B). On first glance, this 
collapse of the male and female genders into one man would seem to wreak havoc on the 
eternal establishment of the family, something we have stressed the importance of to this 
point. However, we respond, a fortiori, that relation of father to son, or mother to 
daughter, carries no inherent notion of gender whatsoever. As we have continually 
maintained, the family is not comprised of constituent parts. Members abide in their 
various relationships only through their relationship to the family as a whole. The family 
is a unity, and the bond that each member shares with it is a spiritual one, not a genetic or 
material one. Of course, the bonds usually are genetic ones. However, they do not have to 
be so, for the ontological bond transcends all biology. 
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To solidify this idea that the male and female genders are not to be found within 
the image of God, Eriugena makes one final claim. Christ, the Word, the ideal first man, 
of which all other men are copies, was resurrected without gender. The savior gave us a 
foretaste of what was to come by rising from the dead. The acceptance of the resurrection 
of Christ rests in faith, and those who assent to it have the ultimate guarantee. Those who 
do not accept it still have the guarantee, though they do not know it. However, we who 
accept it do so because there were some who experienced it through the senses and bore 
witness to it. We are grateful that others witnessed these events and not ourselves, for we 
would not have believed our own eyes. Thankfully, those whom we trust did. Of course, 
in order for them to believe it, they had to be able to recognize Him, thus He appeared to 
them in the male gender. However, in the Word there is neither male nor female, simply 
the true and whole man. “For the humanity of Christ, made one with God, is contained in 
no one place, is moved through no time, is limited by no bodily shape, characteristic of 
sex” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 894 B-C). Before the Word became incarnate, He was not 
confined to the male form, thus He is not confined to it after His resurrection. A person 
who subscribes to the Christian faith could ask why the fatherhood of God is so important 
to the Christ? Our answer is that fatherhood, although often genetic, is not essentially so. 
It is essentially spiritual. We wrote earlier of Eriugena‟s claim that the terms „father‟ and 
„son‟ were terms of relation, as both are one. The relationship of the son to the father was 
apparently of such a character that all genetic connections were transcended.  
Modes of Justice 
In most western societies, the ideal of justice is invariably symbolized by a 
goddess holding three objects: the sword, which represents coercive power; the 
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blindfold, which represents impartiality; and the scale, which represent the authority to 
weigh competing claims. In our discussion, we may immediately dispense with the 
forms represented by the first two symbols. God does not force anyone to accept Him, 
and He manifests the ultimate in impartiality, for He desires all men to accept Him. We 
need only concern ourselves with the final symbol, the scales, for we can agree that God 
has the authority under our presuppositions, to weigh competing claims. We note at the 
outset that the scales imply a limited reservoir of resources. In other words, with any 
human action of any kind in which one party seeks to gain just recompense from 
another, the entire contest is preconditioned by the notion that the first party has been 
harmed by the second and that the second party has taken something away from the first 
in an unjust manner. That something, whatever it is, has been subtracted from a finite 
reservoir of the first party‟s. Perhaps one can already determine where our discourse is 
headed. If the reservoir of the first party is infinite, such as is the case with God, there is 
no damage. In other words, all those who hold that the condemnation of the damned is 
just are viewing justice in human terms. We will now examine several well-known 
conceptions of justice and show that, under all of them, the resurrection of the damned is 
just.  
Plato argues in the Republic that justice is an ideal virtue, capable of definition. 
The main objective of the dialogue is to discover what this consists of. The aged 
Cephalus confides to Socrates his concern that during his long life he may have 
performed unjust actions, and may soon be required to pay the penalty for them 
(Plato,Rep., 1968, 330 D). This prompts Socrates to seek a definition of justice (Plato, 
Rep., 1968, 331 D). Many competing notions are advanced by the various characters. 
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Socrates suggests that since justice abides in both individual men and whole cities, the 
definition could possibly be more easily discovered by first considering the city, for 
“…perhaps there would be more justice in the bigger and it would be easier to observe 
closely” (Plato, Rep., 1968, 368 E). He then formulates a theoretical city in which the 
four human virtues of wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice are all brought to 
perfection. Such a city which “… has been correctly founded – is perfectly good” (Plato, 
Rep., 1968, 427 E). Now, the first three of the virtues are rather easily discerned in this 
city, for they are respectively characterized in the three classes of its citizens: rulers, 
auxiliaries, and craftsmen. Socrates reasons that whatever is left over in the city after 
wisdom, courage, and moderation have been extracted must be justice. “Therefore, just as 
with any other four things… if we recognized the other three first, this would also suffice 
for the recognition of the thing looked for. For plainly it couldn‟t be anything but what‟s 
left over” (Plato, Rep., 1968, 428 A). As it turns out, justice, the final virtue, is the one 
that tends to keep the other three in harmony. “[J]ustice… is the rival of these others in 
contributing to the city‟s virtue” (Plato, 1968, 434 E). “[T]he having and doing of one‟s 
own and what belongs to oneself would be agreed to be justice” (Plato, Rep.,  1968, 434 
A). Now, the just man would be no different from the just city, for a good man must have 
the four virtues of wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice within him (Plato, Rep., 
1968, 435 B). Similarly, “…a man is just in the same manner that a city too … [is] just” 
(Plato, Rep., 1968, 441 D). He is a man in whom the virtues of wisdom, courage, and 
moderation are all in proper balance with justice, being that virtue which tends to keep 
the other three in perspective. However, for man, justice is more of an internal quality 
residing in the soul, and is concerned with “…what is within… [and] what truly concerns 
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him and his own” (Plato, Rep., 1968, 443 D). 
We view Eriugena‟s teaching on the general resurrection of all men as being in 
full compliance with Plato‟s formulation of justice. It should be remembered that the 
entire dialogue is launched in response to a concern with the question of punishment for 
the soul after death. Therefore, Plato‟s Republic could be considered as substantive to the 
overall topic. Eriugena holds that death is the lowest depth of the fall (Eriugena, Bk. V, 
875 C). It is the point where the soul assumes complete control of the body, a 
completeness which is lacking in mortal life. “The end of this present life, then, is the 
beginning of the next; and the death of the flesh is the token of the restoration of our 
nature, and the return to our pristine integrity” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 876 A). If our nature is 
brought to a state of pure and incorruptible completeness, then surely Plato‟s virtues of 
the soul (wisdom, courage, and moderation), are brought into a harmonious perfection. In 
other words, this is perfectly just, for justice is the very quality which encourages a man 
to inwardly “… arrange himself, become his own friend, and harmonize the [other] three 
parts…” (Plato, Rep., 1968, 443 D). We need say little about the just community, for the 
entire exercise of founding an ideally just city was done for the purpose of discovering 
justice in the individual soul. Suffice it to say that an eternal community, whose every 
citizen is perfectly just, would surely seem to be a perfectly just community. One could 
ask whether there would be punishment in the ideal city. Our answer here is, a fortiori, 
that there would be no punishment. The city in Plato‟s Republic is not completely ideal; it 
is practically ideal, being a community of men, not one of resurrected men.   
A second concept of justice views it to be derived from divine command. Many of 
the great medieval philosophers were in this camp, and we suspect that Eriugena would 
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be one of them. We may dispense with the old question of whether something is right 
because God says it is right, or whether He says it is right because it is. This is irrelevant 
for our discussion. If it is the latter, then all the arguments concerning the above 
paragraphs on harmony apply. If it is the former, then justice seems arbitrary based on 
God‟s whim, even though it is still divine. Eriugena would surely claim a false dichotomy 
here, for he would say that God is over and above all forms while still containing all 
forms, and this includes the form of justice. Reconciling this type of divine justice is best 
explained by recalling the parable of the Prodigal Son. Note that the prodigal son had 
already taken his inheritance when he came to the realization that he was living with pigs. 
The father owed him nothing more, not a ring, robe, sandals, not even the spiritual 
benefits of fatherhood, for the prodigal son had abandoned his natural son-ship. Yet the 
father gives all these and more, for we know that the son is fully restored. Moreover, the 
father even speaks directly to the question, for when the obedient son says, “Father, 
where is the justice? I have worked here with you all this time and you never gave me 
anything,” the father calms him by saying, “Look son, your idea of justice and mine are 
two completely different things. What is just is what restores mine to me. You are always 
with me and that is just. All that I have is yours, not half of what I have, but all. And the 
same goes for your brother because my resources are infinite. It is right for us to rejoice 
because he is now claiming his all, just as you have always claimed yours. He was dead, 
now he is alive, just as you have always been alive.” It is true that justice is concerned 
with what is owed to others. However, a better word for this would be fairness. 
Essentially, the argument of the obedient son is that the restoration of the prodigal son is 
unfair. Our point here is that fairness is completely subsumed by justice. This conception 
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of justice is in full agreement with the resurrection of the damned, for the damned are 
claiming what is rightly theirs: essential and eternal life (Eriugena, Book V, 1004 D). Of 
course they are not worthy of it, for none are. The damned simply lay claim to the same 
inheritance that the saved lay claim to, a divine inheritance. One could ask: what if they 
do not even lay a claim to it? We have answered this above: failing to do so means they 
are not men. 
A third concept of justice holds that it is rooted in natural law. This theory posits 
that justice is an ideal determined by nature, and as such has validity across all cultures 
and time periods. Aristotle was an early proponent of natural law. In the Nichomachean 
Ethics he writes, “Of political justice part is natural, part legal; natural, that which 
everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people‟s thinking this or that…” 
(Aristotle, Ethics, 1992, 1134 B). Aquinas followed this line of reasoning when he held 
that man, as a rational creature, holds a certain share in eternal reason, “… whereby [he] 
has a natural inclination to [his] proper act and end...” (Aquinas, Summ. Theo., 1945, 
QXCI, 2
nd
 Art, 618). The ideas that all men seek happiness, or that all men have certain 
inalienable rights are well recognized precepts of natural law theory. Natural laws are 
always discovered, never revealed or invented. Being that natural law applies only to this 
world, as opposed to the next, we note that nothing in it could render restoration of the 
damned as unjust. Moreover, there is and always has been a strong current of passive 
acceptance in natural law that holds to the notion that anything not unjust is just. Aside 
from this, we cannot positively show through natural law theory that salvation of the 
damned is just. There are, however, a few general principles that point in this direction. 
The first is that all men should seek what is good and avoid what is evil. We see no 
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reason why this idea should not carry forward into the next world, where what is good is 
more obvious and clear, and what is evil the same. A second principle is that, generally 
speaking, past offenses should be pardoned, for such action looks forward to the good 
rather than backward to the evil. The last and most convincing is that every man 
acknowledges that every other man is equal by nature. Eriugena would, no doubt, seize 
upon this principle to say that every man has by nature an equal and rational claim to 
eternal life. It would be hard to see how one could lose this claim, seeing how he shares it 
with all. He would have to forfeit it willingly, something that his rationality would not 
allow. Thus, we must conclude that the argument for salvation of the damned through any 
conception of natural justice is very strong. 
A fourth conception of justice holds that it is simply a human contrivance. This 
can take many forms, such as justice laid down by a ruling authority, as in Hobbes; 
justice laid down by all, as in social contract theory; justice laid down by the strong, as in 
the Republic via Thrasymachus; or even justice laid down by the weak, as in Nietzsche. 
In all cases, justice is understood as a subordinate value, and therefore not essential to 
human nature. Justice is merely an intermediate step on the way to achieving some other 
good, such as pleasure or welfare, which is essential to human nature. If we could attain 
that essential good through a more effective means than through justice, we could 
dispense with justice altogether. It appears to us that all the points made in the above 
paragraph pertaining to the carrying-over of justice from this world to the next are 
equally valid. Justice as a human contrivance is all the more removed from divine justice 
than natural law justice, and is meant to apply only within a specific time and culture. All 
the more, can it not be shown herein that salvation for the damned is unjust? 
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Additionally, it appears that the inferential arguments in favor of salvation for the 
damned are even stronger. If justice is merely a subordinate value, and salvation is the 
highest value, then we can dispense with justice altogether. We need not even consider 
whether or not salvation for this or that man is just, for salvation is all that matters. Thus, 
in practical terms, justice conceived as a mere human convention gives us our strongest 
argument yet. 
 A fifth conception we should consider is that of distributive justice, but before 
doing so we note that all of these theories take as their starting point the notion that there 
is something that needs to be distributed. In other words, there is some desire, or perhaps 
a demand, that exceeds the available supply. This is not the case for the God we have 
presupposed for our study. Instead, the opposite is true; the supply exceeds the demand, 
and exceeds it in infinite measure. In short, there is no need to ration the supply. In fact, 
the need is to expend the supply in the most excessive manner we can. Still, we consider 
these briefly because of the inherent intent behind all the theories, which is to maximize 
human good. Egalitarianism seeks to distribute goods equally. This may include wealth, 
privilege, respect, education, opportunity, etc. What better way to distribute equally than 
to give everything to each and all? The Word accomplishes this in the raising of all. 
Marxism seeks to distribute according to need. It recognizes no reality beyond material 
reality. We do not agree, but again our purpose is not to criticize Marxism, but to show 
that the salvation of the damned is just within Marxism. We have posited for our study 
that there is reality beyond the material. If we need freedom from hunger, from the 
elements, from unemployment, all of which are temporary and guaranteed under 
Marxism, we surely need freedom from damnation, which is eternal. The Word 
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accomplishes this in the raising of all men. Meritocratic theories hold that justice must 
be distributed according to talent, hard work, or some combination of the two. This is a 
somewhat more difficult argument, so we make it by its counter; none are worthy of 
salvation on their own merit. This is somewhat problematic, for it seems to imply that on 
this level, damnation is at least conceptually possible. We have never claimed that 
damnation is impossible, just that no one is damned, because grace has saved all men 
from it. Viewed another way, we can agree that love can fail in some, perhaps even most 
relationships. Indeed, the very possibility of failure can sometimes make relationships 
better, and this would include friendships and even marriages. However, it cannot 
include the relationship of parent to child. Even if the child fails, the parent cannot fail 
and still be a parent. Thus, men can fail, but God cannot. This we have accepted as a 
presupposition. Since we have already accepted that some are saved, we can eliminate 
from our consideration all notions that salvation for the damned is unjust according to 
meritocratic theories. Allow us to return to the parable of the Prodigal Son. Neither the 
prodigal nor the obedient son enjoyed their son-ship due to any merit on their own parts. 
Eriugena would claim that it came to the former via grace and to the latter via gift. 
In his famous work A Theory of Justice, John Rawls claimed that justice should 
be distributed based on a total and complete system of impartiality which was directed 
forward (Rawls, 1989, 248-251). In it, we are asked to imagine ourselves being born 
outside of all society in a completely abstract and sterile environment. Then we would be 
randomly placed within society to live our lives. He reasoned that the society we should 
try to craft is one in which we would be willing to live in any one particular subset of the 
whole. Such a society would be supremely fair, for we could fashion it with no biases, 
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social standing, or privilege of any kind. Presuming that no one would elect to take their 
own chances, we could all expect to receive an equal share of labor, food, health care, 
education, entertainment, police, fire protection and everything else. In other words, we 
would rearrange all social and economic inequalities so as to lift our whole society to its 
highest good. As unattainable as this seems as a goal for justice in this world, we must 
admit that this scheme is exactly what Eriugena claims will happen in the next. In 
granting the equal resurrection to all, the Word has conveyed all for each. His distribution 
is equal and, furthermore, it is infinite.  
Robert Nozick wrote an equally famous critique of A Theory of Justice, entitled 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia in which he argued that fairness had nothing to do with some 
ideal conception exclusive to any considerations of history (Nozick, 1989, 338-340). 
Rather, Nozick held that the only things that made any transaction fair were the 
conditions under which it was carried out. Any gain is just if it is acquired through labor 
on unowned things, or transferred through gift, contract, or sale. Acquisitions made in 
any other way, such as Rawls had advocated, would be stealing. Very few of Nozick‟s 
claims apply here since they concern only material things. However, one important idea 
is worth mentioning, that of a free gift. The Word accomplishes this through the 
resurrection of the damned, hence it is just. 
Lastly, we return to the two competing theories on punishment in recompense for 
wrong-doing, utilitarianism and retribution. The former holds that justice must be 
dispensed with so as to maximize the total welfare of all. Justice is not a virtue in itself, 
but only as a means to attain the highest common welfare. Individual punishments meted 
out to evil-doers are never good, always evil, but they are a lesser evil than letting them 
118 
 
go unpunished. The argument is that punishing wrong-doers protects the common 
welfare because it discourages lawlessness in individuals. In other words, men are not 
hanged for stealing horses, they are hanged so that horses will not be stolen. It is a 
completely forward-looking system wherein no effort is made to let the punishment suit 
the crime. Alarmingly, there may be some times in which it is appropriate to punish 
some people who have committed no crime at all under this system. The only concern is 
to maximize the common welfare. If the utilitarian could gain a just society by punishing 
no one, he would do so. Therefore, for our topic, salvation of the damned is just in the 
resurrection. The Word has secured the highest common welfare for eternity. 
Most problematic for us is the retributive theory of justice, for it seeks to punish 
only in reaction to, and in accordance with, the severity of wrongful action. Under this 
theory, authorities do not punish in order to effect a beneficial future. They punish only 
against past offenses committed upon an existing commonwealth. Thus, retributive-style 
punishment always looks back and balances the punishment against the wrong-doing. It 
seems to be in accord with the common notion of justice, but utilitarians argue that it is 
nothing more than revenge in disguise: society upon the individual as opposed to 
individual upon individual (Bentham, Prin. Mor., 1967, C. 2, pt. 14, 797). We have two 
arguments here. The first is that all are worthy of damnation, yet some do not receive it. 
Thus, the salvation of some but not others seems unfair, for all rightly deserve 
damnation. The second, and more convincing argument, is that the punishment does not 
fit the crime. Damnation is eternal, therefore infinitely worse than any and all finite 




Modes of Punishment 
Scripture is replete with references to eternal punishment, and so is the world in 
which we are living, so we must consider its character in the world to come. We have 
already noted Eriugena‟s claim that God does not punish the things he has made. He 
merely allows them to punish themselves. So how does this notion of punishment, surely 
an evil thing, accord with the world to come in which all of creation is restored to a 
unity with God? This is the one area in our study in which we take issue with Eriugena. 
It appears to us that the Periphyseon is too long by about one hundred paragraphs; that 
the work would have been much more unified had this section been left out. Moreover, 
Eriugena‟s claim that some men suffer eternally, if indeed that is his claim, severely 
undercuts his theory of apokatastasis.  Eriugena‟s comments on the nature and manner 
of eternal punishment are inconsistent and perplexing. First, before contesting this point 
on eternal punishment, we shall establish exactly what Eriugena‟s position is.  
As noted earlier, the incarnation of the Word is the point of departure, the 
origination of all creatures visible and invisible, according to Eriugena. It is not only the 
defining moment in the history of man, but the one event from which all creation 
springs. The first Biblical man is always understood in relation to the Word, as is every 
other man. “[T]he Word of God, in whom all things are created according to their causes 
and subsist, descended in His Divinity into the effects of the causes which subsist in 
Him, that is into the sensible world…” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 911 D). There was only one 
reason for this Word to become material: so that He could recall the effects back into 
their primordial causes where they could live eternally and immutably. Had He not done 
this, had His wisdom not filtered into the effects, the primordial causes would have 
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perished, for no effect can subsist apart from its cause. The incarnation, in preserving the 
effects, also preserves the primordial causes (Eriugena, Bk. V, 913 C). Neither man, 
irrational beast, plant, nor inanimate object can resist their own nature, which is an 
image of some divine exemplar. It therefore follows that whatever evil is in them leaves 
them in inverse proportion as they approach that exemplar and leaves them completely 
as they find their rest in it. Eriugena, as always, calls upon the liberal arts, and finds a 
good analogy in astronomy. The sun, being many times the size of the earth, floods it 
with light. If the sun were infinitely large and the earth infinitely small, there would be 
no shadow at all (Eriugena, Bk. V, 918 A). Had Eriugena known of the phenomenon of 
black holes, a star whose mass is so compressed not even light can escape, he could have 
referenced it, for that analogy would be a fitting example in the created order to 
demonstrate the object‟s ultimate rest. The entire point of this discussion is to highlight 
the question in the fullest possible way: once an object, in this case a man, has found his 
divinely appointed rest, why punish him? The only possible motive would seem to be 
that God has the attribute of vengeance, and this condition is one that neither Eriugena 
nor any of his sources are willing to accept. 
This question represents the ultimate contest between reason and authority in all 
of the Periphyseon. Right reason dictates that the totality of human nature is taken up 
into the Word of God, and the essential capacity of resurrection does not permit anyone 
to perish or be eternally punished. However, the authority of the Old and New 
Testaments, clearly threaten eternal damnation for the devil and all his allies (Eriugena, 
Bk. V, 924 A).We must employ reason in the most abstract manner to study this 
problem. Even Holy Scripture, the highest authority known to man, derives from reason, 
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thus reason has priority. So first we must go back and be sure that our reasoning is 
correct. The divine mind of God contains all things (Eriugena, Bk. V, 925 A). Of course 
all of our referenced authorities are in agreement on this point. Moreover, scripture itself 
affirms this; “From Him and through Him and in Him and for Him are all things” 
(Eriugena, Bk. V, 925 A). What is meant by this, according to St. Ambrose and 
Dionysius, is that the Divine Mind knows all things by a wisdom that constitutes their 
very being. The Divine Mind knew them before they were brought into being, sustains 
them in being, and moves them to return to their primary causes. God does not know 
things as we do, by studying them after they exist, but rather they exist because He 
knows them (Eriugena, Bk. V, 925 D). Therefore, God knows no sin and no evil, for if 
He did they would have substantial existence and would have a cause. We may now 
conclude that God does not know evil men, demons, or even the devil. He, of course, 
knows them in substance, for that is the part of them that He created, the good part, but 
He does not know the evil part. God is completely unknowing of the accidental evil that 
they have taken upon themselves (Eriugena, Bk. V, 926 A). 
Evil, death and unhappiness are contrary to the nature of both man and demon, for 
they are not created in the cause of all things, nor do they in any manner participate in it. 
We contrast Eriugena‟s view against that of the iconic image of the demon in 
contemporary culture, such as The Screwtape Letters by C.S. Lewis or “The Devil and 
Daniel Webster” by Stephen Vincent Benet. In these personifications, demons can be 
intelligent, hopeful, talented, secure in friendship, and happy. Moreover, the demons who 
have fallen the farthest, or taken on the most perversity, can be the happiest. They even 
experience joy in their very human relationships of family, and they delight in corrupting 
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their own family members. This arrangement simply cannot be right according to 
Eriugena, for the essential nature of even a demon is good. In the end, the better part of 
their nature, that part having its origin in the divine Word, will overcome the accidental 
part and they will live and be restored toward it, rather than away from it. “For the Divine 
Goodness shall overcome evil, eternal life shall swallow up death, blessedness shall 
absorb unhappiness” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 927 A). God never punishes that which He has 
created. Some would argue that the devil did not choose evil of his free will, but that he 
was created of evil substance and therefore has no inherent, essential goodness. This 
might be a good argument for the ancient Babylonian or Manichean, but not for Eriugena. 
He insists, just as Augustine did, that God made all things, and moreover that all that He 
made was “very good.” Therefore, the devil had to have been made good and then turned 
to evil of his own free volition. A wise and more subtle interpretation of this problem is 
to hold that even now after the corruption of so many millions of souls the universe is 
still ordered to the good. Thus the devil‟s handiwork, though extensive, is nonetheless 
finite and his evil nature clearly circumscribed by his good nature. To support this theory, 
Eriugena references the Commentary on Luke by St. Ambrose (Eriugena, Bk. V, 928 B-
C). Therein, the demons pray that they may enter the swine, and are not forced against 
their will. They cannot bear the brilliance of the Word and they fear their eternal 
destruction. Thus, they ask to enter the swine knowing full well that they will perish in 
their earthly lives and receive their just penalty. Appropriately, the Word grants their 
plea, they enter the swine, die a mortal death, and presumably are recalled into the unity 
of the Word just like everything else (Eriugena, Bk. V, 928 C). This is the fulfillment 
which is complete at the end of the world, that modes of punishment are not ends in 
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themselves, but rather they are the intermediaries which consume themselves. Evil 
vanishes, unhappiness turns into blessedness, and death dies. According to Origen, as 
written in his Treatise on First Principles, “the goodness of God through Christ will 
restore his entire creation to one end, even his enemies...” (Origen, First Prin., 1936, Bk. 
I, Ch. 4, 52). “The destruction of the last enemy is to be understood not in the sense that 
his substance which is made by God, perishes, but that the hostile intention which 
proceeds not from God but from himself, shall be done away with. He shall be destroyed 
then not in the sense that he will cease to be but that he will cease to be an enemy and 
death” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 930 C). 
We could pause at this point and inquire concerning modes of punishment for 
earthly judges. Do not all jurists, school administrators, teachers, coaches, athletic 
referees, and anyone who metes out punishment, harsh or trivial, try to punish the 
wrongness of the offender, as opposed to the offender himself? Of course they punish 
the nature, through some assessment against the body, for in their earthly limitations that 
is all they can do. In this world, the evil will constrains the essential nature of us all; that 
is the very meaning of what it is to live in this world, for the soul has descended into the 
corporeal body. However, to the extent that earthly judges are able to do so, they seek to 
punish only the will. We note that even under the retributive mode, the punishment 
theory outlined above which seems to be the most severe in intention, the punishment is 
assigned so as not to violate the dignity of the person. The spirit of the judge who seeks 
justice is first and foremost one of correction, not vindictiveness. “Even worldly judges 
seek to punish not the nature of the criminal, but his crime. It is only because they 
cannot punish the crime in itself in isolation from the nature that is its subject that they 
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have to punish the body together with the crime” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 943 D). The best 
example here is the human parent, who better than any other judge, looks to the heart of 
the wrong-doer. In the ideal, we turn again to the father of the prodigal son, who saw 
that the evil will of his son was completely gone. Therefore, the just sentence, death with 
pigs, was pardoned and the mode of punishment altered to the extent that death became 
life and more than life; nakedness and hunger were turned into a fine robe and a fatted 
calf. Modes of punishment must always yield to modes of justice, which in the end 
amounts to restoration of the Word. 
Yet, there is a big difference between any earthly judge and the divine judge. 
Whereas the earthly judge cannot confine his penalty to the evil will and must punish the 
nature of the criminal as part and parcel of the crime, the divine judge can. In truth, this is 
small work for Him; He merely shows His goodness and the rational nature of the wrong-
doer leads him to choose his own punishment, submit to it, and rise above it. This is just 
as the evil demons looked on the brilliance of the Word and asked to enter the swine and 
die an earthly death. Moreover, while no earthly judge, not even the parent, can fully 
comprehend another‟s heart, the divine judge can. This is so because in a very real sense 
the soul of the criminal derives its origin, its being, and its continuance from the soul of 
the judge. The criminal goes beyond himself in essence in the purity of what was 
originally intended. Moreover, the truth that binds this relationship is itself dispensed by 
the judge. We speculate that the very ancient relationship of king to subject, where the 
king was very good and the subject very loyal, probably captured this divine relationship 
fairly well. Today, the reality is still well manifested in the ideal of the human family, 
which perhaps cannot be shown to be eternal, however, it can well be shown to have 
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endured through recorded history and shows no sign of corruption even to this day. 
The discussion concerning punishment goes on for some length in Book V of the 
Periphyseon, with the Alumnus never being completely convinced that the tension 
between the right reason of the ultimate return and the authority of the Old and New 
Testament‟s teaching on eternal punishment is completely resolved. “How can the 
torments of the damned exist without a subject to afflict?” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 940 B). The 
Nutritor responds that there seems to be three ways in which some punishment could be 
eternally suffered. Either: 1) that which has no existence in nature can be punished in 
itself without there being a subject to punish, 2) there is some subject in nature which 
undergoes punishment, or 3) that which is punished does not exist in itself but is punished 
in some subject which exists and is free of all punishment. We must reject the first, for a 
subject that does not exist cannot be punished. We reject the second for God creates in 
nature and does not punish that which He has created. This leaves the third possibility, 
the one Eriugena accepts and confusedly tries too hard to reconcile with scripture 
(Eriugena, Bk. V, 940 C). It seems to us that the tension is still unresolved and that 
therefore we need to err closer to option one, hold fast to the authority of reason so 
diligently manifested in option two, reject option three altogether, and look for a better 
interpretation of scripture. This does not seem out of line, especially considering the fact 
that Eriugena has all along taken extreme liberties with scripture. This seems much more 
appropriate for our study. In our view, the trouble with option three seems to be that 
Eriugena is here maintaining that the thoughts of the soul can be punished without the 
soul itself being punished, a most unlikely position. We hold firm to the notion that the 
thoughts of the soul make up the soul. “The lawless will of wicked men and angels, 
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smitten with the memory and conscience of its evil ways shall abide in torment…” 
(Eriugena, Bk. V, 944 D). The vain and temporal desires that the wicked long for in this 
work shall all perish, yet their memory will remain in their once evil minds. These evil 
souls, now restored to their primal condition, are haunted forever by the memory of the 
evil things they can no longer have. Eriugena quotes from Chapter Sixteen of the 
Ambigua of Maximus, who holds that the evil “… make to themselves in the affectation 
of their minds a substance of that which it is not, and thus become themselves in all 
things like the phantasies they invent” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 945 A). A phantasy is much like 
a theophany, however, the former can be an image of evil, whereas the latter is always an 
image of good. Those who invent the phantasies shall become like them, never finding 
truth, tormented forever in false dreams. The body of the evil man is resurrected in the 
Word, it loses its evil, accidental nature, yet some of it still suffers damnation. These are 
the most perplexing passages in the entire Periphyseon and we cannot agree with 
anything of the sort. 
To begin with, we challenge the notion of phantasy altogether. It cannot be like 
the idea of a theophany, for the latter is a manifestation and an image of something, 
while the former, as explained, can be a manifestation and image of nothing. By our own 
standard, evil has no existence except as a privation of the good. Thus, a phantasy might 
exist in a temporal mind constrained by this world of time and space, but it could not 
exist in a mind restored to full rationality. Secondly, we must take issue with Maximus 
when he says “they make to themselves in the affectation of their minds a substance of 
that which is not” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 945 A). By definition, this notion is creation ex 
nihilo, which is the province of God alone in the first division of nature. We recall that 
127 
 
man is in the third division of nature and that, strictly speaking, he does not create. 
Thirdly, as noted earlier, we fail to see how the soul can be tormented in its thoughts but 
not in its substance. This is akin to saying that a body can be tormented in its motion but 
not in its corporeal state. It is in the essential nature of a body to move, just as it is in the 
essential nature of the mind to think. Fourthly, it is the nature of the rational mind to 
pursue truth. Therefore, we fail to see how a mind restored to full rationality could in 
any way abide in “false dreams.” And finally, this idea of torment posited in this very 
limited text in Book V is not in keeping with the overall context of the Periphyseon. 
A much simpler solution is available to us, which has been intimated in 
practically every parable referenced in the work. The evil is entirely dissipated in the 
goodness of the Word. We must remember that the truth, so clearly apparent in the seven 
liberal arts, is derivative of that one truth that “lighteth every man” (Eriugena, Hom. St. 
John, 2000, Ch. XVII, 100). Every man can rightly recognize the truth manifested 
through the arts in this world, thus all the more will he recognize their source in the next 
when his rationality is brought to completeness. The most fitting punishment counted as 
just under all the aforementioned schemes is for the evil man to forfeit his evil will. He 
wants to sin, thus the highest mode of punishment must be to take away his desire to sin, 
or better said, to allow him to take it away himself. This will, of course, render him 
happy, and through the entire process God‟s justice to himself rises to infinite measure. 
To quote in summation, “I will forgive their iniquity and I will remember their sin no 
more” (Jeremiah 31:34, KJV). If God does not remember their sin, it seems quite unlikely 
that they will. To the extent that they do, it can only be remembered with respect to the 
present countenance of full restoration. 
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We wish to contrast our position with that of Donald Duclow and Paul Dietrich as 
laid out in a contemporary essay entitled “Hell and Damnation in Eriugena.” They note 
that commentators have preferred to stress the positive theme of God‟s salvation for all 
humanity. Their intention is to “… correct this imbalance and look closely at Eriugena‟s 
views on hell and damnation” (Duclow, Dietrich, 2002, 347). They have correctly noted 
that both the Treatise on Divine Predestination and the Periphyseon are remarkably 
similar with regard to the explanation of eternal punishment given by Eriugena. We agree 
that most commentators have chosen to stress the positive theme of God‟s salvation for 
all humanity; however, in our view, they have not stressed it enough. We wish to correct 
this imbalance, and maintain that both works should be interpreted even more positively 
than they are.  
 Duclow and Dietrich begin their essay referencing Eriugena‟s high reliance on 
Augustine, especially the latter‟s On True Religion and On Free Choice of the Will. 
These works stress the ultimate simplicity of God: “…if the will of God is in God, the 
will of God is , therefore, God. For him there is no distinction between being and willing; 
rather for him being is identical with willing” (Eriugena, Treat. Div. Pred., 1998,Ch. 2, 
pt. 1, 12). In other words, there is but one predestination, and that is to the good. All evil 
is nothing more than a privation of the good. “…[T]he cause of all evils is the perverse 
notion of a rational substance misusing the free choice of its will” (Eriugena, Treat. Div. 
Pred., 1998,, Ch. 5, pt. 5, 36). “…[E]very defect comes out of nothingness…” (Eriugena, 
Treat. Div. Pred., 1998, Ch. 7, pt. 5, 48). We can agree that evil, insofar as we understand 
it, must be resolved in some way at the world‟s end. It cannot be resolved in the Fourth 
Division of nature, because everything there initially came from the First Division. It 
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cannot be resolved in the Second Division for the same reason, or the Third, because that 
division will end. It can only abide so long as the Third Division continues, then it too 
must return to that from which it came: nothingness. Our objection to the contemporary 
article under discussion is that it treats nothingness as something. 
 Early in their essay, Duclow and Dietrich quote from Chapter 19 of the Treatise 
and claim that this quote anticipates the more thorough treatment of damnation that is 
given in Book V of the Periphyseon. 
“The bodies of the ungodly, that is of perverse men and angels, will 
endure the punishments of eternal fire in such a way that the integrity of 
their substance will in no way perish, their beauty will in no way fail, their 
natural soundness will remain; finally all the good things of their nature by 
a wonderful ordering will shine bright for the adornment of the universe, 
except for that happiness of which they will be deprived, which is not 
from nature but from grace” (Eriugena, Treat. Div. Pred., 1998, Ch. 19, pt. 
3, 112). 
We agree that this quotation anticipates the more complete explanation given in the 
Periphyseon. However, we note that in the quotation, Eriugena is talking about the 
“bodies of the ungodly.” They will be preserved in a most integral, beautiful, and eternal 
way. It is merely the evil cravings of these bodies, which are initially and essentially 
nothing, which will be punished. In other words, God does not punish the person, He 
punishes the non-being of a person. To give an example, it is well known that Beethoven 
was deaf in his later years. Deafness is surely a privation for a composer, even though 
Beethoven was able to deal with it. What is the most fitting way to punish his deafness? 
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We will not punish him in his substance, but only his deafness. After all, his deafness is a 
privation that prevented him from being a greater composer than he already was. God 
will take his deafness away: will he remember it? Perhaps he will, but his memory surely 
could not force his soul into an unhappy condition. On the contrary, it seems to us that his 
memory will prompt him to even higher happiness, for this restoration “… by a 
wonderful ordering will shine bright for the adornment of the universe….” (Eriugena, 
Treat. Div. Pred., 1998, Ch. 19, pt. 3, 112). Will the privation of deafness be punished? 
Surely, and eternally, it will be punished. 
 Duclow and Dietrich cast their entire argument in terms of either unhappiness or 
ignorance for the human soul, which either suffers it or enjoys it. We will first deal with 
the former, and for the human soul the condition of happiness turns on the notion of 
phantasy as advanced by Eriugena, a term that must be explained in some detail. 
Phantasies are images or appearances taken from visible or invisible forms which are 
presented to and impressed upon the mind (Eriugena, Per., Bk. V, 962 C). They may be 
true or false. A theophany, an appearance of God, is one example of a phantasy, but there 
are many others. All phantasies are good in themselves, for they arise out of nature, and 
all nature is good. False phantasies, although good in themselves, are not as good as true 
ones. They arise from the “… fictitious bodies of unclean spirits which become manifest 
to the senses of men whom they deceive and should rather be called shades than 
phantasies” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 963 A). All phantasies flow into the mind as two streams 
flow into a river. The first stream derives from sensible objects and the second from 
intelligible ones. It is the first stream which concerns us here, for this is where the seeds 
of damnation are sown, not in the human soul but rather in the will. Indeed, not the 
131 
 
entirety of the first stream is of a corrupting force, but only the false part, that which 
Eriugena refers to as “shades.” Evil has neither cause nor substance, thus it has no 
attractive force in itself. The only way it can seduce is to disguise itself as something 
good, hence the falseness of the shade (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 828 A). 
 Eriugena gives the example of two men, one wise and the other foolish, 
contemplating a beautiful golden vessel. Both men see the same object, both receive the 
same phantasy, and each stores that phantasy in his memory. However, the wise man, 
while pondering the phantasy, refers its beauty to that from which it ultimately came, 
namely God. For him, this is a simple mental process undiluted by the poison of lust. The 
foolish man is altogether different, because his contemplation of the object is not simple, 
but protracted. He does not refer the beauty of the object to its maker. In fact, he does not 
refer the beauty of the object at all because the beauty eludes him, and he is filled with 
avarice. “Directly, he has absorbed the phantasy of the vessel, he blazes with the fire of 
cupidity, he is consumed, he is poisoned, he dies…” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 828 C). Notice 
that for both men the phantasy is pleasant and good. However, for the foolish man, the 
contemplation of the phantasy, when mixed with the greed of an evil will, becomes 
colored and distorted. In a sense, the simple phantasy initially received in the mind of the 
foolish man is doubled. His selfishness was given form, for it was mixed with something 
good in such a way that what was completely evil, the will, appeared good (Eriugena, Bk. 
IV, 828 C-D). 
 While we agree with the isolated interpretation of this passage as presented by 
Duclow and Dietrich, we do not agree that they can infer eternal damnation of the human 
soul from it. In this example, Eriugena is talking about evil as experienced in this world, 
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not the next. All mortal men live presently in a continuum between good and evil, none 
being wholly one or the other. There are varying degrees of the wise man and the foolish 
man in all of us. In other words, we are all prone to irrational motion, as evidenced by the 
fact that we are all subject to death. Eriugena‟s example is a substantive commentary on 
evil, not the broader implications of it, including damnation. The most that can be 
inferred from this example is that all mortal men who have a desire for the temporal, in 
other words all of us, must die. The last paragraph of his example proves this statement: 
“And it appears that this [irrational] notion comes not from human nature but is induced 
from outside…. [I]t is tinged and mingled with good so as to deceive the lustful 
affections of the carnal senses, and thus to destroy them by death” (Eriugena, 1 Bk. IV 
829 A). 
 “Damnation intensifies this dialectic of cupidity and phantasy. For while in this 
life a lust for sensible things can occasionally be satisfied, in the eschaton it brings only 
torment. When all things return to their causes, the sensible world ends” (Duclow and 
Dietrich, 2002, 358). The writers recall the foolish, greedy man infatuated with the 
golden vessel. He may actually secure the vessel for himself in this life and temporarily 
satisfy his greed. However, in the eschaton, the fool and his desire will still exist, yet the 
vessel will not. Therefore, he will be eternally tormented because his lust cannot be 
assuaged.  
 “The phantasies of the damned punish them in another deeper sense as well” 
(Duclow and Dietrich, 2002, 359). That method of punishment is deprivation of the truth. 
“…[O]ur sole quest should be joy in the truth, which is Christ, and our sole dread the 
deprivation of it, for that is the one cause of all eternal suffering” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 989 
133 
 
A). Again, we agree with the statement made by Eriugena, but not with the extension of it 
to include the notion of damnation for the human soul. The statement is not a substantive 
one about punishment in the eschaton, but rather it is one concerning truth. The claim of 
the contemporary essay examined here is that the wicked will be just as constrained from 
seeing truth in the next world as they are in this one. “In fact, there is little difference 
between the punishments that the damned shall suffer for eternity and those they endure 
here and now” (Duclow and Dietrich, 2002, 360). We would agree that this claim is 
“distinctly modern.” We can even agree that this relatively small portion of the 
Periphyseon, roughly one hundred paragraphs out of four thousand, four hundred, is a fair 
interpretation of Eriugena‟s writing. Our counter-assertion is that it is an anomaly within 
the Periphyseon and does not comport with the overall theme of apokatastasis, which is 
so otherwise apparent. 
The reason, or reasons, for what seems to us to be a contextual contradiction 
within the Periphyseon, is beyond the scope of our study, and could be the topic of a 
separate dissertation. We do note that Eriugena‟s own writings, considered, over time, 
seem to take on a softening tone toward damnation. The earlier Treatise employs the 
most vicious and unforgiving rhetoric. Therein, Gottschalk is accused of being a heretic 
and servant of the devil (Eriugena, Treat. Div. Pred., 1998, Ch. 1, pt. 4, 10), and Eriugena 
states that he justly deserves “to burn in oil and pitch” (Eriugena, Ch. 3, pt. 7, 23). The 
language of the Periphyseon is more moderate, and the articulation of hell and damnation 
is essentially confined to the one hundred paragraphs on which Duclow and Dietrich 
concentrate for their essay. The Homily is the most gracious of all in its tone and 
message, saying that the Word is the light and life of each and every human being. We 
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interpret this claim to include not only human nature in general, but every particular 
contained in it. The “Word [does not] wish to forsake human nature; nor will he ever 
forsake it” (Eriugena, Hom. St. John, 2000, Ch. XIII, 93). If our interpretation of the 
general intent of the Periphyseon is correct, i.e. that all are restored to happiness, then 
Eriugena‟s teaching would have been considered somewhat controversial at the time, as 
indeed it still is. The medieval period is well known as a time in which controversial 
views were not kindly tolerated, nor those who advanced them charitably dealt with. Still, 
we cannot think that Eriugena was couching his work in order to avoid any punitive 
consequences, as he seems to have enjoyed the favor, therefore the protection, of Charles 
the Bald. It seems more likely to us that Eriugena is simply refining his own philosophy 
and constantly trying to ensure that his more general principles are consistent as they 
descend into particulars. Moreover, there is the continual difficulty of interpreting 
seemingly contradictory scriptural passages in such a way that the guiding principle of 
reason is not violated. 
Our claim is that the specific paragraphs which pertain to hell and damnation 
cannot be brought into compliance with the general theme of restoration as a whole. If we 
are wrong, then there is really very little of Eriugena‟s philosophy that is unique; indeed, 
his views on damnation are in the end very similar to those advanced by Augustine, 
Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin. If we are right, then there is eternal hope and assurance for 
man. 
First, we address the issue of the restoration of human nature in the universal 
versus that of the individual. As we have stated and referenced above, there can be no 
doubt that Eriugena held that human nature as a whole is restored to happiness. Thus, the 
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only question to be examined is whether each man contained within human nature is so 
restored. For example, one attribute of the universal idea of a chair is that it is a piece of 
furniture that can be sat upon. Does that mean that the activity of being sat upon is 
realized in every individual chair? Of course the answer is no. However, let us consider 
the universal idea of a runner. One of the attributes of the universal idea is that a runner is 
one who runs. Does this mean that the activity of running is realized in every individual 
runner? It must be, for if a person does not run, we cannot call him a runner. Our position 
is that happiness is like the latter example rather than the former. Augustine, writing in 
the Confessions, holds that happiness for man is an end, as opposed to an activity. “How 
then do I seek the happy life? For I do not possess it until I can say, „Enough! It is there” 
(Augustine, Con., 1960, Bk. X, Ch. 20,  248). It is something that all men seek and no 
one can entirely will against. Moreover, unless men knew it, they wold not desire it. 
Hence it follows that the happy life is already in the memory of man, collectively, as well 
as individually (Augustine, Con., 1960, Bk. X, Ch. 20, 249). This idea is reinforced in 
Book Two of On Free Choice of the Will. “Insofar as all men seek the happy life, they do 
not err” (Augustine, Free Choice, 1964, Bk. II, pt. 9, 58). It is even equated with wisdom. 
“…[B]efore we are happy… we know confidently and say without hesitation that we 
wish to be happy so, before we are wise, we have an idea of wisdom in our minds” 
(Augustine, Free Choice, 1964, Bk. II, pt. 9, 58). The idea of the happy life is impressed 
upon the mind before one is happy. So it seems to us that the happy life is such an 
integral part of man that he cannot be man, certainly not restored man, without it. This is 
not so much a problem for Augustine because for him, man is not restored. As noted 
earlier, Augustine believes that many suffer eternal fire and separation. We view it as 
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quite a problem for Eriugena. There is, for Eriugena, a sense in which the evil will 
precedes the knowledge of happiness, else man would not have fallen in the first place. 
However, man‟s love of happiness is even prior to that, for why else did he exercise his 
free will but to secure happiness, something already in his memory? In other words, if 
Eriugena holds that man is to be restored “as [he was] in the beginning” (Eriugena, Bk. 
V, 1004 A), that would not be his condition after he lost his memory, but before he fell. It 
would be his condition before he lost his memory. Of course, all these arguments are 
meant in a causal way, not in a temporal one. By this, we simply mean that time, for 
mortals, begins with the fall, not prior to it. The sequences of events outlined above are 
not in time, but rather in priority.  
We next address the issue of whether or not man can be punished in his happiness 
through phantasy. Let us return to Eriugena‟s example of the foolish, greedy man who 
covets the golden vessel in this life. Can he still desire it in the next life, knowing that it 
no longer exists? We do not think so. Even in this life, if the golden vessel were melted 
down into bars of gold, and if some vast deposit of gold were found so as to make the 
bars worthless, the greedy fool would be made wise. If such were to happen in this life, 
that would be an even more persuasive argument that he would be wise in the next. We 
ask our readers to consider any object that they have lustfully desired in the past which 
does not exist in the present. Is it still desirable? It is true that people are unhappy when 
they lose money in the stock market, but this is temporary unhappiness. It is true that 
people cry at funerals for lost loved ones. This is different though; for in this case those 
who suffer lamentation suffer not because they lusted in an evil way, but because they 
loved in a good way. In other words, the deceased person made them better, not worse. 
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Moreover, generally speaking, the one who grieves suffers not so much because the 
object of their love no longer exists, but because that object is beyond their presence. 
Consider the death of one of the world‟s most beautiful women, Marilyn Monroe. The 
man who never knew her, but merely desired the seductive image of her, did not cry at 
her funeral. But her husband, Joe DiMaggio, cried, because she made him better. 
We now turn to one of Eriugena‟s own examples, that of the ten lepers (Eriugena, 
Bk. IV, 847 A-B). All ten are afflicted with leprosy, thus all ten are unhappy. All ten are 
cleansed and made well, thus all ten are restored to a happy life. It is surely true that only 
one really seems to appreciate his restoration, and we can reasonably conclude that he 
alone gains the ultimate sense of beatitude. However, all ten are redeemed as men and 
made happy. 
A more subtle explanation to this quandary might be that there are two types of 
happiness: one that inheres through nature, and one that inheres through grace. Eriugena 
may be implying this when he says that the ungodly will be deprived of their happiness 
“which is not from nature but from grace” (Eriugena, Treat. Div. Pre., 1998, Ch. 19, pt. 3 
126). An even more subtle interpretation could be that through the very act of 
punishment, i.e. the removal of the evil will, man is made happy. The latter seems the 
more fitting, and it corresponds to the character of God as Eriugena has described Him. 
God can have no contraries in substance. Thus, it seems somehow very appropriate that 
His purposes are fulfilled through evil intentions just as much as they are fulfilled 
through good ones. “For the Divine Goodness shall consume evil, eternal life shall 
swallow up death, blessedness shall absorb unhappiness” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 926 D).  
Lastly, we note that although the Word is the archetype of every man, He 
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descended into an individual man. “[F]or the sake of humanity [he] became a human 
being among human beings” (Eriugena, Hom. St. John, 2000,  Ch. XVI, 99). It seems to 
us that happiness must be restored to every man individually. “[A]s He granted to all men 
equally that they should be, so He shall grant to all men equally that they shall rise again 
and possess the likeness of the angelic nature” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 986 A). We do not see 
how it would be possible for someone to possess the likeness of angelic nature and to be 
unhappy. This mortal life, with its attending unhappiness, would not have occurred had 
man not fallen, for he would indeed be an angel (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 780 B) and (Moran, 
1989, 200). Some would argue whether men have any likeness to angels; however, this is 
















Chapter V: The Logical Necessity of Salvation 
Extended Platonism 
Thus far, we have conducted our study in the manner of a philosopher working 
with an historical text.  Context has been given so as to ground Eriugena within his own 
time and culture, as well as to establish his own philosophical background.  Much of our 
work has been in the form of exposition, and still we continue in this mode so as to grasp 
one of the more difficult and complex concepts of the Periphyseon, which we call 
extended Platonism.  Of course, Plato maintained that a world of forms had a reality 
independent of our senses.  This world of pure being contained the archetypes of our 
sensory world of becoming.  All the objects that we see here in this world, every physical 
thing, is but an image of that which exists in the world of pure being (Magee, 1998, 27).  
Thus, we could not have real knowledge of this world for it was always changing; the 
only way to attain certain knowledge was to study the archetypes, the forms in the ideal 
world.  Eriugena goes a step further than Plato, for in the Periphyseon there is a closer 
connection between the forms and their images.  In fairness, Plato‟s connection between 
the forms and their images is close. However, God, the forms, and the images maintain a 
certain independence because in a primordial sense they are all different. As noted 
earlier, in the Timaeus God is the supreme craftsman. He fashions the world from 
preexisting materials according to an eternal pattern (Plato,Tim., 1949, pt. 28-29, 12-13). 
For our philosopher, the connection is closer because, in a primordial sense, there is only 
God as the first division of nature. Thus the theophany has a higher ontological status for 
Eriugena than the image has for Plato.  Yet for our philosopher, it is not as though God is 
the less in closely tying Him to His creation, but that He is more.  In other words, in 
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manifesting Himself through His acts, God can be thought of as actually going beyond 
Himself.  In the parlance of negative theology, God is said to be beyond beauty, beyond 
truth, beyond goodness, beyond being, etc. He is also beyond space and time.  In reading 
Plato, one almost has the feeling that his world of being exists just beyond, perhaps 
higher than, our world, and merely extended in our time for perhaps another 10,000 
years. For Eriugena, God is here and now, as well as beyond. 
Plato reinforces these notions with long, physically enduring analogies such as the 
cave and the myth of Er (Plato, Rep., 1968, 614 B). To be fair again, Plato does warn that 
his analogies, such as the cave, are simply that and are not meant to be taken as a literal 
description of the intelligible (Plato, Rep., 1949, 514 A). Still, one never gets this sense 
of extended duration and locality from Eriugena who is always careful not to 
circumscribe God in space and time.  As noted earlier, God is an infinite division of 
nature who exists in infinite dimensions, not just four (three of space, one of time).  In 
some mystical way, placing God in the infinity beyond our world brings Him closer to it.  
This communion has very important implications for our study to the extent that we can 
actually make the argument that there is a logical necessity for the salvation of the 
damned. 
  -All men are saved. 
  -The damned men are men. 
  -Therefore the damned men are saved. 
We see that this is a valid syllogism according to the science of deductive logic.  
Given the truth of these two premises, the conclusion follows:  all the categories of the 
syllogism fall neatly within Aristotle‟s ten. There are some Christian writers who might 
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doubt the minor premise, saying that human nature is now corrupted, thus less human. 
However, we have sufficiently dealt with this objection above.  Few could doubt the 
minor premise, so we only concern ourselves with the major premise, “all men are 
saved.”   Of course, we could never prove this by induction, so again we resort to 
deduction and the notion of extended Platonism.  This mandates another investigation of 
Part I, God as that which creates and is not created.  This first division of nature can be 
understood to be and yet not to be, according to all five of Eriugena‟s modes of 
interpretation.  However, the one that concerns us most at this point is the third mode: 
things in which the visible plenitude of this world is made up, and in their causes in the 
most secret folds of nature, which precede them (Eriugena, Bk. I, 444 C). God is 
understood as having His own being “in that first and one man whom He made in His 
image He established all men at the same time…”  (Eriugena, Bk. I, 445 A).  This “first 
and one” man is the Word who precedes all effects, however He can just as well be said 
to be made in all men.  In other words, from a completely external perspective, which of 
course we can never have, for we cannot circumscribe Him in time and space, God 
subsists in His own being.  However, from the perspective of either God or man, 
Eriugena maintains a kind of process theology where each needs the other.  The first 
division of nature, God as creator, is uncreated in essence, but can just as well be 
understood as being created and we may not casually dismiss this subtle tension.  
“…[T]he motion of the Divine nature is to be understood as nothing else but the purpose 
of the Divine Will to establish the things that are to be made.  Therefore, it is said in all 
things that the Divine Nature is being made…” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 453 C-D).  In God, 
desiring, willing, acting, being are all one and the same.  The motion of the Divine Will 
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is directed to this purpose; that it leads all things calling them from nothing into 
something.  Thus, all other things are said to be and to be good through their 
participation in this one truly existing, truly good source.  The very definition of man, 
the primordial cause, seems to have some measure of dependence on man, the effect, for 
causes are not without effects, just as effects are not without causes. By this, we mean 
that the primordial cause of man resides in individual men.  
            “For when it [Divine Nature] is said that it creates itself the true meaning is that 
it is establishing the nature of things.  For the creation of itself …  is … the 
manifestation of itself in something…” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 455 B).  Moreover, the 
connection is more than a simple coupling of God and man but an interwoven lattice 
between the persons of the Trinity and the essentials of created things.  Their nature is 
understood as derived from the Father, their wisdom from the Son, their life from the 
Holy Spirit.  Like the Trinity, the creatures‟ relationship to it exceeds all definition.  The 
connection is surely not one of substantial equality, but there is indeed some measure of 
transitiveness, for one party finds completion in the other. 
Eriugena gives some specific examples of his conception of extended Platonism 
in order to fully demonstrate his position that a subject and what is predicated of a subject 
are one, and differ in no respect.  Of course, the following would not apply to descriptive 
predicates of a subject, such as “the apple is red.” However, it does seem to apply to 
predicates which are an individuation of a species. When one says that Cicero is a man, 
there is no difference with regard to nature between the subject and the predicate except 
that one is the individual and one the species.  Thus, if the species is unified and one and 
indivisible in the individual and the individuals comprise a unity in the species, there can 
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be no difference with respect to nature of manliness between the subject and what is 
predicated of the subject.  This is even more apparent if we take an example such as art.  
The artistry in each particular work of art is nothing more than what the dialecticians 
term “that which is in the subject,” and is not other than art in general.  In other words, 
we may say that art is manifested in the “Mona Lisa”, “The Thinker”, or the Cathedral of 
Notre Dame just as we may say art is made by them for who could conceive of art 
without its works?  (Eriugena, Bk. I, 470 D-471 B).   
There are two significant elements that tend to weaken these extended Platonic 
bonds uniting God and man: time and place.  God is beyond time and place, and man is in 
them, so Eriugena must deal with these.  Perhaps this is not so much of a difficulty for the 
given examples, because the given examples of Cicero and man, art and artwork, identity 
and numbers all seem to be in the same realm, but God and man appear to be in different 
ones.  Eriugena handles this very skillfully, and shows us that although God and man 
appear to be separated by time and place, they both actually exist and act in the same 
world.  The key to this resolution is understanding Eriugena‟s very unique and bold 
conception of what constitutes time and place.  They are both something very different 
from what we accept them to be in our experience. 
Eriugena returns to the liberal arts, and grounds his theory within them.  “Place is 
constituted in the definition of things that can be defined.  For place is nothing else but 
the boundary by which each is enclosed within fixed terms” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 474 B).  
Next he gives a definition for each of the seven liberal arts, and notes that each art has its 
own innumerable definitions that are unique to it.  They all receive their form from the 
Word of God.  Dialectic is the most important of the seven, for it controls all definitions 
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and therefore “describes the esse of the argument as a place” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 475 A).  
We thus conclude that place exists in the mind alone, “for if every definition is in art, and 
every art is in mind, every place, since place is definition, will necessarily be nowhere 
else but in the mind” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 475 B).  This is a most remarkable postulate.  For 
Eriugena, place is something constituted wholly within the human mind. Every rational 
soul, and presumably irrational beasts, experience it in the same way due to the unique 
contribution of the Word. He establishes place in the mind, not minds in place. Of course, 
many people would laugh at us for asserting such nonsense. “This world is not a place?” 
they would mockingly ask, inculcated as we all are by Newtonian physics.  Eriugena 
maintains that right reason laughs at them (Eriugena, Bk. I, 475 C).   
Eriugena‟s treatment of time is even more subtle.  “For time is the exact and 
rational measurement of the stopping and going of mutable things” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 507 
B).  This definition is very much like that given by Aristotle in Book IV of the Physics. 
“For time is just this: The number of motion with respect to the prior and the posterior” 
(Aristotle, Physics, 1980, 219 B).  Eriugena does not cite Aristotle here, and given his 
tendency to reference his sources it seems likely that his conception of time was his own. 
At the very least, we could say that even if many of Aristotle‟s thoughts on time have 
been appropriated by Eriugena, the latters conception of time is slightly more nuanced.  
For both formulations, motion seems to have a certain priority over time, so it would 
seem appropriate to examine motion.  Eriugena holds that motion is a “natural power 
hastening toward its end…a passion coming from one to another of which the end is 
impassibility…an active operation of which the end is self-perfection”  (Eriugena, Bk. I, 
515 C). Here we have a very different understanding of motion than that given in Book 
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III of the Physics, that “motion is the actuality of the potentially existing qua existing 
potentially.”  Where Aristotle holds later in Book VIII that first motion is caused by God, 
Eriugena seems to be claiming that all motion is caused by God. Of course, Aquinas, 
following on Aristotle, says that God causes all motion for He is the first cause. However, 
Eriugena seems to be saying that God causes motion directly. The first case is like a ball 
rolling because some agent has pushed it; the second is like a piece of iron being pulled 
by a magnet. This is consistent with Eriugena‟s position that God not only creates the 
world, he sustains it and this means the sustaining of motion.  Eriugena quotes Maximus, 
“For God is the Beginning, that is, the cause of all creatures and their ends since from 
Him they receive their being and begin to be, and towards Him they are moved in order 
that they may attain in Him their rest” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 516 A). Moreover, we must 
consider that motion is not just the “stopping and going of mutable things” but it is a 
rational measurement; meaning that whatever moves, moves in place.  As noted earlier, 
place exists only in the mind.  Thus, in the final analysis, Eriugena brings many of these 
vastly different conceptions of time and place into one accord.  In the end, by founding 
his theory of time on that of place and by founding place in the mind alone, time turns out 
to be exactly what Augustine held it to be, a distention contained in the mind.  “It is in 
you, O my mind, that I measure time”  (Augustine, Con., 1960, Bk. XI, Ch. 27, 300).  
“The same thing holds for a man‟s entire life, the parts of which are all the man‟s actions.  
The same thing holds throughout the whole age of the sons of men, the parts of which are 
the lives of all men”  (Augustine, Con., 1960, Bk. XI, Ch. 28, 302).  In other words, time, 
like truth, is shared by all men.  The reason they share it is that the Word in His creative 
act has pressed it into each rational mind.  So it seems to us that Aristotle, Augustine, and 
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Eriugena are all correct with regard to their theories on time, but from different 
perspectives.  However, Eriugena‟s conception of time seems the most subtle 
philosophically. We note that the concept of space is also enjoined upon irrational minds 
while that of time is not.  All animals react in space just as humans do.  They shield 
themselves, distance themselves, hide themselves from danger, try to find food, warmth, 
pleasure, etc.  However, they do not experience time in the same way as humans.  Many 
species of animals such as migratory birds, salmon, and certain insects demonstrate 
remarkable mastery of time despite the fact that they have no comprehension of it.  We 
suspect that this is so, for while the concept of place can exist in any mind, the concept of 
time as the “exact and rational measurement” of movement and can exist only in the 
rational mind.  We note that the sense of time in all dogs seems to be like that of the dog 
of Odysseus, who recognized his master when everyone else, including his wife, failed to 
recognize him. 
The whole point of these discussions of time and place is to show that both forms 
are shared by God and man. We noted at the outset of this discussion that while man 
presently resides in a finite world bound by time and space, God exists in an infinite 
world beyond time and space. So long as these distinctions are maintained, we view the 
separation between God and man as being unbridgeable. Thus, it is important for 
Eriugena to show that time and place, although appearing to separate God and man, do 
not essentially do so. Christianity, with its doctrine of the descending Logos, has done an 
effective job by bringing God into man‟s realm, and Eriugena acknowledges this 
(Eriugena, Bk. V, 912 A). However, he goes even further by lifting man into God‟s 
realm. As noted earlier, the essence of place resides not in space, but in definition, which 
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is in God‟s mind. Likewise, the essence of time does not reside in apparent temporality, 
but in the rational movement of the mind. In his essay Time and Eternity in the 
Periphyseon, Dermot Moran highlights the need for Eriugena to show how time and 
space are bridged. He writes, “Time and space play a crucial part in the dynamics of the 
divine self-articulation and recollection” (Moran, 2002, 488). They are added on to the 
essential nature of things as a result of the fall, thus they must be taken off in the return. 
In this present life, we are viewing things through the distorted lens of time and space. 
The return of man to his primordial causes overcomes the dimensions of time and space 
by bringing the body back into the mind (Moran, 2002, 492). The resurrection 
accomplishes this for man. As noted above, Christ‟s resurrection and ascension are a 
preview of what is in store for everyone, and proof that the humanity of the second 
person of the Trinity “… cast off all spatial and temporal characteristics and returned to 
its timeless and eternal and wholly spiritual nature” (Moran, 2002, 492). God transcends 
time and space for in the creation of man he establishes them in the mind.  He can be 
understood as moving in them, even though He is beyond all movement.  He can also be 
understood as giving account of human history and prophesying in time, even though He 
is beyond all time.  He shares these realms with man because he knows them, having long 
established them through the Logos.   
Thus, to conclude this section on what we have termed extended Platonism, God 
needs man more than Plato‟s world of being needs the world of becoming. In truth, He 
needs man infinitely for the very reason that He has created Him.  In a practical sense, 
God creates freely; but in an essential sense, He requires Himself to create. Of course, 
this is not to say that this requirement is imposed by any external source.  Rather it is to 
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say that He creates out of goodness in accordance with His nature.  Eriugena calls this a 
“relation of Middle, which appears to observers under a double mode, first when the 
Divine Nature is seen to be created and to create- for it is created by itself in the 
primordial causes, and, therefore creates itself, that is, allows itself to appear in 
theophanies…” (Eriugena, Bk. III, 689 A-B).  We raise the analogy of the artist and his 
works.  The artist surely does not need his works of art for his own subsistence.  Yet, 
could he even be an artist without his art?  One could answer that we surely do need some 
of his works in order to call him an artist.  This is true enough, for the works are 
accidental to the artist and the two exist in different realms.  However, once the artist 
makes the art “in his image” he brings it into the same realm in which he exists.  His 
work is no longer accidental as to that it is, but only as to what it is.  Some of his 
paintings may be black, some white, big, small, good, bad, accepting of his greatness, 
non-accepting of it.  However, every work of art in his image must bear his personal 
guarantee through the very creation of it.  “…[I]f the Word of God took human nature 
upon Him, it was not a part of it… but the whole of it universally.  And if He took upon 
Himself the whole of our nature, then clearly it is the whole of it which is restored in 
Him…. No part of that humanity which was wholly assumed by Him is abandoned to the 
eternal punishments…”  (Eriugena, Bk. V, 923 C). 
 
Completeness for God 
As noted earlier, Eriugena maintains that the completeness of God is understood 
in the resolved tension of gift vs. grace.  Gift is a datum, grace is a donum (Eriugena, Bk. 
V, 905 A). Both words carry the idea of something freely bestowed; however, there is a 
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significant difference.  A datum is something called forth out of nothingness and common 
to all, a basis or standard by which all is measured.  A donum implies something high and 
superlative rather than standard.  It is the root of our word donation, or large gift. A 
donum goes beyond itself, and in our case it brings what is common to nature beyond 
mere existence and into God.  Sometime after completing the Periphyseon, circa 867, 
Eriugena wrote a Homily on the Prologue to the Gospel of John.  This work, much more 
mystical than the speculative Periphyseon, was to become a classic in medieval Spiritual 
literature and was widely disseminated (Moran, 1990, 79). In the Homily, Eriugena 
writes with even more clarity on this idea of completion for God through this resolution 
of gift into grace.  “In the beginning was the Word”  (Eriugena, Hom. St. John, 2000, Ch. 
6, 78). Beginning here, Eriugena means to signify substantial priority rather than 
temporal.  “All things were made through Him”  (Eriugena, Hom. St. John, 2000, Ch. 7, 
80). This is the downward manifestation of gift into the primordial causes, then the 
discernible effects.  Eriugena holds that to consider that anything came into existence in 
any other way would be unreasonable, for all things are brought into being by the Word.  
And lest we be tempted to doubt this truth in any manner, the evangelist quickly adds 
“And without Him was not anything made”  (Eriugena, Hom. St. John, 2000, Ch. 8,82). 
Therefore, nothing made can be co-essential, co-substantial or co-eternal with Him.  This 
concept is something that we must not only believe but understand.  The Father speaks, 
the Word acts, the effects begin their existence and all this happens once and eternally, as 
opposed to historically and temporally.  Moreover, all that the Word makes, He makes in 
truth and wisdom; in His creation there can be no falsehood and no foolishness.  The idea 
is very similar to Plato‟s overflow of goodness.  God, being infinite, cannot contain His 
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truth, beauty, goodness or being, and this is the gift of created nature.  However, this gift 
is only half the narrative.  It is akin to the artist who brings his work to the canvas and 
then is forever separated from it through the corporeal nature of our world.  The Word is 
not constrained.  He not only brings it to the medium, He sustains it thereon and recalls it 
back into Himself when the medium fails.  This is the restoration of all things through the 
Word, the fulfillment of the gift through grace.  In Eriugena‟s philosophy, one cannot be 
understood without the other.  “And the life was the light of human beings”  (Eriugena, 
Hom. St. John, 2000, Ch. 2, 88). The evangelist makes a subtle shift here and what was 
previously called the Word, or Logos, is now life and light.  This shift is not without 
meaning, for we are now to understand that this Logos descended and has commonality 
with all life.  This light illuminates itself as it goes forth revealing itself to all men.  This 
is why Eriugena claimed that all creatures are created in man, even angels and demons, 
because the light of life is first and foremost to humanity.  Thus, we are forced to 
conclude that this incarnation of the Logos unfolded according to a plan, and that the plan 
was a perfect one.  Eriugena maintains that “full of grace and truth” signifies that the 
Logos brought this plan to fulfillment.  Grace refers to the deification of humanity, truth, 
the manifestation of the divine (Eriugena, Hom. St. John, 2000, Ch. 23, 112). 
First, we address the notion of the plan itself.  Does it seem logical to save the 
damned?  Again we hearken back to our earlier claim and argue that the damned are 
saved because all are saved.  Is it logically necessary to save all?  Let us place ourselves 
in God‟s mind here. Of course, we do not know God‟s mind directly, but we do kow our 
own mind, which must be less. This seems to be a reasonable approach since our minds 
are illuminated by the very mind of the Logos.  What plan would we formulate?  The best 
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approach, perhaps the only one, is to envision ourselves as artists.  Of course, we cannot 
create from nothing as God does, but this should not be a limitation to our method of 
speculation.  Indeed let us imagine that we can.  We have all had the experience of 
drawing a picture, writing a story, or composing a song.  Let us examine our experience 
and project it by way of what we know with certainty.  We can extend our talents far 
beyond our corporeal limits and even imagine that we are creating great works of art out 
of nothing.  We must also remember that there are no other artists in the world, indeed 
there is no world at all until we make it.  We are all there is, we are before all that we 
make, we are “in the beginning.”  There is no room for smallness here, for we will only 
make the beautiful, the wise, and the good.  In fact everything that we make will be such 
that after it is made we will say it is good, it is good…it is very good.  There is nothing 
bad about our efforts.  Indeed we are even incapable of making anything bad.  
Furthermore, let us suppose that one of our works is very special to us and we love it 
more than any of the others, to the extent that we make all the others through it.  Our final 
gift, other than loving this one thing forever, is to give it something of our very selves, an 
attribute of ours that we vest in no other creature.  We give it our image.  We will call this 
thing Adam and vest him with the very immortality that we have.  Could we ever let 
Adam perish in torment?  Of course we will not.  Adam may be permitted to go his own 
way for say seventy years, but at the end of that time we will bring his wisdom to a near 
equality with our own and let him see where he came from.  He must turn to us, for the 
wisdom he has is the very same that we gave him.  Lacking any of the above, our plan is 
an imperfect one.  We must admit that God‟s plan was a perfect one and that the perfect 
plan warrants perfect redemption. 
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Next we must examine the motive of our love for Adam.  We can do this without 
any regard whatsoever of Adam‟s love for us.  Love is a “certain unitive and continuative 
power which moves the higher things to provide for the lower…” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 519 
C).  By our love we will care for Adam, sustain him, and draw him back toward us when 
he tries to turn away.  We may allow him some freedom because this benefits us in the 
long run for when he turns back to us he will be less likely to turn away again. The key 
question is what degree of freedom to allow. Suffice to say, we will allow him to be any 
kind of man he wants. However, the crucial point is that he must be a man. We will 
permit him to be a bad man, but we will not permit him to be a horse. We know that 
Adam is a rational man because we have given him a share of our own rationality.  Thus, 
we can be assured that he will eventually come home to us.  We are more in him than he 
is in him, for we are the very cause of what he is.  Moreover, we love Adam to such 
measure that we cannot be happy without him.  We are incomplete if our relationship 
with him is in disarray.  The very love that is us, is our will, and his cause is no less after 
he is made than before and suffers no diminution when he turns away from us.  Indeed, 
he really cannot turn away from us for we are everywhere. By this we mean that we press 
our thoughts to him from every space, time, situation, and relationship, especially in his 
own family members. Adam cannot even turn inward into his own soul for we are there 
before he is there.  We will forgive anything he does because that is the nature of what 
we are.  Even if, in his insolence, Adam tries to become “as one of us,” we in our infinite 
wisdom understand that he is trying to accomplish, albeit on his own, what we all along 
had hoped he would try to accomplish, indeed created him to try to accomplish.  Such is 
the uniting bond that connects us.  We fashion him in such a way that the more he turns 
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to us the closer we draw him, and paradoxically the more he turns away the closer we 
draw him as well.  To think that Adam might follow his own destiny into eternity is to 
view him from his own narrow perspective.  We love him to such an extent that we have 
created in him a pathway to fulfillment that is our destiny alone.  Ultimately, Adam must 
choose to follow it, and from his perspective he must do so freely and rationally. We 
provide for him and call him back into that relationship for which we made him in the 
first place.  Through the resolution of this grace our love for Adam is made complete. 
We turn briefly to the highest theophany that is concretely discernible in this 
world, that of the human family, or more particularly, the vertical dimension of it. 
Aristotle called it the greatest friendship, and we go even further and call it the 
intelligible manifestation of God‟s relationship to man. The ideal of the human family 
seems to be constant across all of history and all cultures. No human family is all that it 
should be; however, it is the one and only ideal which comes closest to manifesting 
divine grace. We would all choose to have a different house or automobile, providing that 
the new house or automobile would be better, yet very few of us would choose to have a 
different parent or child, even if the parent or child were better. As such, the family has a 
unique excellence in that we perfectly understand its ideal form and can come very close 
to actualizing it. This is not unlike the form of a circle in that the mathematician 
understands it perfectly, and although he cannot draw a perfect circle, he can come close. 
The family itself is essentially prior to its members, thus the members bear no inherent 
relationship to one another. It is only by virtue of the relationship of the parent to the 
family and the child to the family that the child is related to the parent, and even the 
parent to the child. Thus the parent can be understood to make himself in the making of 
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the child. The parent needs the child in order to be who he is. Essentially, this is the very 
same notion that Eriugena talks about when writing about theophanies. God, the 
uncreated, can be understood as being created through His creative acts, and His essence 
is one and the same (Eriugena, Bk. I, 453 D-C). Thus, there is a certain dependence of 
God upon His creation. Substantially, God is independent because He exists in and of 
Himself. Yet by virtue of the truth that God created Adam, He needs Adam. Perhaps we 
may once again call upon the analogy of the artist. The artist exists substantially as a 
man, thus he is not dependent on his art. However, as an artist, he exists only by virtue of 
his art and is very dependent on it. The difference between an artist and God is that the 
artist exists substantially as a man and as an artist. God has no such two-fold 
substantiality. His substance as God and His substance as creator are one and the same. 
We turn next to the incarnation of the Word as the completion of God‟s 
redemptive work. The Logos descended into humanity to save the effects of the causes, 
which He already possesses, immutably and eternally. He loves the particular effects, and 
the only way for these effects to be preserved eternally is for them to be mystically called 
back into their primordial causes. This is perhaps the one place in the Periphyseon that, 
more than any other, establishes a kind of dependence between God and man. God is the 
cause, man is the effect, and each must be understood in terms of the other. They came 
into being together, and they perish or subsist together. There can be no cause without 
effect, and no effect without cause (Eriugena, Bk. V, 912 B). “Therefore, in the only-
begotten Word of God, incarnate and made man the whole world is restored even now 
according to its species, but at the end of the world will return universally and into its 
genus” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 912 B). “For the incarnate Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, 
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received the fullness of grace according to his humanity, since he is the head of the 
church and the firstborn of universal creation – that is, of the totality of universal 
humanity, which is in him and through him healed and restored” (Eriugena, Hom. St. 
John, 2000,  Ch. 23, 112). By this, Eriugena means that the work of the Logos was 
eternally completed in the creation before it temporally began. Our argument here is this: 
since we know that the redemptive work of the Word has already been completed, we are 
not permitted to act as if it had not. If Christ has already paid the price in full, what part 
of the debt remains to be paid? Moreover, since He has done His part already, who else 
could possibly do it? To insist, as many do, that we must somehow activate our end of the 
bargain is to misunderstand the reality of the completed relationship.  It is not a bargain 
to be contracted; rather, it is a promise already fulfilled. Strictly speaking, we participate 
in God, He does not participate in us. Over the centuries, this insistence of an overt 
actualization by us in our salvation has taken various forms. One must pay a certain 
indulgence, perform a certain good work, be baptized in a particular manner, make an 
active acceptance of Jesus Christ as one‟s savior, etc. All of these, no matter how well-
intended, place the key to the gate of paradise in the hand of he who is saved, not He who 
does the saving. The Word became flesh in order to save the world; thus grace extends in 
equal fashion to every man. In other words, no one can reasonably claim that Christ came 
to save some men and not others. All too commonly the question turns on the details of 
what each individual man must do. In some denominations, man must do a great deal; in 
others, very little, perhaps as little as saying “I believe.” Yet, all of these conditions, no 
matter how trivial they might seem, limit the grace offered by the Word. The truth of the 
matter is that the statement of faith “I believe,” which seems to be a slight inconvenience 
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for some, is actually a matter of grave consequence for others. Millions of people are 
constrained by their traditions, culture, or upbringing from accepting the truth of our 
presuppositions. Many die without ever hearing about it. Others do not have the 
intellectual capacity to understand it. Our point here is that under any system whereby 
man must in some way actualize his own salvation, not all men have an equal chance, and 
some have no chance at all. If one were to go into the county jail, unlock the door, and 
offer freedom to all within, some will choose to stay. Offer life or death to a large sample 
of humanity, and some would choose not to live. None make these choices freely. They 
are bound by demons of some kind to live in darkness, turning away from rational 
goodness. God must find some way to reconcile all of these souls; not just some, or the 
majority, or even most of them, but everyone. 
The notion that man must actualize his own salvation is akin to receiving a new 
credit card in the mail. The credit card company says, “Here is your new credit card. You 
may use it at any time and can begin enjoying numerous benefits, as well as the renewed 
financial security and flexibility that is yours. For security reasons please call this toll 
free number to activate your account.” This is a small inconvenience, for who of us has 
not made the call? Still, we insist that the entire transaction has now been reduced to one 
of contract. As has been stated, the work of the Logos in descending into His created 
effects is not the work of a party under contract. It is not even the work of a party who 
offers a free contract in return for some act, admission, or confession. Rather, it is the 
work of a unity freely pledged under promise that cannot be violated, because the unity 
and the promise are one and the same. We must remember that in the work of salvation, 
the one to whom the covenant is given is in the divine image of He who gives it. This is 
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not the same case as the credit card company, for you are not an image of it, although 
your money is. 
Moreover, the notion that one must actualize his own salvation is to presuppose 
that God lives and acts in time just as we mortals do.  To claim that the Word descended 
circa 4 B.C. but that His work is made manifest today is synonymous with saying that He 
is alive today, not that He is alive eternally.  Similarly to say that His work will be 
completed when time ends is to say that He lives endlessly as opposed to eternally.  To 
live eternally is to have the simultaneous and whole possession of endless time.  To insist 
that one must today acknowledge the truth of a particular event that happened 2,000 years 
ago, and thereby gain eternal life through that confession is to claim that the mission was 
unaccomplished at that time.  And even if we could somehow be convinced of this, what 
of the poor unfortunates who died prior to 30 A.D.?  How can they acknowledge the truth 
of an event that has yet to take place?  Thus, we would have to concede the absurd 
position that Jeremiah (circa 626-586 B.C.), the very prophet through whom the covenant 
was spoken, was not sealed by it.  We must, therefore, insist that the mission of the Word 
was completed, 2,000 years ago and that the promise is an eternal one in keeping with the 
life of Him who guaranteed it. 
In summation of this idea of completeness for God, we quote the Periphyseon: 
“For man was created for the contemplation of his creator…”  (Eriugena,  Bk. V, 941 D).  
If so, then every man, not a few, or some, or most, or even all save one, but rather all 





Completion for Creation 
We now examine how the salvation of the damned can be understood to complete 
the world.  Compared to our last section, Completion for God, we can be more objective 
here, for man has an end.  He is not eternal in the same sense that God is eternal, for man 
is dependent on some other entity for his creation and being.  We must show that the 
salvation of every damned soul can be understood to complete man in his own right, not 
simply God‟s.  It is bold to say herein that under any metaphysical system imaginable the 
restoration of every soul could be understood to complete it.  Even under such 
conceptions of nothingness, as some modern philosophers have posited, it would be hard 
to see how the obliteration of even one soul could not be understood to render creation 
incomplete.  Next, we address the traditional mindset of hell, that of eternal torment.  
Jesus said that hell was very hot, Norse mythology very cold, Dante wrote that it was a 
place without hope.  We question how torment of any kind could be eternal when the 
very definition of it seems to imply temporality.  Of course it might be never-ending, 
however, this posits the mere extension of time.  Our definition of eternity is the 
simultaneously whole possession of endless time.  Given our definition, we hold that it 
would be easy enough for someone in hell simply to call back in memory an instant in 
which he was cool, was warm, or had hope and reside eternally there. Of course, the 
notions of hell that we have enumerated are all corporeal, as most formulations of hell are 
in religion, myth, and literature. One could ask if memories of goodness in any form 
could make hell worse. We do not think so, and have previously explained why: that 
good memories make men better, not worse. There are indeed a host of ontological 
questions with regard to the notion of either hell or nothingness. 
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However, we turn to the positive and begin with Eriugena‟s definition of love: 
“Love is the end and quiet resting place of the natural motion of all things that are in 
motion, beyond which no motion of the creature extends”  (Eriugena, Bk. I, 519 B).  This 
formulation is given in Book I and concerns that nature which is uncreated and creates. 
Perhaps we should explain why love is an activity, a rest, and a goal all at once. This is 
easily explained when we remember that in Plato‟s Symposium, Socrates suggests that 
the lover wants the beloved as well as the continued love of his beloved (Plato, Sym, 
200d, 2000). Thus, love can be all of the above.  In Book II, we saw that love was a 
primordial cause, and in Book III that it manifested itself downward into the discernable 
particulars of creation.  In the culmination of that which is uncreated and does not create, 
Books IV and V, love is not just an activity but a goal in itself, for the things in motion 
turn back and are resolved in that from which they came.  God is not just love; He is 
super love for He is the cause of all love, therefore man ultimately becomes one with 
God.  This definition of love encompasses the entire created realm, everything that 
moves.  This includes the so called “damned” for they too move, love and eventually find 
their rest.  Thus, it seems that the idea of eternity must include a rest from motion.  This 
too seems to preclude eternal punishment for those who are under torment are in motion.  
This principle applies not only to all men, but angels, demons, irrational beasts, and 
inanimate objects as well. 
Eriugena begins the discussion on the return of all created nature to God by some 
speculation relating to the world we live in and experience.  There is some very 
convincing evidence that suggests that the return of all nature is highly probable.  Calling 
upon the art of astronomy, he notes that the sun revolves around the earth every twenty 
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four hours, the moon completes its orbit every twenty seven plus days, the stars return to 
their positions every day, the planets all have their appointed courses.  Moreover, the 
earth displays remarkably consistent growing seasons, tides, and climate cycles.  
Eriugena claims that these local and temporal returns point toward some mystical 
meaning.  “For it is my opinion that there is no visible or corporeal thing which is not the 
symbol of something incorporeal and intelligible” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 866 A).  The apostle 
Paul says that “the figure of the world shall pass away” and Augustine interprets this to 
mean that there is a distinction between figure and essence.  For the figure is not the same 
as the essence, and this essence must turn back to that from which it originated and be 
forever preserved there.  Created nature is brought forth according to the wisdom of the 
Logos in space and time, however it is created unalterable.  Temporally the world 
becomes the nucleus of all other accidents and at some point in scientific time it will 
perish.  To perish sensibly is to return mystically, and this return is precisely what is 
signified in the visible working of the ordered cosmos (Eriugena, Bk. V, 867 C).  
“…[A]mong the Greeks „beginning‟ is called telos which really means „end‟: They name 
both beginning and end telos without distinction- what but the return of our nature to its 
beginning, out of which it was made, and in which and through which it moves and 
towards which its tendency is always to return” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 867 B).  The tendency 
of all nature is to return to its beginning. 
This notion applies especially to man. As was noted earlier, every other creature 
is brought into the sensible realm through man.  Man is the pivotal point for all nature.  In 
a very real sense, man is not in the world; rather, the world is in man. Eriugena refers to 
scripture to emphasize this point: “Heaven and earth shall pass away but My words shall 
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not pass away” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 890 D). In this quotation, “My words” refers to the 
second person of the Trinity. In the sense of space and time, the world will perish. 
However, in the sense that the world is not a place, but an idea or primordial definition, it 
will endure. In other words, the apparent chaos in the world is the work of man, whereas 
the discernible order is the divine manifestation of the Word. “The heavens are the works 
of thy hands; they shall perish, but thou remainest” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 891 A). 
Unequivocally, the local and temporal nature of the world is accidental; it (the world) is 
man giving corporeal and temporal interpretation to the primordial causes. “They shall 
perish” means that man‟s sense of space and time will come to an end. “Thou remainest” 
means that man, to the extent that he is an image, will not. When man makes his return 
through the Logos, the world and everything in it returns with him. Also, all men are the 
same with regard to their nature, for they all desire to return. “For all men in general, 
whether perfect or imperfect, chaste or defiled, redeemed through knowledge of truth in 
Christ, or lingering in the darkness of ignorance… have one and the same natural 
yearning after being and well-being and being forever…” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 867 C). This 
desire stems from their creation through the Logos, the one who is, is well, and is forever. 
In truth, the Logos is more than being, being well and being forever, for He is the cause 
of this desire in every other creature. No creature desires not to be. Ultimately, all “will 
be free from death and unhappiness. For being and living and immortality will be 
common to all, good and evil alike” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 868 C). Examples from the world 
of intelligibles that most appropriately demonstrate this are those sciences which the 
philosophers call the liberal arts, for their ultimate end is to liberate the soul. 
Given that the human soul is immortal, we address the question of whether or not 
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the soul can be complete if it fails to secure happiness. Aristotle can be of great help in 
this effort. In the Nicomachean Ethics, he held that happiness is the end of all human 
activity (Aristotle, Ethics, 1992, 1097 B). We never seek to be happy so that we are 
healthy, respected, wealthy, etc. Rather, we seek those things so that we may be happy. 
Of course, Aristotle considered happiness to be the paramount goal of man in this life. 
However, we see no reason why this goal cannot be extended into eternity. The majority 
of the Nicomachean Ethics deals with the practical attainment of happiness, but it seems 
to us that the underlying premise that man always seeks to be happy is a universal truth 
about man. Eriugena claims that man is composed of body and soul in this life, and 
spiritual body and soul in the life to come. The spiritual body is different from the 
corporeal one in that it is not composed of the four elements. However, it would have to 
be the same insofar as it desires happiness. So it seems that this notion of happiness can 
be extended infinitely into eternity. Our definition of eternity as the perfect, and 
simultaneously, whole possession of endless time seems to include it, for how could life 
be perfect if one is not happy? For Aristotle, the happy man is the completed man. 
Moreover, no man can be said to be complete without happiness. It is the virtue for which 
he aims, and works the hardest to secure. “No happy man can become miserable; for he 
will never do the acts which are hateful and mean. For the man who is truly good and 
wise, we think, bears all the changes of life becomingly and always makes the best of 
circumstances” (Aristotle, Ethics, 1992, 1101 A). Just as any good artisan, such as a 
physician healing the body or a general commanding an army, the happy man does the 
best with what he has been provided. Benjamin Rush is perhaps our country‟s most 
complete physician despite the fact that he could not cure the daughter of John Adams. 
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Robert E. Lee is most likely our country‟s greatest general, even though he lost at 
Gettysburg. The happy man can be thought to complete himself in his activity of seeking 
happiness, for that is his ultimate goal. It then seems only right that all men seek what it 
is in their nature to seek, which is the infinite movement of the soul toward God, which 
brought it into being. The soul ultimately takes its rest there, “free from death and 
unhappiness” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 868 B). 
We have considered the notion of completion of man in himself, and turn now to 
the problem of the completion of man in others. Aristotle addressed this question in the 
Ethics, namely whether or not a man could be happy in the next life if someone he loves 
is unhappy in this one (Aristotle, Ethics, 1992, 1100 A). There is no sure answer, but the 
implication seems to be in the negative. We go further, and say that the answer is no. No 
man can be complete if someone he loves is unhappy. We know this full well from our 
experiences with the temporary misfortunes of our lives. When we hurt, those who love 
us hurt as well; conversely, when those we love hurt, we hurt as well. By extension, if 
those we love hurt eternally, so would our hurt be eternal. Man cannot be complete with 
respect to others unless all others are eventually reconciled with him.  This idea of 
completeness for man through the redemption of others is derivative of the idea of 
completeness for God through the redemption of all.  Man, in desiring the salvation of his 
fellows, is simply reflecting the essence of what the Word has already accomplished.   
 
Reconciliation of Completion for God and Justice for Man 
We now come to the pivotal point in our study, the resolution of the tension that 
seems to exist between the idea of completion for God versus that of justice for man.  
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God must restore the totality of His creation for it is of Him and from Him, yet God must 
dispense justice to that creation in accordance with His divine law, for it is of and from 
Him as well.  We have noted that the history and tradition of the Christian church, at least 
in the West and since the era of Augustine, has tended to resolve this tension in favor of 
the latter principle.  Eriugena suggests that the tension should be resolved in favor of the 
former principle.  This is the idea of apokatastasis, taught mostly by the eastern fathers of 
the church since antiquity. As noted above, Origen advanced this idea as early as the third 
century in Alexandria. It has had limited acceptance in western Christianity. However, 
both the Old and New Testaments contain numerous accounts, parables, and in some 
cases explicit statements on the theme. These pertain to apokatastasis on both an 
individual and a societal level. They seem to imply that there is nothing which is beyond 
God‟s redemptive will and power. One of the more striking examples is given by Isaiah 
to the people of Israel, using the parent-child analogy that we have constantly 
emphasized. “Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have 
compassion on the son of her womb? Yea, they may forget, yet I will not forget thee” 
(Isaiah 49:15, KJV). This emphasizes the notion that no mother, as a mother, could leave 
her child unredeemed. Although an individual mother could forget her child, God cannot 
forget that which He has created. Another passage which Eriugena references in Book V, 
1004 A, “… Sodom and her daughters shall return to their former estate… [just as you 
and your] daughters shall return to your former estate” (Ezekiel, 16:55, KJV). Here we 
note that even the vilest city, one that was physically destroyed by God, ultimately gains 
its spiritual restoration. Moreover, we interpret the word „daughters‟ to mean all the 
citizens of Sodom; thus, everyone from the city is redeemed. The gentiles enjoy the same 
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restoration as the Israelites, and the gentile cities the same as Jerusalem.  
Thomas O‟Laughlin examines this restoration of humanity in an essay entitled 
“Imagery of the New Jerusalem in the Periphyseon and Eriugena‟s Irish Background.” 
He maintains that whenever Eriugena refers to Jerusalem, he means more than the 
historical city in Palestine. For Eriugena, Jerusalem is a vision of peace and a symbol of a 
higher reality. In other words, Eriugena is employing the same imagery as Ezekiel. 
Jerusalem is the final city for man; a spiritual paradise. Before man fell, he was secure in 
his citizenship; however, man went out from there and went down to Jericho. Eriugena 
uses the image of the New Jerusalem more frequently in Book V when he discusses 
man‟s final restoration. “Everything… that is part of the history of Jerusalem is 
sacramental of the Jerusalem above… which is to come” (O‟Laughlin, 2002, 245-247). 
Since every individual in the human race left to begin with, then everyone must return. 
We are not “prevented from believing that the whole human race is redeemed in Christ 
and shall return into the heavenly Jerusalem” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 1007 C). Moreover, it 
seems that as this apokatastasis is accomplished, man returns not only to his original 
spiritual city, but he returns to it in a higher spiritual disposition. If it were otherwise, he 
would be liable to fall again, and this condition would not be contained within Eriugena‟s 
fourth division of nature.     
Returning to our immediate topic of reconciliation of completion for God and 
justice for man, the philosopher Thomas Talbott, of Willamette University, formulated 
this problem rather neatly.  He stated three propositions all of which are apparently 
Biblical, yet only two which can be true. They are: 
1. God is omnipotent- He directs all creatures to restoration in Him. 
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2. God is omni-benevolent- He cares equally for all of His creatures. 
3. Some creatures are damned (Talbott, 1999, 43-45). 
Those in the Arminian tradition deny the first.  Those in the Calvinist tradition deny the 
second.  We deny the third.  However, we are not affirming universal salvation in the 
sense that no one has freedom of choice, for we still maintain that every rational soul has, 
and must have, this gift.  Some hold, quite illogically, that if all are saved, then there can 
be no such thing as freedom of choice.  Two years ago our country elected a new 
president in keeping with our system of majority rule.  Had every person in the country 
voted for Barrack Obama that does not mean they did not have a choice.  It simply means 
that everyone chose President Obama.  This is our position, that all truth is derivative of 
the incarnation of the Word. Rational beings are created such that they ultimately choose 
truth.  Therefore, all men will ultimately recognize the truth of the incarnation of the 
Word, accept this truth and gain salvation.  Hence, we must deny the third proposition 
and hold that all men are saved.  We accept proposition one, that God is omnipotent, and 
proposition two, that God is omni-benevolent.  As an aside, we claim that this problem 
can be immediately solved by relying on the principle of Occam‟s Razor, entities are not 
to be posited unnecessarily, or perhaps better said, always choose the simplest 
explanation, but not too simple. To choose a solution that denies either proposition one or 
two involves us in enumerable difficulties and contradictions.  
 As detailed in earlier paragraphs, completion for God means salvation for every 
one of His creatures, and justice for man can mean any number of things depending upon 
which conception of justice one holds.  However, under all conceptions the plan for 
achieving justice abides in some adherence to the concept of law.  The spirit of law may 
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or may not be codified into some formal system.  It could be as simple as a set of 
principles which abide in the conscience.  However, the attainment of justice must in 
some way coincide with the notion of law; conversely that of injustice must in some way 
violate that notion of law.  We see this clearly by referring to the Biblical passage in 
Genesis on Cain and Abel.  Whether one views this passage historically or allegorically, 
one must recognize that Cain has violated no codified law.  Yet he surely violated the 
divine law. Thus, we conclude that law is the very plan of justice, the method or perhaps 
device, through which justice is attained. 
 Similarly, grace is the plan through which salvation is attained.  Grace is 
unmerited favor, the receipt of some benefit by someone who was in no way deserving of 
that benefit.  As before, we allude to the parable of the Prodigal Son. He was in no way 
deserving or even worthy of the grace that his father showered upon him.  We further 
conclude that even the obedient son who was deserving and worthy received his father‟s 
grace, i.e., “all that I have is yours,” not because he was worthy but rather because he was 
a son.  It only stands to reason that had both sons been prodigal, or even a multitude of 
sons been prodigal, they all would have been blessed with the same homecoming. It is 
true that the prodigal son returned in a penitent manner. We maintain that grace aided in 
his penitence. It should be noted that this parable, in the fifteenth chapter of Luke, is 
preceded by two others that have abstracted all notions of penitence or free will. 
We attack the problem of the reconciliation of completion for God vs. justice for 
man, not through themselves but through their respective blueprints of grace versus law.  
Eriugena has taught often throughout the Periphyseon that the downward manifestation 
of God‟s goodness is gift, the upward return is grace.  The first is datum, the second 
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donum. The second is the completion of the first.  Although both are interdependent, 
donum has priority. The downward gift is only manifested to the extent that the upward 
grace resolves back into its creator in a stronger, more sanctified, higher state of 
communion. It is the same with law versus grace. Law is a datum, grace is a donum. Law 
is a downward manifestation of God‟s goodness; grace (as used herein, the term is much 
narrower) is the upward resolution. To phrase it in practical terms, the two are always in 
conflict. Just as there can be no redemption without creation, there can be no grace 
without law. The two are interdependent, yet grace has priority, for there can be no law 
that is not fulfilled, made right, or overcome without grace. 
The first consideration here should be a discussion of law. Aquinas gave perhaps 
one of the best formulations of it, so it would seem reasonable to begin our comments 
there. “It belongs to law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to 
command… therefore law is something pertaining to reason” (Aquinas, Summ. Theo., 
1948,Q XC, Art. 1, 610). Law is the rule and measure which directs action to a prescribed 
end. Hence, according to both of these rationales, law is a downward manifestation; a 
gift, or datum. Law sets all men under it. The ultimate purpose of the law is to direct all 
men toward God, thus everyone is subject to it, just as every man is subject to reason. 
The greatness of King David was never more manifest than when he realized that, even 
though he was the writer of the law, he was still subject to the law. Technically, David 
did not violate the law, because he was the law. Inherently, he admitted to himself and to 
everyone else that he had transgressed upon the spirit of the law that subordinated every 
rational being. Next, it should be noted that law is always directed toward the common 
good. This common good is happiness, as conceptualized by Aristotle. This further 
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supports the idea that law is a gift, something manifested with man in creation (Aquinas, 
Summ. Theo., 1948, Q XC, Art 2, 612). 
Aquinas discourses on three types of law. The first is eternal law. He shares much 
in common with Eriugena here, for Aquinas holds that eternal law is a unity contained 
within the divine exemplar of wisdom. “…[J]ust as the exemplar of the divine wisdom, 
inasmuch as all things are created by it, has the character of an art,… so the exemplar of 
divine wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, bears the character of law” 
(Aquinas, Summ. Theo., 1948, Q XCIII, Art. 1, 629). All men know eternal law to some 
degree, just as all men know truth to some degree (Aquinas, Summ. Theo., 1948, Q 
XCIII, Art. 3, 631). All other laws proceed downward from eternal law. The second type 
of law is natural law. Natural law is the manifestation of eternal law into first principles. 
There are, for rational creatures, several natural inclinations which form the precepts of 
natural law. These laws are common to all men everywhere, and are in accord with the 
human inclinations of self-preservation, reproduction, education of offspring, etc. The 
virtuous acts are all subject to natural law, which is immutable. “The natural law dates 
from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary but remains unchangeable” 
(Aquinas, Summ. Theo., 1948, Q XCIV, Art. 5, 643). The third type of law is human law, 
but it is of little relevance to our study here. Suffice to say that human law is that law 
which is enacted by man for human convenience.  
We now turn to the Thomistic conception of grace in order to contrast it with that 
of Eriugena. For Aquinas, man, by his own intellect, can know some truth. “…[H]uman 
understanding has a form, viz., intelligible light itself, which of itself is sufficient for we 
know certain intelligible truths viz., those we can know through sensible things. Higher 
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intelligible truths the human intellect cannot know, unless it be perfected by a stronger 
light… which is called the light of grace…” (Aquinas, Summ. Theo., 1948,  Q XCIX, 
Art. 1, 653). As we have seen, Eriugena holds that man cannot know truth without grace. 
There may appear to be some contradiction here, for we stated earlier that the liberal arts, 
through which man knows truth, are a downward procession from God, which would be 
law or gift as opposed to grace. However, although the arts themselves are a gift, the 
employment of them is through grace. As we noted in Chapter One, to contemplate the 
arts is to converse with the very mind of Christ, which is imparted through grace. Man 
must first be granted grace in order to know truth in any form. This is so for two reasons. 
First, the Word in His descent into human nature brought the liberal arts with Him, and 
these are the seven pillars of truth. The arts inform the rational mind, so without them 
there is no mind with which to know. Second, we have noted that for Eriugena, time, 
place, intervals, and corporeal objects are all man-made things. Thus, without the mind 
informing those things, there are no things to know. To take one common example, 
Aquinas would say that a man can know what a horse is without grace, because a horse is 
a sensible object, and that the intellect of man by the “proportion of its own proper 
endowment” (Aquinas, Summ. Theo., 1948,  Q XCIX, Art. 1, 653) can comprehend it. 
For Eriugena, the tangible horse is merely that which has descended through man in the 
creation of man. To know what the sensible horse is requires knowing what the idea of a 
horse is in God‟s mind. In other words, Secretariat is not a horse because he looks like 
Man-of-War, or Traveler. Rather, they are all horses because they conform in some way 
to the idea of a horse as it is defined eternally in the mind of God. Hence, grace is needed 
for man to comprehend that idea. Furthermore, the knowledge of what a horse is, since it 
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derives from the one truth of the incarnation, is actually a more sophisticated and difficult 
cognition than that of the incarnation itself. For Eriugena, if human nature can rise to 
comprehend a complex truth in this world, such as what a horse is, all the more will it rise 
to comprehend a simple truth, namely what the Word is in the next. Thus, grace has a 
certain ontological priority, which completely subsumes law, as well as many other 
intermediate goods. 
This second idea of grace as end has the support of Aristotle, Plato, Aquinas, and 
Eriugena.  Aquinas writes, “Now eternal life is an end exceeding the proportion of human 
nature.  Hence man by his natural powers cannot produce meritorious works proportioned 
to eternal life; but for this a higher power is needed, the power of grace.  And thus, 
without grace, man cannot merit eternal life” (Aquinas, Summ. Theo., 1948,  Q XCIX, 
Art. 5, 660 ).  Eriugena would clearly agree and add that without grace, man cannot live 
at all. 
The Christological tradition of Latin theology has essentially held that the 
redeeming grace of God was completed through His suffering and crucifixion (Bett, 
1964, 105). This follows closely on the Old Testament prophecy, “But he was wounded 
for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: …and with his stripes we are 
healed” (Isaiah 53:5, KJV). Eriugena offers a more subtle interpretation, one in keeping 
with the eastern Christological tradition. The crucifixion was but one part of God‟s 
redemptive purpose. The birth of Christ, His life, mission, obedience, spirit, etc., are all 
part of God‟s redemptive plan completed through the incarnation (Bett, 1964, 105). 
“Therefore, in the Only-Begotten Word of God, incarnate and made man, the whole 
world is restored…” (Eriugena, Bk. V, 912 B). We affirm the latter and ask, where is the 
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inherent justice in any situation in which one pays the debts of another?  In other words, 
assume the usual instance of creditor, and debtor.  The debtor pays the just amount, the 
creditor receives it, all are made whole and justice is served.  Now enter a third party, a 
payer.  The payer steps into an obligation not his own and pays the stated amount.  Where 
is the justice?  Only the creditor is made whole.  The debtor is advantaged, the payer 
disadvantaged.  There could be only one way for this arrangement to be thought of as 
just, and this is if the debt owed is somehow the debt of both debtor and payer.  This, we 
see, as the mystery and paradox of grace.  The Word in His descent into the created 
realm, not only assumed that debt, but He incurred it as well.  As stated before, the 
human family is the highest theophany of this God-man relationship.  The family is grace 
on earth, and has unity above all others.  It is not perfect, but it is as close as we humans 
can come.  This reach has extended from the ancient dynasties, through the era of 
nobility, and into the modern democratic age.  It has transcended the antique empires, 
feudalism, capitalism, even crime.  There is quite simply no other human relationship like 
it.  In procreating we not only assume the debts of our children, we incur them as well.  
And we do it joyfully, for somehow we know their debts are our debts, because we are 
them. Of course, the words „we are,‟ the copula of the above argument, are not meant in a 
literal sense. We mean that the relationship of parent to child is of such a unique 
character that all normal human dynamics are transcended, and grace is manifested on 
earth.   
As stated earlier, law and grace are always in opposition when viewed from a 
human perspective.  Therefore there can be no reconciliation in logic.  There can only be 
three possible outcomes: 
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1. Grace is completely subordinated to law. 
2. Law and grace are always in tension. 
3. Law is completely subordinated by grace. 
Our presuppositions will not admit of proposition one.  Most have traditionally chosen 
proposition two in one of its numerous interpretations.  Eriugena chooses proposition 
three. Grace, as a donum, perfects the law, a datum. In the final analysis, grace subsumes 



















Chapter VI: Implication for Contemporary Theology 
Justification 
 The common traditional view in western Christianity holds that all men were 
created in perfect condition, all brought damnation upon themselves, and some are 
restored. Some might claim that this incomplete restoration of only some men leads to a 
higher perfection. Our claim is that a partial restoration leads only to a partially better 
condition. Indeed, the less complete the restoration, the less complete will be the 
perfection.  Eriugena maintains that all are restored.  If he is correct, then the implications 
of his claim need to be addressed.  We have chosen to examine four key areas of the 
Christian experience, two of them quite contentious, two of them not so.  It is our view 
that the acceptance of this philosophy of restoration for all can bring much clarity and 
needed unity to the church universal. We do not intend for this chapter to be considered 
as a defense of Christianity. It is offered only to show that a broad, serious consideration 
of Eriugena‟s teaching on the question of salvation for the damned could be beneficial for 
all.  
 We begin with the concept of justification, for no other debate has produced such 
discord within Christendom.  In fact the word “discord” is mild, for in centuries past this 
conflict has led to ex-communication, persecution, and death.  Political and social 
considerations aside, divergent views on the concept of justification led to the Protestant 
Reformation and the ensuing inquisitions of the sixteenth century. Justification means the 
act or perhaps the declaration, for this is the heart of the debate, which renders the sinner 
worthy before God.  The concept is discussed in several books of the Old and New 
Testaments.  The books of the Old Testament, most notably Leviticus, always stress the 
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need for both external and internal piety.  The external piety was perfected through overt 
acts of charity, obedience, courage, etc.  Yet the prophets of the Old Testament set a 
standard so high that no one could possibly reach it through external acts alone.  Thus 
they also stressed a need for inward cleansing that was symbolized by outward signs, 
such as baptism and sacrifice.  The earliest Christians tended to see the inward piety as 
being completed through the suffering of the Word.  This forces us to ask the question 
“Why does Christ not suffer eternally?”  In other words, if He paid the debt in full and 
there is nothing left to pay, He paid it all for men in all times and forever.  Why does He 
suffer for three days only?  The only answer seems to be that in some mysterious way He 
lives in every man and every man lives in Him, for all time.  In other words, three 
seconds would have been enough. The traditional mindset with regard to justification 
presumes time in a mechanistic, temporal way, thus external works are very important.  
This theme is quite apparent when reading the Epistle of James which has a practical 
approach to such virtues as charity.  “You see then how that by works a man is justified 
and not by faith only” (James 2: 24,KJV). And “Even so faith, if it has not works is dead, 
being alone” (James 2:17, KJV).  In other words if you see someone naked and starving 
and you say “Have faith, go your way, be clothed and fed,” what good have you done?   
 Contrary to this, the reformers claimed to take as their authority the writings of St. 
Paul, primarily the Epistles to the Romans and Galatians.  “Therefore, we conclude that a 
man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law”  (Romans, 3:28, KJV).  Paul is 
always careful to present Christ as the completion of Adam.  The first man brings death 
and division, the second man brings life and unity.  So of the Protestants we ask, why did 
Christ have to suffer at all?  The only answer, once again a profound mystery, seems to 
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be that through His earthly life He lives in all men and all men live in Him.  Absent His 
downward manifestation into the created realm, no one would know Him.  Somehow in 
making Himself known in the temporal order, He made Himself known to all men in all 
time, although not explicitly.  The incarnation is, therefore, a mystery of metaphysics, the 
resurrection a mystery of epistemology.  In order to authenticate His mission He had to 
somehow demonstrate that He had sovereignty over the corporeal realm.  He 
accomplished this through a long list of demonstrated miracles, all of which rose above 
created nature.  The resurrection was the final demonstration of this.  Eriugena says that 
He gave us a forward look of what was in store for all of us (Eriugena, Bk. V, 894 A).  So 
the question of exactly what justification is turns on one‟s conception of time; or better 
said, it turns on one‟s conjecture of how mortal time is transferred into the eternal.  As we 
say in the previous chapter, Eriugena holds, similar to Augustine, that time is in the mind.  
Therefore, there need be no difficulties as to whether justification is a process perfected 
by God in the individual over time or whether it is an event conferred by God in an 
instant.  They are both the same when considered from the perspective of the eternal. 
 Historically, this controversy concerning justification had developed early in the 
fifth century.  Pelagius (circa 354-420), a British monk, had insisted that human freedom 
and responsibility played an integral part, in fact the key part, in God‟s redemptive 
action.  A duty presupposed an ability to do the right thing, thus Pelagius maintained that 
the final test of one‟s salvation was his merit manifested through benevolent and 
charitable works.  Consequently, God‟s saving grace became superfluous under this 
formulation.  Moreover, Pelagianism tended to wrest sovereignty from God, making Him 
a mere dispenser of justice rather than the author of it. This was an idea to which 
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Augustine was strongly opposed. He spent the latter part of his life attacking this notion, 
primarily in A Treatise Against Two Letters of the Pelegians, circa 420 AD. Augustine 
was largely successful in his efforts, for Pelagian doctrine was condemned as heretical by 
the Council of Ephesus in 431(Augustine, Ret., 1964, Note prior to Art. 1, 151).  The 
authority of this council was precisely where Martin Luther appealed in his famous “habo 
augustinum,” in which he claimed that the Papacy had abandoned the condemnation of 
Pelagianism.  According to Luther, the doctrine of justification by faith alone was the 
central article of Christianity to such an extent that the church universal would rise or fall 
with it (Luther, Commentary on Galatians, 1961, 106).  Justification was the theme 
around which all other doctrines were founded.  This mindset was taken up by John 
Calvin, who extended sound reasoning into particulars that divided the reformers even 
among themselves.  Salvation came after justification which was “by grace alone, 
through faith alone” in the righteousness of Christ alone. 
This discussion concerning justification is mainly apparent in the western 
tradition. This is so because, doctrinally, both Roman Catholics and Protestants tend to 
view the sin and guilt of Adam as being genetically transferred to his offspring. As 
evidence of this, we cite the Catholic decree concerning original sin of the Fifth Session 
of the Council of Trent in 1546 (Leith, 1963, 405), as well as the Lutheran Augsburg 
Confession, Article II [Original Sin] in 1530 (Leith, 1963, 30). Both of these stress that 
the sin and guilt of Adam entered the human race as a result of his fall. However, the 
Catholic and Protestant response as to exactly how God overcomes this sin and guilt is 
quite different; hence, justification has become, and still remains, an issue. Both 
denominations recognize the essential importance of grace. However, the Protestant 
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claim “through faith alone” is at variance with Catholic insistence that faith is not the 
only virtue, hence faith cannot, by itself, be sufficient. For entirely different reasons, 
explained below, justification tends to be a nonissue in the eastern tradition. Eriugena, 
despite his sensitivity toward the west, is more aligned philosophically with the eastern 
tradition. Therefore, he sees no need to address the issue of justification, and writes on it 
only incidentally. Generally speaking, the position of Eastern Orthodoxy concerning 
justification cannot be reconciled with Protestantism, but is not fundamentally at variance 
with the doctrine of the Roman Church. This is partly because the eastern tradition is 
understood as having a more nuanced conception of original sin than the western 
tradition. Theologians in the west tend to view the sin and guilt of Adam as genetically 
transferred to his offspring, while those in the east end to see this as a genetic transfer of 
sin but not of guilt (Kelly, 1958, 349). We can see this easier by the analogy of an 
inherited defect or disease. The defect is passed on; however, there is no sense of blame. 
Thus, there is no need of forensic or legal justification. Furthermore, while the 
Reformation and the extended schisms within Protestantism can be seen as driving the 
issue to a polarized, irreconcilable end, the eastern and western churches had already long 
since separated themselves. Orthodoxy tends to see salvation as a process in which one is 
restored in Christ, and where the goodness of God is reproduced in him. 
Although Eriugena often shows inclination to Protestantism on many issues, 
justification is one issue where he would side with the eastern tradition. We tend to agree, 
and we maintain that perhaps all of us initiated in western theology would be better 
served by the same. Generally, the reformers held that justification was an action, not a 
process. We allow them to define it however they choose and then raise issue within their 
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own parlance. They maintain that justification is a declaration or pronouncement on the 
part of God that renders the individual just. Taking their authority from St. Paul, who 
wrote, “Abraham believed God and it was reckoned to him as righteousness” (Romans 
4:3, KJV), they hold that justification is simply God calling someone just when he is not. 
We ask, what is just or truthful about this? It can only be just and truthful if the Word, by 
descending, is obliged to pay our debt even before we are able to incur it, just as parents 
are obliged to pay the debts of their children. The Word must be prior to all He justifies, 
including Abraham, who never knew Him. Thus, justification must be eternal. The 
Protestant makes a complete separation between justification and sanctification. For the 
Catholic, they are part of the same process. However, there is an even greater problem 
with the reformers, who view justification as an event or declaration. When does God 
make this declaration? If He makes it in time, then it would seem that His pronouncement 
is dependent on something else. God‟s decision would be contingent, and this cannot be 
so. If the declaration is made in eternity, then it would have to justify some men, or all 
men. If it justifies only some men, then we have arrived at John Calvin‟s doctrine of 
limited atonement. This will be addressed more thoroughly in the next section, but for 
now suffice it to say that it is a most unsatisfying solution, for it necessitates that Christ 
did not suffer for all of humanity, but only for a part of it. If He suffered for all men, then 
our problem is solved, for this is the very topic of this dissertation. 
First, all of the camps discussed above are in agreement that justification is a 
consequence of divine grace. Grace, the cause of justification, is eternal, therefore 
justification must be eternal. A logician might say that this argument is invalid, for a 
certain cause does not always produce a certain effect. We would normally agree, but not 
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in this specific case. Eriugena speaks directly to this in Book IV: “For the image is not in 
a part of man‟s nature nor grace in any one of those considered to have grace, but… the 
whole genus equally” (Eriugena, Per., Bk. IV, 797 B). For Eriugena, in this case, a cause 
cannot be without its effect. Otherwise the effect is less than the cause. Second, 
justification as an imminent act of God must be from eternity just as God is from eternity. 
Opponents might say that this proves too much, for by this logic we could also say that 
creation is eternal. Eriugena would answer this by saying that creation is a fortiori 
eternal, which has been shown above.  
Predestination 
We now turn to one of the thorniest problems to beset Christianity. Despite this, it 
is not so grave an issue in consequence as that of justification, for it does not divide as 
deeply. In our view, an analytical discussion of predestination must be preceded by an 
understanding of the nature of time. This prerequisite seems to be lacking in all of the 
controversies that have arisen since Augustine. Moreover, the discussions become more 
convoluted following the rise of Newtonian mechanics, because now many of us are 
inclined to view time as a continuum of intervals. While Augustine was attempting to 
define time for everyone, Newton was essentially postulating it as a medium for classical 
mechanics. He conceived of time as a continuum, extending endlessly backward and 
forward with no transcendental connection from one instant to the next (Callender, Edny, 
2005, 18-19). This conception is convenient; it works for mechanical and practical 
purposes, but it does not work for some sciences like astronomy, and there is no reason to 
think it would work for philosophy or theology. Thus, we cannot even debate the 
question of predestination without acknowledging that we are predisposed to thinking 
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that time is Newtonian.We introduce this distinction here because any study on the topic 
of predestination would surely turn on God‟s understanding of time, as opposed to 
Newton‟s understanding of time. Eriugena gave his own formulation of time, as we have 
discussed earlier in Chapter Five. As we said above, Newton‟s conception of time can be 
described as the medium of classical mechanics. In other words, it is the ground on which 
mutable things operate. In his article Time and Eternity, Dermot Moran has noted that 
this cannot be “…the whole Christian story; since a more positive view of time is 
required for the unrolling of God‟s plan for the salvation of humans and the cosmos…” 
(Moran, 2002, 489).   
The groundwork for predestination is clearly laid in the New Testament (KJV). 
1. Romans 8: 29-30: “For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to 
be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be 
firstborn among many brethren. And those whom he predestined he also 
called; and those whom he called he also justified; and those whom he 
justified he also glorified.” 
2. John 15: 16: “You did not choose me but I chose you, and appointed 
you that you would go and bear fruit, and that your fruit would remain, 
so that whatever you ask of the Father in my name He may give to 
you.” 
3. Ephesians 1: 4-6: “According as he hath chosen us in him before the 
foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame 
before Him in love, having predestined us unto the adoption of children 
by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the pleasure of his will, to the 
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praise of the glory in his grace, wherein he hath made us accepted in the 
beloved.” 
The teaching of predestination has traditionally taken one of two forms: single 
predestination or double predestination. 
Single predestination is the more moderate form, and it stresses God‟s abiding 
presence and love within us. We experience this love through no right of our own. It is 
granted to us by God‟s grace and no action on our part can merit it. This love was set 
aside for us before the world was formed, and we experience it directly whenever we 
claim it as our freely given birthright. 
Double predestination is the more severe form, and it is the more troubling of the 
two. This form is a logical extension of single predestination and a natural consequence 
of it. If some are predestined to receive God‟s favor, then all others are predestined not to 
receive it. There can be no middle ground, for we are either saved or we are not. This 
would seem to run counter to human reason, and even counter to the teaching of Christ 
and the apostles. If one thing is sure, it is that we will be held accountable for our actions. 
Indeed, why do we have a conscience at all, and why should we try to follow the 
righteous course? Double predestination presents us with a problem that seems to have no 
solution. Thus, many theologians and philosophers have tended to discount it. 
Traditionally, the doctrine of double predestination (hereinafter referred to as 
predestination), has been advanced by several well-respected scholars and theologians. 
The first and most influential was Augustine. In his theology, the incarnation of Christ 
had two main purposes: to provide mankind with inspiration to live righteously through 
the perfect example of the life of Jesus, and to raise the believers to the glory of heaven 
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through His death on the cross and His victory through resurrection (Augustine, Con., 
1960, Bk. X, Ch. 43, 274). He held that God was not the direct cause of evil and that evil 
was not a positive, or negative, force unto itself. Augustine saw evil as the privation of 
God‟s goodness. He also believed, as we noted in Chapter One,  that most of mankind 
was predestined to remain unredeemed. God, being the creator and master of time, could 
surely see through it and know who would be saved and who would not be saved. Could 
this mean that God‟s foreknowledge could preclude His will that all be saved? According 
to Augustine it did not, because Christ is both the redeemer and the judge of all mankind. 
As the redeemer, His sacrifice on the cross heals all those who accept Him, but as a 
judge, He separates the wheat from the chaff. His foreknowledge certainly does not cause 
us to make the choices that our minds make. Indeed, our mind‟s choices are some of the 
infinite things that God foreknows (Augustine, Con., 1964, Bk. IV, Ch. 2, 94). It must be 
remembered that the main thrust of Augustine‟s writing was aimed to combat the heresy 
of Pelagianism. Moreover, the teaching of Augustine with regard to predestination was 
conceived after the development of his most subtle formulation concerning the nature of 
time.  
Martin Luther (1483-1546) developed his theory on predestination primarily as a 
safeguard against the paying of indulgences. He taught the single predestination theory of 
salvation. Luther writes in his essay “Preface to Romans” that it is through eternal 
providence that God decided “… who should and who should not have faith; who should 
conquer sin and who should not be able to do so” (Luther, Preface to Romans, 1961, 32). 
Yet in a very perplexing way he maintains that although one‟s salvation is beyond his 
own control and strictly in God‟s, one‟s damnation is his own. In the end, one has to have 
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faith in God‟s abiding justice, for it is beyond all reason. Luther admits that God‟s 
condemnation, or more accurate, His refrain from salvation, seems unjust. Yet, “[I]f His 
justice were such as could be adjudged by human reckoning it clearly would not be 
divine; it would in no way differ from human justice” (Luther, Bondage of the Will, 
1961, Ch. 19, 200). Luther‟s On the Bondage of the Will was published in 1525 as a 
response to Erasmus‟ treatise On Free Will, published in 1524. 
With the teaching of John Calvin (1509-1564), predestination reached its most 
radical form. Calvin believed that God foreknows and ordains all things, not just man‟s 
eternal destiny. The promises that God has made to man since antiquity and has fulfilled 
through the ages were preordained. One cannot abstract the doctrine of predestination 
from the promises; rather, the promises were, in part, a consequence of predestination. 
Calvin held that acceptance of this doctrine is needed, and that the denial of it could and 
would lead to great harm (Calvin, Com., 1958, Bk. VII, pt. 2, 302-312). Much of what 
Calvin taught on predestination was directed against the idea of justification as held by 
the Catholic Church. Of course, „justification by faith‟ means more than „justification by 
faith alone,‟ because the Catholic Church taught that works were needed as well. Works 
oftentimes meant the payment of indulgences. This latter disagreement was largely what 
the Reformation was all about. Protestants were summarily excommunicated and 
persecuted, so Calvinism was an understandable encouragement to them. They were the 
„elect,‟ and the suffering inflicted upon them could be viewed as a necessary part of the 
completion of God‟s holy plan. Many of the negative commentaries that have criticized 
predestination can be judged in some measure as being directed against Calvin himself, 
rather than his theology. Certainly, Calvin was a most immoderate man, at times tending 
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toward fanaticism. Michael Servetus, the discoverer of pulmonary blood circulation, 
himself a Protestant, was accused of heresy by Calvin when he sought asylum in 
Switzerland. Servetus was tried, found guilty, and burned at the stake in Geneva in 1553. 
It seems easy enough to condemn one to death given that God has already condemned 
him to endless damnation. 
Calvin‟s theology can be conveniently summarized in the acronym TULIP: 
T= Total depravity. People are incapable of coming to God on their own. 
U= Unconditional election. God chooses to save or damn people with no regard to  
       merit. 
 L= Limited atonement. The suffering of Christ covers only the elect. 
 I= Irresistible grace. When God elects to save someone, the person will respond 
      positively. 
 P= Preservation of saints. The elect cannot lose their salvation. 
We must note at the outset that such a formulation considers the downward creation of 
humanity as only a gift, or datum, not as grace, or donum. Basically, we can subscribe to 
the Calvinist position in every article except for one: the notion of limited atonement. 
Given that every man is an image of God, and that every image is the effect, with God as 
the cause, it seems inconceivable that He became incarnate to redeem some effects and 
not others. 
Eriugena himself entered this controversy prior to writing the Periphyseon. His 
Treatise on Divine Predestination was primarily a refutation of Gottschalk‟s theory of 
double predestination. Gottschalk was a Saxon monk of noble lineage born circa 800 AD. 
He was orphaned in early childhood, and was raised and educated in the monastery of 
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Fulda. Unjustly deprived of his land and inheritance by the church, he waged a continual, 
though unsuccessful, struggle to regain them. A committed maverick all his life, 
Gottschalk found lasting distinction in the history of medieval thought by being branded 
a heretic. He claimed to espouse Augustine‟s teaching on predestination by interpreting it 
in extreme double fashion (Nigg, 1962, 144-145). He stated, “[a]s immutable God before 
the creation of the world by his grace immutably predestined all his elect to eternal life, 
so he also equally predestined all the wicked, upon whom on the Day of Judgement the 
divine punishment will be visited for their evil ways to their merited eternal death” (Nigg, 
1962, 146). Christ had been made incarnate and sacrificed for only the elect, according to 
Gottschalk, and God‟s will was eternally fixed before time began. Of course, this is not 
close to what Augustine said, but it is very close to what John Calvin would say. We 
view Gottschalk‟s arguments as invalid, due to his misuse of the word „eternal‟ in this 
quotation. He views eternity as mechanical time extended rather than unbounded, 
simultaneous, and whole. Augustine‟s formulation of time and eternity is very different 
from Gottschalk‟s. 
 Given Eriugena‟s inclination to apokatastasis, the invitation to write such a 
treatise would have been a welcome one. He openly displays his enthusiasm in the 
preface, thankful to be recognized as one “… having some ability to defend the salvation 
of all…” (Eriugena, Treat. Div. Pred., 1998, Preface, 3). Essentially, it seems to us that 
Eriugena is advancing a scheme very close to the one outlined above. Appropriately 
adjusting the Augustinian model to rule out the possibility that anyone is non-elected, he 
begins the work by stating his method of study. As always, there is a dialectical approach, 
circumscribed by the liberal arts. He stresses that in God there is absolute unity. Hence, 
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there can be no difference between what God wants and what He is. “For him there is no 
distinction between being and willing; rather for him being is identical with willing” 
(Eriugena, Treat. Div. Pred., 1998, Ch. 2, pt. 1, 12). Furthermore, there is an intimate, 
unbreakable connection between God and the human soul, because the good aspects of it 
are particular manifestations of His will. “The virtues of the soul are really nothing other 
than the effects of the one great cause of all things itself, namely the divine will” 
(Eriugena, Treat. Div. Pred., 1998, Ch. 2, pt. 1, 13). The human soul and God are of one 
nature and the soul always abides in a common truthfulness with God. Any turning away 
from this unity must, therefore, be temporal. In eternity, the ultimate domain of the soul, 
the unity is restored and held secure. This is even more apparent when one considers 
what man is. The definition of man stated earlier in this study is “a certain intellectual 
concept formed eternally in the mind of God” (Eriugena, Bk. IV, 768 B). The outward 
gift cannot be discarded because it is eternally bound to restorative grace. For God to 
“…predestine is nothing else than to predefine…” (Eriugena, Treat. Div. Pred., 1998, Ch. 
18, pt. 4, 119). The accidental part of man‟s nature is defined by man; however, the 
essential part has nothing to do with him, it is defined by God. Thus, man controls only 
the accidental attributes of his own self, and retains no control over the essential. 
All of the above demonstrates that predestination has a remarkable independence 
from time as it is experienced. We need not consider it when discussing the question. 
This we view as the fatal wrench which has corrupted most discussions of predestination 
since the fourth century. If time is contingent, then it has no influence on the necessary. 
Strictly speaking, predestination does not have anything to do with man, other 
than that he is the object of it. It has everything to do with God. In Aristotelian terms, it 
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would be the formal cause of humanity, the plan through which man is brought to 
completion. In essence, predestination is the completion of the Genesis account of 
creation because it is the plan of fulfillment for that creation. In Eriugena‟s parlance, it 
would be the plan through which grace operates to restore humanity. The authenticating 
seal of predestination would be the multiple covenants of the Word which received 
validation through the incarnation. There can be no mistake about the direction of those 
covenants, for the One who pledges to them is without any contradiction of parts. He is 
one, supremely whole and simple. Indeed, as per the method of negative theology, He is 
even beyond unity, for He is the cause of it in all particulars. 
We could even speak of predestination as being a divine exemplar within 
Eriugena‟s second division of nature, for it is the perfect ideal of redemption. It must be 
one and unified within itself, just like all other primordial causes. It would make no sense 
to think that there are two of them, one for salvation, one for damnation. For if we could 
grant two, then we could grant three, four, or any multitude. In this respect, 
predestination has the same self unity as all the other divine exemplars. Reason cannot 
allow that the uncreated, creating first cause has contained within it any primordial cause 
which is multiple. In other words, we cannot allow two wisdoms, two truths, two 
eternities, two beings, or two loves within the divine mind. Likewise we cannot allow 
two predestinations (Eriugena, Treat. Div. Pred., 1998, Ch. 2, pt. 6, 15). Luther, Aquinas, 
and others taught that there is only one predestination, and that it is a call to the good. We 
can allow this only if this call to the good does not exclude anyone. What we cannot 
support is any system that calls one image to restoration and does not call another, for 
this would mean there are two predestinations. The final cause for any uncalled man 
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under any such scheme is damnation, just as it is under any system that calls one directly 
to damnation. We may be grateful to Calvin for pointing this out to us, not so much 
because of his theology but because of his logic. Any form of predestination that does not 
include a universal call to every man is merely a semantic denial of double 
predestination. 
God‟s church on earth is a human institution, and as such it is just as corruptible 
as any other. These two issues of justification and predestination, or rather the various 
doctrines formulated to describe them and the extreme measures executed to establish 
those doctrines, have corrupted the church as no others have done. No reasonable 
Christian could deny the extensive suffering that attended the various inquisitions 
subsequent to the Protestant Reformation. Since the Reformation, there have been 
countless other schisms. None have been as horrific as the first, however many have been 
fraught with wretched excess to some degree. We note that every one of these divisions 
took place after the ninth century, when the Periphyseon was written and ask the same 
meaningful question: could wide acceptance of the idea of apokatastasis, as advanced by 
Eriugena, have made any difference? It could have, especially with regard to the issue of 
justification. In other words, if all men are justified eternally in Christ‟s incarnation, and 
if this truth would have gained universal acceptance, who would have ever heard of 
Martin Luther? His rallying cry of „sola fide‟ would have fallen on deaf ears. Moreover, 
he would never have needed to utter it, because it was a cry against the common practice 
of paying for indulgences. The whole idea was that some of the saints were so good that 
they had gotten into heaven with grace to spare. Therefore, they could afford to be 
„indulged‟ and divested of some of their grace and still not lose their saintly salvation. 
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For a stipulated payment made by a living person, this excess grace could be transferred 
to a departed loved one, thereby securing their salvation. A worse hoax has never been 
perpetrated on the theophany of the family, and the fact that it was successful is evidence 
that the love of one family member for another transcends this world. In other words, had 
the clergy of the day universally accepted the idea that justification is eternal in the 
incarnation of the Word, there could have been no dispute. 
In a similar vein of reasoning, the issue of predestination, though not as tragic in 
its consequences as justification, could never have arisen. If it could have been granted 
that there was only one predestination to the good and, further, that all men are eternally 
called to it through the incarnation of the Word, who would ever have heard of Jacob 
Arminius, or his counterpart John Calvin? They both could have turned their considerable 
talents to building up the churches in Holland and Switzerland. Instead, we now have 
discord throughout Christendom. If predestination is an eternal call which none can 
rationally resist, then there is no need to posit that God‟s atonement is limited. We have 
instead a unifying ideal that could strive toward that of the human family. 
Fellowship 
The previous two issues were chosen to illustrate how the failure to adopt this 
conception of apokatastasis has made the church worse. We now turn to issues chosen to 
show how adoption of it could make the church better. The first of these is fellowship. 
Our view is that factionalism within the church has taken a terrible toll on the gift of 
fellowship. The ultimate cause of factionalism turns on the opinion of some person or 
group of people that those who are away from the community of fellowship are „outside 
the faith,‟ „not saved,‟ not baptized,‟ „damned,‟ or some other exclusionary statement. 
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With the common adoption of the idea that no one is damned, as advanced by Eriugena, 
all preclusions to fellowship are empty. The believer can rest secure in the knowledge 
that all of his friends and family members are eternally with him. We have continually 
stressed that the human family is the earthly manifestation of grace. In this formulation, 
we go beyond the traditional family and include all loved ones, friends, and even 
enemies. This subjective commitment to fellowship is not unlike that exercised by Coach 
Tomlin of the Pittsburgh Steelers in stating that Ben Roethlisberger would be his starting 
quarterback. Now Roethlisberger, for all his athletic skills, is only human and on any 
given day someone else might perform better. Yet the coach knows that any indecision 
on his part might hurt the performance of the quarterback, as well as any backups, and 
that this would hurt the entire team effort. At some point, the coach and the other team 
members must subjectively commit to the coach‟s decision in filling this critical position. 
Fellowship is teamwork of the highest sort, and it can only benefit from the security of 
knowing that everyone will ultimately choose to play the game. 
    The need for fellowship is as old as man. Essentially, it is nothing more than 
friendship. Once again we turn to Aristotle, who says that friendship is “… most 
necessary with a view to living. For without friends, no one would choose to live, though 
he had all other goods” (Aristotle, Ethics, 1992, 1155a). We all value this mutual 
communion very highly, and we surely love those with whom we share it. There are three 
types of friendship: friendship based on pleasure, friendship based on utility, and 
friendship based on goodness. The first two tend to be transient, but the last one is long-
lived, and in people of good virtue it lasts until death. Friendships based on goodness are 
both pleasant and useful, but the key to the relationship is the inherent goodness of the 
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friends. Ideally, Christian fellowship is like the highest form of friendship and even more 
so, for Aristotle in his Ethics was studying only earthly happiness. By positing the soul as 
eternal, friendship takes onto itself the dimension of eternity. Thus, Christian fellowship 
has no end in death, and what we enjoy now is just a taste of what is to come. 
There is much support in both the Old and the New Testament which commands 
this idea of fellowship. A few of the more prominent verses are as follows (KJV): 
Ecclesiastes 4: 9-10: “Two are better than one because they have a good 
return for their labor. For if either of them fails, the one will lift up his 
companion. But woe to the one who falls when there is not another to lift 
him up.” 
Acts 2: 46-47: “Every day they continued to meet together… praising God 
and enjoying the favor of all the people.” 
I Corinthians 12: 12-13: “For even as the body is one and yet has many 
members, and all the members of the body, though they are many, are one 
body, so also is Christ. For by one Spirit we were all baptized into one 
body, whether Jews or Greeks, whether slaves or free, and we are all made 
to drink of one Spirit.” 
I John 1: 13: “What we have seen and heard we declare to you, so that you 
and we together may share in a common life, that life which we share with 
the Father and with His Son Jesus Christ.” 
Historically, the manifestations of fellowship have taken on varied interpretations 
with the growth of Christianity. Generally speaking, the need for a higher amount and a 
better quality of fellowship has coincided with the eras of greatest threat to the life of the 
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church-universal.  Before the incarnation of the Word, a time we refer to here as the 
Prophetic Era, the people of Israel could be understood as being unified as to culture and 
purpose, and fellowship came naturally.  During the first four centuries, a time when the 
church was growing exponentially, the need for fellowship was great.  During this era of 
martyrdom, the external threat to the early church was very grave, thus the earliest 
Christians needed the security, edification and confidence of their fellows.  From about 
the fourth century to the sixteenth, Christendom gained certain geographic strongholds, 
and the greatest threats were the rise of Islam, the eastern nomadic hordes, and the Viking 
marauders. This is the period in which Eriugena is writing. He rarely discusses the notion 
of fellowship, however, the Homily on the Prologue to the Gospel of St. John does 
display the importance of it.  Moreover, the Periphyseon can be viewed as the highest 
manifestation of catholic fellowship, two friends earnestly seeking to understand God‟s 
truth.  The era of Reformation in the sixteenth century, which brought on the various 
inquisitions and counter-inquisitions, strikes us as the greatest internal threat that the 
church has ever, indeed will ever, face.  This is also the era in which the believers in 
Christ violated the principle of universal fellowship to the highest degree.  For this 
reason, the localized need for it was perhaps the greatest.  We tend to view this era as a 
time of relatively high need for fellowship.  The persecution has mostly ended in our 
time, at least in certain countries. However, we do live in a time of multiple cultures, 
ethnicities, and religions.  All over the globe people of one faith live side by side with 
people of another.  Hence, the need for the security of being able to trust in one‟s own is 
still needed.  The technology of mass media has not helped fellowship at all, and has 
most likely hurt it.  The transfer of information may be instantaneous, but real 
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communication lags far behind and fellowship further still.  The transience of modern life 
has taken its toll as well.  Aristotle says that friends must often spend time together, and 
this is likely what is most difficult today. 
As we can see by the scripture passages referenced above, we are commanded to 
fellowship.  Fellowship is more than just being pleasant, useful, or even uplifting; it is 
sustaining and necessary.  The first passage from Ecclesiastes shows the utility of it, the 
second from Acts shows the pleasure of it, and the fourth from I John shows the goodness 
of it. All of this we can understand in Aristotelian terms.  The third passage from I 
Corinthians speaks directly to a higher realm and a higher basis for fellowship that 
surpasses anything that we read in the Ethics.  St. Paul seems to be saying that all 
fellowship is grounded in the incarnation of the Logos.  Aristotle claims that the basis of 
all good friendship is the love of self, for a friend is one who wishes good for his friend 
for his friend‟s sake, one who wishes for his friend to live, one who lives with, one who 
grieves and rejoices with his friend.  Now, all of these are true of a man‟s relation to 
himself, for he wishes all these things for himself just as he would wish them for his 
friend.  A man must abide within himself, care, provide, and educate himself.  Moreover, 
no good and virtuous man would exchange himself for another for “no man chooses to 
possess the whole world if he has first to become someone else” (Aristotle, Ethics, 1992, 
1166 A).  We can agree with Aristotle so long as it is on the condition that happiness and 
friendship is limited to this world.  However, we have presupposed the immortality of the 
soul, so we cannot ground fellowship of any good kind in limited consciousness, and 
even a soul that lives endlessly in the Newtonian time of classical mechanics is limited.  
We must ground fellowship in that part of the soul that is immortal, or better said, in the 
195 
 
very cause that grants the soul immortality.  This cause is the Word incarnate, hence, 
fellowship in all its forms is a theophany of God.  Since fellowship and friendship are one 
and the same, all friendship is likewise a theophany.  This theophany may be slightly 
good or very good, depending on how well it makes visible God‟s gift and God‟s grace, 
however it is always good to some degree and never evil. 
St. Paul speaks to the subject: “For even as the body is one and yet has many 
members, and all the members of the body, though they are many are one body, so also is 
Christ”  (I Corinthians 12: 12-14, KJV).  Christ is first, the pattern and cause of every 
man, thus every man is dependent on Him.  However, there is more than just this, for 
according to our hypothesis on extended realism, or extended Platonism, Christ is 
understood to be made in every man; thus He is also dependent on every man, not for his 
existence but for his essence. If Christ is in every man, it seems that, in a very real sense, 
every man must be in Him. In other words, He cannot be who He is if any of His images 
are lost. Since these are one and the same, we can say in one sense that every man is Him, 
or better said, part of Him “as one body.”  There are no constituent parts here, for there is 
no man that can be said to belong to some other body other than Christ.  Throughout our 
study, we have stressed the priority of nature that is found in the human family.  It is a 
macrocosm of the family that is established in the “one body” of Christ.  We are told in 
the Old and New Testaments that the church is God‟s structure here on earth through 
which His people are sheltered and nurtured (Acts 2:42, KJV).  We are also told that all 
governmental authority has its basis in divine authority (Romans 13:1, KJV).  If this is so, 
then all the more is the human family a divine idea, for it precedes both church and 
government.  It derives from some divine exemplar. Moreover, we claim that the 
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manifestation of the family here on earth is perhaps one of the highest derivations 
conceivable in that it closely approximates the divine exemplar.  Allowing for this 
priority, which has shown and continues to show longevity over all recorded history, we 
claim that the primordial cause from which the human family takes its existence is the 
one that the Apostle Paul is referring to above.  Both conceptions describe a relationship 
without constituent parts.  Just as an eye cannot be taken from one body and placed in 
another (at least not in Paul‟s day), a child cannot be taken from one family and placed in 
another. The special case of adoption, universally recognized in its basic intention, does 
not negate our argument, and in fact it reinforces it. In a metaphysical sense, the adoption 
of a child is not an addition to the family; rather it is a reconstruction of the family. 
Similarly, a man cannot be taken from Christ‟s body and placed in another without 
violating the unity of the relationship.  This is exactly as we would expect after some 
subtle reasoning.  Throughout the Old and New Testaments there are numerous examples 
given in which an offence against one man is considered an offence against God.  
Similarly, a good deed done for one man is considered a good deed done for God.  How 
else can this guilt of offence or the blessing of good be justly transferred unless the victim 
or benefactor is somehow part of God?  Outside of this vestment of God, the recompense 
for doing wrong or the blessing for doing good would only seem just between criminal 
and victim or benefactor and beneficiary.  Incidentally, this is one reason, perhaps the 
major one, for rejecting any theology that claims there are those who are elect and those 
who are non-elect, such as Calvinism.  It is election and only election that conveys value, 
hence, under any scheme, to kill one who is non-elect is to do no harm. 
As stated earlier, Eriugena had taught that no one can see God directly for He 
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dwells in inaccessible light.  However, He can be intuited through His theophanies, which 
are made in us and in our world by Him.  Of this multiplicity of theophanies, fellowship 
is perhaps the greatest.  We do not condemn the attempt to reach for God through the 
contemplative gazing on mountains, oceans or stars, in fact we commend it.  However, 
this should never be a substitute for the higher avenue of knowing, that of fellowship.  
According to Eriugena, the mountain and the friend are both theophanies of God; 
however, the friend is a direct image of God and the mountain is not.  We, therefore, tend 
to be skeptical of any type of religious practice, such as certain types of extreme 
monasticism, that removes fellowship from man for extreme periods of time. It seems to 
us that fellowship is the natural course of man and should not be permanently abridged. 
The theophany of fellowship takes on three forms, and each shall be addressed 
proceeding from highest to lowest. The highest is the fellowship of one family member to 
another. Above all, every family member needs to be able to know, believe, and rest 
secure in the promise that his fellow family members will abide with him eternally. 
Eriugena, in the Periphyseon, can be a great source of comfort in this area. God does not 
condemn that which He has made. We have all witnessed the lamentation within the 
human family when one member dies. This grief is only assuaged by the knowledge that 
a joyous reunion will happen in due course. This type of sadness rises to the level of 
tragedy with the death of a child because the time until the reunion becomes longer, a 
length of time we feel we cannot endure. The greater the pain, the higher the theophany 
must have been, else we would not feel the pain so keenly. We have seen family 
members embrace other religions and other philosophies. This turning away is only 
temporary, for they will return. The non-belief of a family member is not to be feared. 
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One must trust in the words of St. Ambrose, as spoken to St. Monica, “Do not trouble me, 
for it is impossible that the Son of Tears should perish” (Augustine, Con., 1960, Bk. III, 
Ch. 12, 92). 
The second type of fellowship is that of believer to believer. This is perhaps what 
usually comes to mind when we ponder fellowship. It is a relationship of equality born 
out of mutual goodness. This is what Aristotle had in mind when he held that only good 
men could be good friends (Aristotle, Ethics, 1992, 1156 B). It was even more eloquently 
said by Rudyard Kipling in his poem, “The Thousandth Man.” Your true friend is one 
who stays with you “until the gallows foot, and after” (Kipling, 1956, 430). 
The last type of fellowship is that of the non-believer to the believer. Some might 
self-righteously say that this is not fellowship at all. Eriugena would claim the contrary. 
Calling on his definition of love as that which tends to move the beloved toward the 
lover, he claims this is what calls the non-believer to faith. The believer must know and 
rest secure in the truth that his fellowship with his friend will at some future time reach 
its highest fulfillment. God never condemns what He has created; He restores it. This 
type of fellowship, through an overflow of goodness in the heart of the believer, leads to 
our final issue.  
Evangelism 
The first three issues discussed, justification, predestination, and fellowship, were 
all non-temporal. We have demonstrated that there is one eternal justification, one eternal 
predestination, and one eternal fellowship. Evangelism is different in that it involves a 
temporal activity within the church. For this reason, we view the adoption of a mindset 
toward the eternal salvation of all to have the greatest practical significance for 
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evangelism. Some would hold to the opposite view, that a mindset toward eternal 
salvation for all cancels out the need for evangelism. Moreover, some may ask what the 
purpose of believers amounts to if all men are eternally saved. These points need to be 
addressed, for they seem to be reasonable objections. When viewed from the perspective 
that eternity amounts only to the endless succession of Newtonian, mechanical time, the 
questions are well-founded. All evangelism is pointless because, eventually, everyone is 
saved. Our best evangelistic efforts have no significance, because, at the end, everyone 
will be resurrected in Christ. Indeed, they would be right, if one is constrained by his 
thinking to believe that eternity is time extended. But eternity is not time extended; it is 
the simultaneous and whole possession of unlimited time. The former mindset posits no 
connection over the intervals of time, while the latter maintains an infinite connection 
from before the first moment of mechanical time to after the last moment of it. 
Paradoxically, we insist that when one considers that there is one eternal justification, one 
eternal predestination, and one eternal fellowship, a call to evangelism takes on an even 
greater importance. 
Christianity is an evangelical religion in that it actively seeks converts into its 
fellowship. The basis for the Christian call to evangelism is revealed in the New 
Testament, as these examples show (KJV): 
Matthew 28: 19-20: “Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the 
name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. Teaching them to 
observe all things as I have commanded you….” 
Mark 16: 15: “Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature. 




These two passages constitute what is commonly called the Great Commission. 
This can be interpreted in a number of ways. However, we see it as a summons for every 
Christian to share in the duty, as well as the privileges, of increasing the earthly 
fellowship of believers in Christ. In the hands of the modern technology, the general 
principles outlined in the Great Commission have descended into the most excessive 
details imaginable. For over nineteen centuries, the universal church seemed to hold true 
to the spirit of the directive. The Catholic Church especially can be praised for the 
outreach of establishing missions, schools, and parishes in all nations. This is certainly in 
keeping with the ministry of Jesus and His apostles in the first century. While this is still 
happening today in various quarters of Christianity, it is not the norm. The early twentieth 
century has seen the advent of mass-marketing, targeted advertising, bulk mailing, etc. 
These, combined with the modern advances in information technology, have given the 
overzealous evangelist the ability to intrude into people‟s lives, even at times to exploit 
personal situations. Moreover, the world has grown smaller to the extent that the gospel 
has already been proclaimed to the vast majority of it. The focus should now be on that 
small minority who have not heard it, rather than the masses that have. Evangelism is 
now an industry rather than a calling, employing various means such as rock concerts, 
movies, dramas, and studio recordings. This industry is not „going into all the world,‟ it is 
merely entertaining with the same message to those who want to hear it again, and 
intruding upon those who do not. The end result of all of this has been a false glory, and 
in some cases vast wealth, for the evangelist, and little for anybody else. There is always 
the ubiquitous altar-call, which generally accomplishes nothing. Those who respond 
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positively are not saved; rather they are ‟saved‟ again and again.  
We note that the emphasis of the Great Commission is not on converting, but on 
teaching. The reasonable interpretation here is that if one is taught, he will be naturally 
inclined to lay claim to an inheritance that is already his. Plato holds in the Meno (Plato, 
Meno, 2002, 86 B), and Augustine affirms in On the Teacher (Augustine, Teacher, 1938, 
Ch. 11, 46), that teaching is not the acquisition of new knowledge, it is simply awakening 
one to knowledge that he already holds within his soul. We must agree with Plato and 
Augustine here, for Eriugena maintains that the knowledge of Christ is already present in 
the soul. Thus, all evangelistic efforts should be geared toward this objective. Moreover, 
we note that the Great Commission does not say that anyone will be damned. Indeed, it 
points to the higher truth that no one will be, otherwise Christ would be issuing a 
command that could not be fulfilled. The church should not be trying to save as many as 
it can, but rather it should be trying to teach people that everyone is already saved. It 
should be noted that Eriugena‟s fifth mode of knowing and unknowing is a matter of 
understanding, not a declaration of non-existence. Things are said not to be if Christ has 
yet to enlighten them (Eriugena, Bk. I, 445 C). Thus, the focus of evangelism should be 
to enlighten them. The incarnation of Christ is the summation of all truth. Hence, anyone 
who knows any truth in any manner already knows this. The church makes its own 
mission more difficult by presupposing that the unsaved do not already know it. 
The most problematic aspect of evangelism as it has evolved over the last century 
is that it stresses the temporal over the eternal. No matter how much eloquence attends 
the presentation, the question, “will you take Jesus Christ as your Lord and Savior” turns 
into “will you take Him as your Lord and Savior now. Time is short, for no one knows 
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when the world will end. Tomorrow may be too late. You had better be ready, so you 
must accept Him now.” All of this misses the intent of the Great Commission. It takes 
what is eternal (justification, predestination, and fellowship) and seeks to make those 
things temporal. The importance of true confession is done away with, only to be 
replaced by urgency. We must stress importance over urgency, for the former is long-
lived and valuable, while the latter is momentary and costly. Eriugena would contend that 
there is an eternity of time available for this commitment. Not that we should take that 
time if we do not need it, for every moment in darkness is one in which we can be 
understood not to be. However, we do not “begin to live” until the “grace of the only-
begotten Son of God” brings us to it (Eriugena, Bk. I, 445 C). In other words, one should 
allow this eternal call to be born in him as quickly as possible, but not too quickly. 
Modern evangelism is too quick. The apostle Paul was always careful not to offend 
others. “For though I be free from all men, yet have I made myself servant to all…” (I 
Corinthians 9:19, KJV). Evangelism in its standard modern form is offensive, for it seeks 
to make all men servants to the temporal. 
There is another troubling aspect of modern evangelism, in that it seeks first to get 
men to turn away from evil rather than turning toward God. The focus is always on 
avoiding damnation first, and turning to God second. In truth, the former cannot be done, 
only the latter. Evil has no substance, thus it cannot be turned away from. We can only 
turn toward God or away from Him. This is a technical parsing of words, perhaps, but it 
is still a significant point. We do not turn darkness on or off when we enter a room; we 
turn light on or off. We often say that temptation should be turned away from. A more 




In order to highlight the temporal nature of modern evangelism, we posit the 
following counter factual problem. Suppose that we proceed according to this system, 
and with all the tools of modern technology, combined with polished rhetoric, we are 
completely successful. In other words, we are able to make every person on this earth a 
Christian, and there is no one left to convert. However, nothing has been achieved, for if 
each soul in the world has freely chosen to accept Christ and be saved, then each one can 
now reject Him and be damned. Alas, we must begin again, because all could fall from 
grace. This might seem like an ideal situation for an evangelist; however, the philosopher 
will immediately recognize that evangelism has now become an end in itself. The cycle 
would repeat endlessly, and God is no longer its final rest. Therefore, we maintain that 















To conclude our study, we refer back to the opening lines of this text. Our 
intention was to investigate an historical work in the critical and discerning manner of a 
contemporary philosopher to determine whether a scholar working nearly twelve 
centuries ago could impart any wisdom to modern times. Our study has been aided, and 
in some cases hindered, by the thoroughly Christian perspective of Eriugena. We have 
accepted certain presuppositions and founded our work upon them. Some of those 
presuppositions can only be allowed by those of the Christian faith, but our hope is that 
the study will be of interest to everyone, for the ultimate question of salvation concerns 
everyone. For Eriugena, faith has an exceedingly non-theological definition which is 
based solely in wisdom. It is that “…  a certain principle from which knowledge of the 
Creator begins to emerge in the rational nature” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 516 C). This seems to 
be a definition which most men would be willing to accept. Hopefully, we have been 
able to stay on the philosophical side of the very fine line which separates philosophy 
and theology, excepting this last chapter, which is intended to be an exploration of the 
implications of this topic for those of the Christian faith. 
We hinted at the beginning of this dissertation that Eriugena may not have gone 
far enough. By this we mean that his writing sometimes gives the impression that he 
might hold that one can be completely restored to his original, pristine condition as a 
creature of God, and yet remain unhappy. As was discussed in Chapter Four, Eriugena 
seems to say this. We consider his comments here, roughly one hundred paragraphs out 
of four thousand four hundred, to be an anomaly within the Periphyseon, which simply 
does violence to the overarching theme of apokatastasis. 
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Willemien Otten has written a book entitled The Anthropology of Johannes 
Scottus Eriugena, in which she forwards the claim that the Periphyseon is primarily a 
work which tries to understand that part of the vast universe of nature which is uniquely 
man. Eriugena studies all nature, with man as its central player. True to the title, Otten 
interprets the word anthropology to mean Eriugena‟s “… view[s] of man in the context of 
how natura unfolds” (Otten, 199, 125). This is what seems to distinguish Eriugena from 
his patristic predecessors. Man holds the central, leading role in the universe; however, 
his role is not so much one of dominance but one of responsibility. Man is charged with 
leading nature back to God (Otten, 1991, 5). This central them is one which is revealed 
gradually throughout the Periphyseon. We must agree with Otten here, for as we reflect 
on the Periphyseon from beginning to end, we are forced to concede this subtle but 
always emerging character of man which integrates all nature. This is even more reason 
to conclude that man‟s own end is the key to any broad conception of reality. It seems to 
us that man must be unified with God before he can lead the rest of nature into 
unification with God. Moreover, man must be happy, for that was his original condition. 
Our argument is that man is always unified with God, even if he does not realize it. 
Otten holds that Eriugena must explain how sin is abolished, for it “… impinges 
on the integrity of human nature…” (Otten, 1991, 123), and thus threatens all nature. Sin 
essentially gives direction to the circular dialectic of procession and return by prompting 
man to move upward toward God, always striving and ultimately attaining the fourth 
division of nature, that which neither is created nor creates. We have suggested that sin is 
easily overcome by the return, simply on account of the non-essence of sin itself. Sin is 
not merely wrong-doing, nor even the will toward wrong-doing; it abides primordially in 
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man‟s fractured relationship with God. Moreover, we have continually advanced the 
theme that the human family is our surest earthly guarantee that sin is easily overcome. 
The father of the Prodigal Son did not care that his son had taken his inheritance, lost it, 
and lived an evil life. He only cared that his son was not with him. The son‟s return 
overwhelmed all sin. We cannot see how the son could return to his father yet remain 
unhappy. 
Otten writes that “… Eriugena‟s concern was never with a schematic layout of the 
metaphysical universe, but always with the overall development of natura towards its 
final unity with God” (Otten, 1991, 128). We confess that an ulterior aim of our study, 
perhaps thinly veiled, is to demonstrate that rational man cannot, in the end, deny God, 
who vests him with rationality. A study of the Periphyseon seems to be an appropriate 
setting for this demonstration. Recall that the Fifth Mode of being or non-being, unique to 
human nature, concerns those who are not “… reborn in Christ” (Eriugena, Bk. I, 445 D). 
Those who accept the fact that they are an image are said to be; those who do not are said 
not to be. In the Eschaton, man cannot simply fail to be. 
We conclude with a quotation from Book Five of the Periphyseon which best 
summarizes our entire study. “He sacrificed and surrendered for the purification and the 
redemption of the whole human race without any exception. For as there was nothing of 
that nature, save sin, which He did not receive, so there is nothing of that nature which 
He shall not redeem, and by redeeming shall not save and sanctify. For He is the 
Redemption and Salvation, the Purification and Illumination and Perfection, of the whole 
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